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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines how the cost of equity associates with reporting incentives in 
mandatory IFRS adoption for [18] European Union (EU) countries. First, with more 
data available for the post-adoption period, prior studies are extended by measuring if 
the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005 reduces the cost of equity. Second, using a 
comprehensive set of reporting incentives by both firm-specific core business factors 
(CBF) and internal corporate governance (ICG), and country-specific institutional 
environment factors (IEF), this study further investigates if both individual and 
interactive effects of reporting incentives in mandatory IFRS adoption are associated 
with cost of equity effects. Using a sample of 7,294 firm-year observations in the EU 
between 2000 and 2009, the findings show that, on average, mandatory adopters have a 
significantly lower cost of equity of 1.2% (significant at the 1% level using a two-tailed 
test). Also, the results provide evidence that mandatory IFRS adoption interacts with 
both firm-specific CBF and ICG and associates with significant differential effects in 
the cost of equity. In addition, when sampling firms are partitioned into different 
comprehensive legal, economic, social and cultural characteristics, mandatory adopting 
firms interact with CBF and/or ICG based on their particular IEF settings.  Overall, 
these findings support the pro-incentive view that significant capital market benefits to 
shareholders cannot be derived by only adopting a single set of high quality accounting 
standards, unless firms have a high level of reporting incentives.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Globalization creates great opportunities for businesses to expand their international 
access
1
. At the same time, globalization also fosters the creation of a single global 
capital market which integrates and supports multi-national firms. One of the challenges 
is to ensure financial reports of global businesses are comparable and transparent so that 
users can be well-informed to make better investment decisions such as buying foreign 
equities. However, the existence of many different local accounting standards in 
countries makes comparison and analysis very difficult. Therefore, the solution is a set 
of one-for-all high quality accounting standards in all jurisdictions. International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are generally regarded as enhancing the 
comparability of earnings and require additional disclosures (Nobes, 2001).  
 
1.1 IFRS: Brief History and Evolution of Development 
In 1973, representatives of the professional accounting bodies from major developed 
economic countries
2
 agreed to establish the International Accounting Standards 
Committee (IASC), with the aim of developing a set of globalized accounting standards 
as the common accounting principles in different countries (Kim and Shi, 2007). Thus, 
under the commitment and great effort of IASC, the endeavor of working on a set of 
global accounting standards was advanced. As a result, a set of International Accounting 
Standards (IAS) was developed and gradually it received support and recognition 
internationally. An important milestone was achieved in 2000 when the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) endorsed and recommended the IAS 
to securities regulators around the world (IOSCO 2000). Later, in 2001 the IASC 
became the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) which was given more 
resources to formalize IAS into International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The 
IASB was mandated to coordinate the harmonization process of IFRS with national 
accounting standard setting bodies around the world in order to develop a single set of 
high quality standards that are universally accepted so as to provide better information 
to investors and other users (Barth 2006).  
 
                                                 
1
 According to hubpages.com, globalization is defined as the system of integration among countries of the 
world in order to develop the global economy, involving technological, economic, political and cultural 
exchange made possible largely by advances in communication, transportation, and infrastructure.  
2
 The participating countries for establishing the IASC are Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, 
Mexico, Netherlands, the UK/Ireland and the U.S.A. 
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Since then, the convergence effort of IFRS with other local accounting standards has 
been getting more and more global acceptances. As a result, many countries have 
gradually mandated the adoption of IFRS to replace their local Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP)
3
. One of the greatest benefits for many countries is to 
enhance international comparability of financial results and position, and attract foreign 
capital investments in order to stimulate local economy.  
 
To become internationally recognized, the IFRS have been designed as principle-based 
standards, and steps have been taken to remove other allowable accounting alternatives 
and to require accounting measurements that better reflect a firm’s economic position 
and performance (IASC, 1989). 
 
1.2 Motivations  
Early research studies on the impact of adopting IFRS mainly analyze the average 
effects of IFRS adoptions with outcome variables such as earnings quality, liquidity and 
cost of capital (e.g. Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Barth et al., 2005; Cuijpers and Buijink, 
205; Daske, 2006). Most of these studies characterize the observed effects being 
attributable to IFRS adoption per se, neglecting the underlying factors driving the 
adoption effect. Due to the fact that firms’ reporting incentives are different and the 
strength of legal enforcement and investor protections varies substantially across 
countries, we can expect differences in the adoption effect from these factors. When 
some countries, such as Germany and Belgium, allowed firms to voluntarily adopt 
IFRS
4
, early studies focused on testing whether there are capital market benefits, such 
as higher shares turnover, from voluntary adoption of IFRS. When the adoption of IFRS 
in many countries became mandatory (such as for the European Union, effective 
January 1
st
, 2005), studies have focused on the capital market consequences of such 
mandatory IFRS adoption, such as the change in the cost of equity.  Due to the limited 
data available, however, most empirical studies focus on the initial stock market 
reaction to news of the mandatory adoption of IFRS (Soderstrom and Sun 2007). 
However, there is little empirical evidence to date giving conclusive results to support 
                                                 
3
 According to Investopedia.com, GAAP is defined as the common set of accounting principles prepared 
by national authoritative accounting bodies, standards and procedures that companies use to record 
accounting information and compile their financial statements.  
4
 While the EU has regulations to adopt IFRS from January 1
st
, 2005,  five EU  members (Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, Finland and Luxembourg) allowed firms to switch to IFRS preparing for consolidated 
financial statements much earlier (than 2005) on a voluntary basis (Prather-Kinsey, et al. 2008). 
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any significant cost of equity effects. Overall, the academic debate is still open for the 
two different schools of thoughts as to whether there are cost of equity effects from 
adopting IFRS alone or whether these effects are due in part or in whole to reporting 
incentives. Thus, with more data available and better proxies for reporting incentives, 
the main purposes of this study is to (1) extend prior studies by testing if the cost of 
equity is reduced by mandatory IFRS adoption beyond the transitional period; and (2) 
shed some lights on the existing literature by examining if significant association 
between mandatory adoption of IFRS and cross-section effects in the cost of equity are 
actually shaped by differences in reporting incentives.    
 
Proponents of common accounting standards (pro-standards view) argue that high 
quality accounting information, such as IFRS, will result in significant capital market 
benefits because high quality accounting disclosures will lead to a lower cost of equity 
(Barth et al. 2008). For instance, a recent study by Li (2010) provides evidence that, on 
average, mandatory IFRS-adopting firms have a lower cost of equity when (i) 
comparing pre- and post-mandatory periods; and (ii) comparing them with voluntary 
IFRS-adopting firms.  
  
Another school of thought for reporting incentives (pro-incentives view) contends that 
accounting standards alone are not sufficient to ensure capital market benefits. Since 
IFRS is principle-based, there is discretion available to managers to exercise their 
judgement on how to report financial results. Therefore, reporting incentives rather than 
the accounting standards, will determine if financial reports by IFRS are of high quality 
(i.e. provide more and better disclosures and transparency). For instance, Daske et al. 
(2007) focus their IFRS tests on two stages. They do not find any changes in the cost of 
equity for mandatory IFRS adoption but, for firms with stronger reporting incentives, 
they document that when such motivated firms reduce asymmetric information in 
adopting IFRS standards in their financial reports, investors respond with a lower cost 
of equity compared to firms with weaker reporting incentives. Therefore, when 
incentives or commitment to financial reporting vary, financial reporting quality may be 
different. It may also result in different effects (i.e. heterogeneity) on capital market 
consequences (e.g. a different effect on the cost of equity).  
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However, these tests are mainly based on the data available in the transitional period of 
mandatory IFRS adoption, possibly indicating that these empirical results may be a 
short-term effect only. Also, when reporting incentives are not directly observable, prior 
studies do not comprehensively control for all relevant firm-level and institutional-level 
factors that may directly and indirectly influence reporting incentives. In addition, most 
IFRS literature argues that voluntary IFRS adopting firms may have stronger reporting 
incentives to switch to IFRS because of the expected differential capital market benefits 
(such as a lower cost of equity) compared to non-adopters. In contrast, when all EU 
firms had to adopt IFRS mandatorily at the same time (January 1, 2005), individual 
firms should gain no comparative advantage (Bova, 2009). Therefore, it is still an open 
question as to whether mandatory adopters have a lower cost of equity than voluntary 
adopting firms beyond the transition period. In addition, when Europe mandated to 
adopt IFRS, it prompted an interesting question on how such diverse firm- and country-
specific characteristics across the EU enhance reporting incentives and how these may 
associate with different cost of equity effects. Empirical studies on the relationship 
between mandatory adoption and reporting incentives are still rare.  Hence the present 
research aims to fill a gap in the existing literature in this area. 
 
1.3 Research Objectives  
Some prior studies support the pro-standard arguments that mandatory IFRS adoption 
may be expected to reduce the average cost of equity due to its requirements for greater 
disclosure than most local accounting standards (Ashbaugh and Pincus, 2001).  
However, these findings may not necessarily generalize to mandatory IFRS adoption. 
The pro-incentive view therefore supports the idea that when firms are mandated to 
adopt IFRS, those underlying differences in firm-specific factors such as size, 
profitability and corporate governance, and institutional factors such as legal 
enforcements may significantly influence reporting incentives. In turn, it may result in 
non-uniform cost of equity effects. Thus, this study has twofold objectives. First, to 
revisit, extend, modify and compare with prior studies by examining whether there is an 
association between the cost of equity and mandatory IFRS adoption since 2005 in EU 
countries beyond the transition period. Second, by developing the Influence, Process, 
Output and Outcome (IPOO) accounting harmonization model as proposed by Rahman 
et al. (2002) as a means of identifying if reporting incentives affect the cost of equity 
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effect
5
. The present study argues that such association is mainly attributable to 
differences in the reporting incentives in a mandatory setting and not simply by the 
introduction of new accounting standards alone. Using a larger and more representative 
dataset, and better proxies for reporting incentives and the ex-ante cost of equity, the 
current research tests the importance of reporting incentives in driving any variation of 
significant capital market effects in mandatory IFRS adoption. 
 
To do so, there are two types of tests. First, this study tests for any overall effects of 
mandatory IFRS adoption on the cost of equity, (i) in comparison with voluntary IFRS 
adoption; and (ii) between the pre- and post-mandatory adoption periods. Next, it 
examines whether and how mandatory adoption is affected by proxies of reporting 
incentives. In particular, this study assesses if any changes in capital market effects 
(proxied by cost of equity) are associated with individual firm factors and interactions 
between firm-specific factors. In this study, reporting incentives are proxied as firms’ 
Core Business Factors (CBF) and Internal Corporate Governance (ICG), and macro, 
namely Institutional Environment Effect (IEF).  
 
In addition, this study uses data longer time frame for the post-adoption period ( 2000 to 
2009), better metrics to measure the cost of equity (using Price-Earnings Growth (PEG) 
model), more comprehensive proxies for reporting incentives, and a larger cross-country 
based sample (18 countries in the EU) than prior research in this area. Using multiple 
regression models, the empirical results are designed to show whether overall 
mandatory IFRS adoption is related to significant capital market benefits; and if it is, 
whether such benefits are conditioned by reporting incentives (influenced by both firm 
and institutional environments) in the IPOO model. 
 
1.4 Results 
Controlling for the potential multicollinearity and endogeneity issues in modeling, 
empirical results from the multiple regression tests in general confirm that there is a 
statistically significant reduction in the cost of equity (COE) for mandatory adopters for 
the whole sampling period (2000 to 2009). However, contrary to some other studies 
(like Li, 2010), mandatory firms do not experience a greater decrease in cost of equity 
                                                 
5
 IPOO accounting harmonization model will be explained in details in the Literature Review section in 
Chapter 2. Basically it is developed by Rahman et al. (2002) illustrating that conceptually accounting 
harmonization can be achieved by the four-inter-related components. 
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in the post-adoption period. This suggests that the significant reduction in the COE 
evident in prior studies is mainly attributed to the transition effect. Also, the evidence 
shows that high CBF firms experience an incremental lower cost of equity. It implies 
that there is a significant association between mandatory firms with high CBF such as 
high ROE, high TobinQ and high market value of equity, and a greater reduction in the 
cost of equity. 
 
Next, this study examines if another firm-specific influence on reporting incentive – 
Internal Corporate Governance (ICG) — plays a role in relation to the reduction in the 
cost of equity during mandatory IFRS adoption. Findings reveal that the Deminor 
corporate governance index
6
 shows a small but significant reduction effect on the cost 
of equity. It suggests that, from the equity investors’ viewpoint, Board of Directors’ 
internal governance mechanisms and efforts to monitor and regulate managers in 
exercising their discretion in IFRS financial reporting are relevant and important in 
mandatory adoption of IFRS. 
 
When high Core Business Factors (CBF) interacts with ICG in the model, it is 
documented that for mandatory adopters there is a complementary effect of further 
lowering the cost of equity. These empirical results support the pro-incentive view that a 
joint effort between firms’ high CBF and ICG can enhance reporting incentives in 
mandatory IFRS adoption. As a result, high quality financial reports are produced that 
possibly lead to a lower cost of equity.  
 
In addition, this study also examines if the macro-level institutional environment factors 
(IEF) in mandatory IFRS adoption are associated with a lower cost of equity. After 
partitioning sampling firms in the EU into four different general legal, economic, social 
and cultural origins; namely British Origin (BO), French Origin (FO), German Origin  
(GO) and Scandinavian Origin  (SO), these are tested to determine whether dissimilar 
institutional settings are associated with differential effects on the cost of equity in 
mandatory IFRS adoption. As expected, only BO and FO are significantly related to a 
lower cost of equity. GO responds insignificantly and SO shows a positive effect on the 
cost of equity. This suggests that in mandatory IFRS adoption, the highly diverse 
                                                 
6
 Deminor is a leading European company advising clients on corporate governance practices, capital 
market transaction and business valuations (www.deminor.com/en). The company measures annual 
comprehensive corporate governance index based on a complete list of criteria. Details of such index will 
be presented in Ch.3 and 4. 
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institutional characteristics in the EU influence reporting incentives differently and that 
this leads to differences on the effect on the cost of equity. These findings are further 
supported by the results from testing the cost of equity effect from mandatory firms’ 
interaction between strong CBF and the four legal origins. Due to the underlying 
differences in cultural, economic and legal background, only GO and FO mandatory 
firms’ strong CBF are related to the lower cost of equity. Furthermore, following prior 
studies to proxy IEF with institutions’ bureaucratic and administrative formalities, this 
study tests such institutional proxies have any effects on the cost of equity in mandatory 
IFRS adoption. The results support the proposition that those countries in mandatory 
IFRS adoption build up infrastructures to support capital market development and 
consequently associated with lowering cost of equity effect.  
 
Finally, interdependence between all three proxies of reporting incentives (i.e. CBF, 
ICG and IEF) in the IPOO model in mandatory IFRS adoption is modeled for testing 
how mandatory adopters’ strong CBF and ICG interact with different legal origins that 
may associate with any reducing cost of equity effect. The findings support the 
hypothesis that cost of equity effects differ among legal origins. Particularly, BO 
mandatory firms with more established capital market environments interact 
significantly with ICG to associate with a lower cost of equity. For GO and FO 
mandatory firms, on the other hand, high level of reporting incentives are empowered 
by strong CBF to relate with a lower cost of equity. SO mandatory firms, however, do 
not link to any additional reduction in the cost of equity. Probably this is due to their 
lack of significant firm- and country-specific factors to promote reporting incentives in 
mandatory IFRS adoption during the sampling period. 
   
Besides using overall legal origins as the proxy for IEF, this study follows the literature 
and examines whether specific IEF factors such as investor protections and stock market 
disclosure requirements may also influence reporting incentives and be associated with 
lower cost of equity for mandatory adopters. The results indicate that among a few 
specific legal mechanisms, only stock exchange disclosure has a significant effect on a 
lower cost of equity for mandatory adopters. This is consistent with the literature that 
mechanisms to promote and enforce greater and better disclosures along with IFRS may 
lead to lower cost of equity. Further empirical tests also show that among the four legal 
origins, only British-origin (BO) mandatory firms interact with stock exchange 
disclosure requirements and are associated with a significant lower cost of equity effect. 
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This result accords with the literature that in mandatory IFRS adoption, countries 
domiciled in institutional environments that expect and demand high level of 
disclosures in reporting requirements are benefitted by additional lower cost of equity. 
 
1.5 Contributions 
By revisiting and validating prior studies, the current study extends the tests for the 
post-mandatory adoption period beyond the transition period and examines if the COE 
is lowered by mandatory IFRS adoption rather than simply being a transitional effect. 
Moreover, the present study examines the important role of reporting incentives in 
adopting new accounting standards that associate with reduced COE. By using 
comprehensive proxies of reporting incentives, including firm-specific strong core 
business factors and board of directors’ internal corporate governance, and country-
level diverse institutional environment factors, results of various empirical tests suggest 
that the reduced COE effect in the overall mandatory IFRS adoption may be mainly 
attributable to those adopters with strong reporting incentives.  
 
On average, both individual and interactive effects of CBF and ICG in adopting IFRS 
show significant effect on lowering the cost of equity. The empirical results support the 
incentives-view that if firms have strong reporting incentives in mandatory IFRS 
adoption, firms will commit and devote in full compliance. As a result, information 
asymmetry between investors and managers should be improved; and the required cost 
of equity may be lowered. In addition, empirical results prove that internal corporate 
governance implemented by firms’ board of directors is important to relate to the lower 
COE because a high level of governance may lead to high level of reporting incentives 
for managers to adopt IFRS with full compliance.   
 
Furthermore, this study shows that differences in country-specific institutional factors 
such as cultural and business practices in mandatory IFRS adoption exercise an 
influence on managers’ reporting incentives. Test findings exhibit that dissimilar IEF 
factors shape reporting incentives and hence associate with differences in firms’ COE.  
 
The empirical results shed some light on the existing literature by reinforcing the 
important roles of reporting incentives in mandatory IFRS adoption (e.g. Daske et al., 
2007, Bova 2009, Bova and Pereira, 2009). In particular, firm-specific CBF and ICG, 
and country-specific IEF systematically influence reporting incentives in adopting IFRS 
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that lead to differential effects in the cost of equity. Overall, the findings add to and 
support the incentive-view on prior studies which mainly focus on accounting 
standards-effect (e.g. Barth et al. 2008, Hail and Leuz, 2007, Prather-Kinsey et al., 
2008). The present results clearly show that prior studies that found that voluntary and 
mandatory adoption of IFRS alone create significant reduction in the cost of equity are 
limited in that their results are only valid for the short-term (transitional) stage effect 
and are subject to non-comprehensive measurement metrics and proxies.   
 
In addition, this study provides empirical results to support that interaction effects 
between CBF and ICG in different IEF associate with significant lower cost of equity. It 
highlights an important fact that substantial capital market benefits from adoption of 
IFRS needs strong reporting incentives.  
 
A recent paper by Lee et al, (2010) also examines the cost of equity in Europe when it is 
mandated with IFRS. Initially, Lee et al. (2010) find a 0.72 percent reduction in the cost 
of equity using the same measurement metric as this study (i.e. PEG model). The 
researchers also partition and estimate a composite score for EU countries with high and 
low reporting incentives based upon their institutional characteristics indicators, 
namely, outside rights, the importance of equity market, ownership concentration, 
disclosure quality, and earnings management. Empirical results indicate that significant 
lower cost of equity is only possible for firms domiciled in high-incentive countries. 
Their results strongly confirm the argument presented here that desirable benefits from 
the capital market mainly are attributable to the pro-incentive view, not the accounting 
standards alone.  However, a weakness in the Lee et al study is that it uses the sample 
period from 1995 to 2006 in the Europe Union, which is the same as the study by Li 
(2010). Both studies have the same issue of only measuring the cost of equity effect 
during the transitional period, rather than for an extended period as per this current 
study (which uses data from 2000 to 2009). Also, even though the approach used by Lee 
et al. (2010) to proxy reporting incentives by specific institutional characteristics is 
similar to this study’s additional analysis, it ignores other important firm-specific factors 
to influence reporting incentives in the IPOO model such as business characteristics and 
internal corporate governance.  
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Similar to another prior study by Daske et al. (2008) that capital market benefits from 
mandatory IFRS adoption come from institutional environments which provide 
incentive for transparency, the results of Lee et al. (2010) conclude that countries with 
high (low) reporting incentives and enforcement yield significantly lower (higher) cost 
of equity. However, since firm-specific factors are not systematically examined, as one 
may argue that it is possible that there are high firm-specific incentives in IFRS 
adoption for low institution countries that still relate to capital market benefits (Bova, 
2009). Hence, contrary to the results by Lee et al. (2010), the present study shows that 
mandatory IFRS firms with high firm-specific factors (CBF) domiciled in low level of 
country-specific incentive countries, but associated with the lower cost of equity, such 
as German origin (GO), consequently can have a positive effect on the cost of equity.  
 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, the literature on IFRS 
adoption and its benefits is discussed, and then the research gap is identified. In Chapter 
3, the literature synthesis from Chapter 2 will be explained and elaborated in order to 
develop the basic theory and theoretical framework. Then it is followed by Chapter 4 on 
the research questions, aims, objectives and hypotheses. Chapter 5 will follow the 
rationales of Chapter 4 to discuss sample design and data collection. In Chapter 6, the 
research methodologies and models are described in detail. From Chapter 7 to 10, 
results of the various univariate and multivariate regression tests, and additional 
analyses, are presented, analyzed and discussed. Finally, Chapter 11 provides some 
conclusion and provides suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
The academic accounting community generally recognizes that even though IFRS may 
be of higher quality than local accounting standards (Ball et al. 2000; Ball et al. 2003; 
Ball 2006, Daske et al. 2007; Barth et al. 2008; Horton et al. 2008; Lopes and Walker 
2008), the capital market benefits that result from the harmonization of accounting 
practices may still vary due to differences in certain firm-specific and institutional 
characteristics. In the following section, a thorough review will be presented of the 
literature on accounting harmonization, the voluntary adoption of IFRS and then the 
mandatory IFRS adoption. At the end, the research gap in the literature is identified.  
 
2.1 Research on International Accounting Harmonization 
 As accounting standards and practices are harmonized globally, researchers are refining 
their definitions of acceptable outcomes. Early studies like Rahman et al. (2002) 
introduce the concept of accounting harmonization as an inter-related and inter-
dependent process. It can be characterized by four sequential and essential components, 
namely, influences, process, output and outcome (IPOO). Figure 2.1 shows the model. 
“Influences” refer to both regulatory influences (i.e., Statutory, Stock Exchange and 
Accounting Standards) and other influences such as firm- and country-specific 
characteristics, and international factors. “Process” means the actual accounting practice 
harmonization. “Output” includes comparable accounting numbers arising from 
accounting harmony; and finally “Outcome” equals better informed capital market 
decisions.  
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Figure 2.1 
The Four Stages of Accounting Harmonization 
Rahman, Perera and Ganesh (2002) introduce the concept that accounting harmonization is a process 
characterized by four sequential and essential components, namely, influences, process, output and 
outcome (IPOO).  
Influences are mainly consisted of regulatory and others. Regulatory influences come from statutory, 
stock exchange and accounting standards that foster the process of harmonization of accounting 
regulations. Other influences include firm characteristics, country characteristics, and international factors 
(namely, trade and investment agreements, international regulatory institutions and colonial influences). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Influences (Regulatory and Other Influences)   
Process in which managers harmonizes accounting 
practice from the harmonization of accounting 
regulations  
Output: comparable financial reports arising from 
harmony of accounting regulations and accounting 
practice 
Outcomes: Better informed capital market decisions  
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To test this, Rahman et al. use both the Jaccard coefficient and the chi-square 
distribution and show that harmonization of regulations improves accounting practices. 
Where there are significant differences such as size or auditing practices between two 
countries, regulations may not be enough to achieve such harmonization. In addition, 
Rahman et al. (2002) also argue that institutional differences between countries such as 
international trade and investment agreements, regulatory bodies and colonial influences 
affect accounting practice harmony. While the Rahmen et al. study (2002) illustrates 
that to achieve comparable accounting numbers from the harmonization of accounting 
practice (i.e. output) it depends upon the harmonization of accounting regulations and 
other influences. A failing of the study is that it neither systematically examines other 
institutional factors such as the legal and investor protection mechanisms nor measures 
any specific capital market results (such as cost of equity or accounting quality).    
 
The first wave of the literature in international accounting studies focus on measuring 
the effects from institutional characteristics such as cultural and legal systems. Prior 
studies (Gray, 1980; Hofstede, 1980; Nobes, 1992; Perera, 1989; Radebaugh & Gray, 
1995) use cluster analysis to examine how culture interacts with accounting practices 
and regulations. Other studies work on different aspects of regulation harmonization, 
especially the association between characteristics of listed firms and the level of 
disclosure requirements by a stock exchange (Adhikari & Tondkar, 1992). Another 
stream of empirical studies focus on macro-environmental factors as influences to test 
the link between cultural values and the effects on accounting practice and disclosure 
(Gray, 1980; Jaggi, 1975; Perera, 1989; Doupnik & Salter, 1995; Zarzeski, 1996). In 
particular, Hofstede (1980) develops a cultural model to demonstrate that cultural 
characteristics among countries correlate negatively in terms of uncertainty avoidance 
and power distance, and positively with individualism and masculinity. Besides cultural 
values, researchers want to test whether any business-related variables have effects on 
financial disclosures. For example, Zareski (1996) finds evidence that, instead of 
cultural values, firms that have an international presence and market forces influence 
disclosure practices. 
 
In addition to market forces, Gray (1988) develops a model to argue that institutional 
factors, such as legal systems, are more important than comprehensive accounting 
systems (namely accounting standards, practices and financial disclosures). Following 
this line of thinking, La Porta et al. (1998) pioneer the study of the distinct legal roles 
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from common and code law-based countries on firms’ accounting practices and 
disclosures. Similarly, numerous empirical studies such as Adhikari and Tondkar, 
(1992); Ball, R., (1998); Ball, R., et al. (1998); Salter, 1998; Zarzeski, (1996) posit that 
firms in common law and code law jurisdictions display significant differences and 
characteristics of corporate ownership (widely dispersed vs. concentrated ownership), 
corporate capital structure (equity-based vs. debt-based) and capital market 
developments (equity markets or private lending sources). As a result, such variations 
will lead to different information needs from investors and debt-holders. Subsequently, 
it will exercise discernible effects on financial accounting and disclosure practices. For 
instance, firms in common law countries will exercise more public disclosure due to the 
demand by widely-dispersed equity owners, and are perceived to be more effective in 
resolving information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. However, code-
law based firms rely more on private debt financing, and have more concentrated equity 
ownership, therefore private communication between agents and principals/debt-holders 
is more common. This conjecture is further supported by Jaggi and Low (2000) who 
find that, due to the different legal structures, financial reporting and disclosure 
practices will not be the same. As a result, common law countries are associated with 
higher financial disclosure than firms from code law countries. In addition, Jaggi and 
Low (2000) argue that globalization and internalization of businesses will lessen the 
importance of cultural values on financial reporting and disclosure.      
 
Researchers, such as Emenyonu and Gray, 1992; Evans & Taylor, 1982; Nair and 
Frank, 1981; Walton, 1992, have also investigated the effects of accounting regulations 
on accounting practice harmony at global and regional levels. Earlier studies (Choi, 
1983; Gray, 1980; Hellman, 1993) demonstrate how the relationship between 
accounting practice harmonization and accounting numbers, such as profit, and key 
financial ratios shape accounting practice differences. Later, as more countries adopt 
IFRS voluntarily, international accounting research shifts to the association between 
accounting regulation harmonization via IFRS and capital market consequences, such as 
the relationship between share prices and different accounting standards (Alford and 
Jones, 1993; Amir et al. 1993; Barth & Clinch, 1996; Harris et al.1994). 
 
 
Some countries, such as Germany, have allowed firms to adopt IFRS voluntarily, before 
it became mandatory on January 1, 2005. Where IFRS is not mandatory, there are some 
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firms and managers who are willing to adopt it.  In the light of this, researchers have 
examined if such firms may have particular expectations and commitments.  
 
In summary, the early literature on international accounting research is valuable in 
understanding empirically the relationship between accounting regulation 
harmonization, its process and output. However, the literature ignores the importance of 
ultimate outcomes (i.e., capital market consequences) of accounting regulations such as 
IFRS. In addition, the comprehensive relationships among the variables of the IPOO 
concept (Rahman et al. 2002) have not been addressed. 
 
2.2 Voluntary adoption of IFRS 
The evidence shows that voluntary adoption of IFRS by various countries accelerated in 
the 1990s. More and more firms seeking capital from international sources have adopted 
IFRS, especially stock exchanges in Europe
7
 (Soderstrom & Sun, 2007). Furthermore 
some national accounting regulators—such as Germany’s—allowed firms to adopt 
IFRS before the mandatory implementation date. This raises two empirical questions: 
 
(1) Does IFRS have higher quality accounting standards than the local GAAP? 
According to the early study by Rahman et al. (2002), accounting standard, such as 
IFRS, is one of the influences for firms preparing financial statements. If IFRS produces 
a higher quality than the local GAAP, and some firms voluntarily adopt IFRS for users, 
this indicates a better influence and process, hence a better output. If early IFRS 
adoption produces higher quality accounting information, does that mean that IFRS 
alone is sufficient?  However, voluntary IFRS adopters may be different to other firms 
which have not adopted IFRS. Thus, studies examine the types of firms, the factors that 
drive their decision, and the particular characteristics provide the motivation for 
voluntary adoption.     
 
 
 
(2) The conceptual model of IPOO (Rahman et al. 2002) contends that a higher quality 
of accounting output should result in better outcomes for those firms who have 
voluntarily adopted IFRS. Thus, whether voluntary IFRS adoption is associated with 
                                                 
7
 For example, Germany’s New Market was launched in 1997 to aid small hi-tech companies in raising 
equity capital is required to choose either U.S. GAAP or IAS, the predecessor to IFRS. 
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subsequent economic consequences in the capital markets is another focus for empirical 
studies.  
 
In the following sections, the literature addressing these two questions will be discussed. 
 
2.2.1 Research on perceived higher quality of voluntary IFRS versus local GAAP  
Research studies (Barth et al., 2008) on voluntary IFRS adoption propose that IFRS 
possesses a higher quality of accounting standards than domestic GAAP, therefore, 
providing benefits to adopting companies. However, overall the evidence shows that 
there are inconsistent and mixed results, depending on the proxies for accounting 
quality, sample size and measurement metrics used. 
 
Hail & Leuz, (2006) recognize that IFRS, being a principle-based accounting rule, 
provides managers with substantial discretion to influence how informative earnings 
are, but this private managerial incentive cannot be observed directly. Therefore, 
researchers rely on different metrics, such as earnings management practices, bid-ask 
spread and proxies of value relevance. Empirical tests are conducted to measure if 
between the pre- and post-voluntary IFRS adoption periods there are differences in the 
metrics as a way to approximate the extent of reporting higher accounting quality. 
 
However, the question is: how do researchers determine that IFRS is of higher quality? 
Evidence to support the higher quality of IFRS over local GAAP is documented by a 
group of studies (Bartov et al. 2005, Barth et al. 2008). Gassen and Sellhorn (2006) 
suggest that IFRS numbers are of higher quality for German firms from 1998 to 2004. 
According to Gassen and Sellhorn (2006), significant differences in earnings quality are 
documented when IFRS firms have more persistent, less predictable and more 
conditionally conservative earnings than comparable German firms using local 
accountant standards (HGB). The result is confirmed by testing the proxies of 
information asymmetry differences between IFRS and HGB firms. Specifically, they 
argue that higher quality is supported when IFRS adopting firms in Germany experience 
a decline in bid-ask spread of 70 base points, an average 17 more days with price 
changes per year, and more volatile stock prices for IFRS adopters . Hence, it is evident 
that for a sample country such as Germany, where there are large differences between 
the local GAAP and IFRS, there are significant differences in earnings quality observed 
between the two standards. Nevertheless, given that the evidence based on a single-
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country study, it may not be generalized to other jurisdictions. As a result, other studies 
focus on larger sample sizes to test cross-countries accounting quality.  
 
Using a sample size of 21 countries, Barth et al. (2008) provide evidence that those 
countries that have adopted IFRS voluntarily perceive a higher quality than those of 
domestic non-US standards. Accordingly, the study argues that IFRS firms have lower 
earnings management practices, more timely loss recognition, and more value relevance 
(i.e., higher association of accounting amounts with share prices and returns) than those 
matched sample of firms applying non-US domestic standards between the pre- and 
post-adoption periods. When Barth et al. examine whether the higher quality metrics of 
accounting is solely attributable to IFRS, they control for such effects as the volatility of 
economic activity, information environments and incentives by using a matched sample 
design. Under this approach sample firms that apply domestic standards in the same 
country are similar to the firms that apply IFRS. Nevertheless, the researchers concede 
that even with the matched sample design, the study may not fully control for 
differences in the economic environment because IFRS is also associated with the 
combined effects of firms’ standards, interpretation, enforcement and litigation, and 
incentives. On the other hand, other studies provide similar empirical evidence that even 
though IFRS constitutes a relatively higher quality of accounting standards, adopting 
IFRS alone is not necessary to deliver high quality and consistently applied financial 
reporting (Ball et al. 2003; Ball, 2006;  Leuz et al. 2003).). 
 
In opposition to the above results, some studies show that voluntary IFRS adoption does 
not produce higher quality of accounting information. Inconsistent with the results done 
by Gassen and Sellhorn (2006) on the higher quality viewpoint in Germany, Hung and 
Subramanyam (2007) use the same proxy of accounting quality voluntarily adopting 
IFRS for a period of time, proxy variables (such as the variability of book value and 
income) are significantly higher under IFRS than under German GAAP (HGB). Also, 
book value and income are not more relevant under IFRS than under HGB, therefore 
IAS does not exhibit greater conditional conservatism than German HGB income. Hung 
and Subramanyam’s (2007) findings have been confirmed by Van Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen (2005), who study 636 firm-year observations of German firms voluntarily 
adopted IFRS between 1999 and 2001. In particular, they demonstrate results that IFRS 
adopters do not exhibit lower earnings management compared to firms reporting under 
German HGB. Therefore, this implies that IFRS is not necessarily bringing high 
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accounting quality. Nevertheless, these mixed results may be attributed to the tests that 
conducted in the transitional period, and sample drawn from a single country (e.g. 
Germany). 
 
Another study performed by Burgstahler, et al. (2006) gathers evidence from 1997 to 
2003 to prove that the extent of managers’ discretion depends on firm-specific 
characteristics (reporting incentives and operating characteristics) when less (more) 
earnings management in both private and public firms is associated with strong (weak) 
legal and enforcement systems. But private and public firms respond differently to such 
institutional factors as book-tax alignment, outside investor protection, and capital 
market structure.  
 
In summary, research on voluntary IFRS adoption is still at an early stage. Overall 
results have been inconsistent due to different uses of metrics for earnings management, 
different sample periods, and different sample countries. As a result, the hypothesis that 
adoption of IFRS will lead to substantial improvements in accounting quality has not 
been confirmed. 
 
2.2.2 Economic consequences associated with voluntary IFRS adopting firms’ 
strong reporting incentives 
The voluntary switch from local accounting standards to IFRS is a huge commitment by 
firms, especially if their local GAAP is very different from IFRS.  The change includes 
disclosing substantial new financial and non-financial information to outsiders. 
Investors should be informed of the decision by firms to voluntarily adopt IFRS, which 
will have economic consequences which are observable in the capital markets.  
 
Regarding the second question on economic consequences from voluntary IFRS 
adoption, numerous studies have examined the question of what actual benefits accrue 
to firms who voluntarily adopt IFRS. The expectation of capital market benefits have 
been documented by early literature. Zarzeski (1996) conjectures that firms who 
compete for foreign resources (i.e. dependence) will be more willing to expand their 
financial and accounting disclosure to reduce the perceived risk to resource providers 
and accordingly enjoy a lower cost of resources. This concept has been supported by El-
Gazzar, et al. (1999) who cites cross-border financing and listing on foreign stock 
exchanges as major reasons to voluntarily adopt IFRS.  The high level of international 
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market dependency, as expressed by high percentage of foreign sales, low leverage, 
increasing number of foreign stock exchange listings and membership of the EU are all 
significant factors for firms to voluntarily adopt international accounting standards. 
When firms face increasing demands for transparency in financial reports and 
disclosures, compliance with IFRS can facilitate consistent and reliable comparisons 
across the international spectrum of GAAPs. Investor confidence in the integrity of 
IFRS helps firms access more resources internationally at lower costs.  
 
Another metric for economic consequences include improvements in analysis. For 
instance, Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) argue that voluntary IAS adoption reduces the 
cost of information acquisition and improves the accuracy of forecasts. After firms 
adopt IAS, analysts make fewer forecast errors and there are more news reports for 
adopter firms in the sample.  
 
However, there is no overall consensus about economic consequences from voluntary 
IFRS adoption. For instance, Cuijpers and Buijink (2005), with a fairly small sample of 
133 non-financial firms listed in the EU in 1999, attempt to test if the firms adopting 
non-local GAAP enjoy lower levels of information asymmetry. This study proxies’ 
information asymmetry by the number of analysts who follow the company, cost of 
equity, uncertainty among analysts and investors, and forecast dispersion in stock return 
volatility. The results are mixed, as for those firms adopting non-local GAAP, there is a 
positive effect documented on analysts following. However, it fails to find evidence of a 
lower cost of equity, and also fails to find lower uncertainty among analysts and 
investors. When comparing early and late adopters, the two researchers conclude that it 
may take time for both analysts to learn how to interpret financial statements with IFRS 
or US GAAP, and for firms to comply with the new standards and obtain the benefits.  
 
To proxy and measure specific capital market outcomes associated with voluntary IFRS 
adoption, such as decreased information asymmetry, prior studies tend to measure 
directly whether there is a reduction in the cost of equity. However, the following 
section shows that prior studies on the cost of equity as economic consequences for 
voluntary adoption provide inconclusive results. 
2.2.3. Measure of cost of equity as economic consequences from voluntary IFRS 
adoption 
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Concerning the cost of equity estimate, Cujipers and Buijink   (2005) use the method of 
Easton (2004), emphasizing that this calculation does not need to explicitly define a 
growth rate of abnormal earnings beyond the forecast horizon. Other researchers argue 
that since there are different opinions about the computation of the ex-ante cost of 
equity, such as using an average estimate of the four methods in calculating the cost of 
capital, these affect the results. It is because the four models (i.e. Gebhardt, Lee and 
Swaminathan, 2001; Claus and Thomas, 2001; Gode and Mohanram, 2003 and PEG 
ratio, Easton 2004) provide different measures based on different accounting-based 
representations. This issue is not really significant in influencing the magnitude of 
change in cost of equity since Kim and Shi (2007) and Hail and Leuz (2006) point out 
that the cost of equity estimates are highly correlated and similar within a reasonable 
range. 
 
Daske et al. (2007) examine the cost of equity reduction as a proxy for economic 
consequences of voluntary IFRS adoptions for 24 countries between 1988 and 2004. 
They find that, on average, firms which have voluntarily adopted IFRS experience only 
modestly lower costs of equity. However, when the study partitions voluntary adopters 
into label adopters firms (i.e. firms which do not have strong reporting incentives) and 
firms with a serious commitment to IFRS implementation, the researchers finds that 
only serious adopters have a significantly reduced cost of equity. While Daske et al. 
contribute to the extant literature that firm-specific commitment is crucial to enhance 
reporting incentives, it is difficult to justify the proxies of strong (weak) reporting 
incentives with increase (no increase) in disclosures, as proxied by the additional 
number of pages of annual reports between pre- and post-adoption period. In fact, the 
literature argues that an increase in the quantity of disclosures does not mean an 
increase in their quality (Bauwhede & Willekens, 2008; Botosan, 1997; Botosan & 
Plumlee, 2002; Botosan & Plumlee, 2005). 
 
On the other hand, when a single country study shows that there is a direct measure of 
the cost of equity (from several stock valuation models), Daske (2006) fails to find any 
decrease in the cost of equity. Daske points out that there is a lack of supporting 
evidence for the proposition that on its own German firms’ voluntary adoption of IFRS 
between 1999 and 2002 leads to significant economic consequences, such as a reduction 
in the cost of equity. A possible criticism is that the sampling period (just four years) is 
not a sufficiently long period to capture the effect of a reduced cost of equity from 
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adopting IFRS. The results also highlight that to collect supporting evidence from 
testing the effects of IFRS adoption in any reduction in the cost of equity, it is important 
to control for other factors, such as different reporting incentives. 
 
Instead of directly calculating the cost of equity as a proxy for economic consequences, 
economic theories also link the cost of equity effect between the bid-ask spread and 
information asymmetry. For instance, Verecchia (2001) and Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985) develop the conceptual link between corporate disclosure and market liquidity 
from the theoretical underpinning that the share price contains elements of adverse 
selection from information asymmetry. In fact, compared to privately or better informed 
counter-parties in the stock markets, uninformed or less informed investors have 
concerns about unfair dealings by informed investors. Therefore, they will try to protect 
their interests by selling (buying) by lowering (increasing) the price more than what 
they are willing to buy (sell). This consequence of price-protection is reflected in a 
wider bid-ask spread. In addition, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) proxy the change in the 
cost of capital by measuring bid-ask spreads and stock turnover ratios (as liquidity 
changes), because they argue that opaque information environments will reduce the 
demand for stocks which will result in increasing bid-ask spreads and lower stock 
turnover ratios. Given this, in order to attract potential investors, firms with low 
financial reporting quality have to sell their shares at lower prices, which in turn will be 
affected by the higher cost of equity .  The bid-ask spread and turnover ratios is also 
used by Diamond and Verrecchia, (1991). After controlling for the self-selection bias in 
their sample, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) empirically document that firms voluntarily 
adopting IFRS or US GAAP have higher stock turnover ratios and lower bid-ask 
spreads.  
 
According to Hail and Leuz (2006), firms’ adoption strategies are driven by reporting 
incentives, and must be considered in accounting for any economic effects of switching 
to IFRS, especially when there is evidence that voluntary IFRS adoption is perceived to 
have more benefits than costs (e.g. Ball, 2006; Barth et al., 2008). 
 
Overall, a number of empirical studies suggest a relationship between voluntary IFRS 
adoption and the expectation of capital market benefits. However, the direct link 
between voluntary IFRS adoption and actual capital market benefits is mixed. It may 
suggest that firms that voluntarily adopt IFRS appear to have strong reporting 
22 
 
incentives. However, Daske et al. (2007) point out that some voluntary adopting firms 
may just be following others without actually having reporting incentives. It is possible 
that there are voluntary adopters without reporting incentives are looking for certain 
bonding benefits arising from voluntary IFRS adoption (Daske et al., 2007). In other 
words, those firms adopting IFRS voluntarily but only cosmetically believe that their 
voluntary adoption can mimic other adopting firms with strong reporting incentives. 
These mimicking firms believe that such willingness to adopt IFRS voluntarily will 
signal their transparency to capital markets and, as a consequence, they will receive 
capital market benefits. However, if the financial reports are not prepared in accordance 
with IFRS requirements, the quality will not improve. As a result, those firms without 
strong reporting incentives will not receive capital market benefits.  Therefore, in 
voluntary IFRS adoption, the benefits are not uniformly distributed to all adopting firms 
because some firms are highly committed to adopting IFRS while others are not. 
Therefore, voluntary IFRS adoption may actually have differential capital market 
benefits, depending on whether adopters have reporting incentives (Daske et al., 2007).  
Thus, studies that measure economic consequences from all adopting firms without 
controlling for reporting incentives will produce inconclusive results.  
 
It is Rahman et al. (2002) view that even though IFRS may provide a good influence, 
and potentially produce high quality output, firms who expect capital market benefits 
and have actual reporting incentives must commit to the process. This process should 
produce high quality financial reports as outputs which are well received by investors 
who may respond positively with better outcome in capital markets. This argument has 
been further supported by Daske (2006) who argues that IFRS adoption alone may not 
produce discernible economic consequences, and therefore future research should 
address the potential cost of the equity reducing effect from variations between firms’ 
adopting strategy, and its corporate governance and ownership structure, as well as 
explore the structures in institutions both within and across countries and jurisdictions. 
 
2.3 Mandatory IFRS Adoption 
Since January 1
st
, 2005, firms in the EU have been required to adopt IFRS
8
. Therefore, 
the literature in IFRS studies turns its attention to examining the two empirical 
                                                 
8
 On June 6
th
 2002, the Council of Ministers of the EU issued an official statement to require that all 
publicly listed companies in the EU to adopt International Accounting Standards (IAS) in their 
consolidated or simple accounts for the fiscal year beginning January 1
st
 2005 (Soderstrom and Sun, 
2007) 
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questions in this mandated setting. First, when voluntary IFRS adoption cannot support 
the higher quality viewpoint, is it different when there is mandatory IFRS adoption?  
Second, while voluntary IFRS adopters may have higher expectations of capital market 
benefits and stronger reporting incentives, is this the case for mandatory IFRS adopters? 
Hail and Leuz (2007) point out that the empirical evidence supported by voluntary 
adoption cannot be directly transferred to mandatory adoption, because voluntary 
adopting firms seem to have more incentives to implement the new standards. 
Moreover, when all firms implement IFRS, the accompanying effects from bonding and 
network will no longer apply to firms’ signaling their commitment to transparency to 
the capital markets (Coffee, 2002).  Therefore, mandatory IFRS adopters may find it 
challenging to realize higher accounting quality or economic consequences without a 
strong reporting incentive. 
 
In addition to the difference in reporting incentives, institutional environments also 
differ. In supporting mandatory IFRS adoption, jurisdictions have been improving their 
legal enforcement, investor protections and other institutional factors (Daske et al. 
2007). Accounting scholars have found evidence of an association between institutional 
effect and firms’ reporting incentives, leading to differential capital market 
consequences. In addition, accounting scandals in recent years show the urgent need for 
both firm directors and national regulators to strengthen corporate governance 
mechanisms.  
 
Subsequent to the mandatory date for adopting IFRS, researchers have been gathering 
empirical evidence to determine the validity of the high quality and incentive 
viewpoints, as well as any economic consequences resulting from mandatory IFRS 
adoption.  
 
2.4 Accounting Standard view: Mandatory IFRS Adoption results in High Quality 
of Accounting Information   
Proponents for the view that higher accounting quality can be derived from accounting 
standards claim that overall it will benefit stakeholders in two ways. The first way is 
primarily related to IFRS convergence benefits that: 
   Disclosing more relevant information about the economic performance and 
positions of entities will make financial reporting more transparent; and   
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   Enhance financial information comparability and reduce the cost of preparing 
and comparing multi-national business financial reports.  
 
The second benefit is that mandatory IFRS adoption requires greater financial 
disclosure and transparency than most domestic accounting standards (Aksu, 2006; 
Ashbaugh & Pincus, 2001; Bae et al., 2007; Daske & Gebhardt, 2006) This will 
translate into higher quality accounting information.  
 
However, opponents express serious concern about the inherent flexibility in principles-
based standards and that mandatory IFRS may give managers too much room to make 
judgment calls in its application. For instance, Sunder (2009) is concerned that the 
underlying differences in business, industry and country level may further complicate 
the interpretations of IFRS principles, giving rise to greater variability in international 
financial reporting, instead of comparability. In addition, it may also create greater 
opportunities for managers to exercise their earnings management techniques. 
Switching from a rules-based to principle-based set of standards may allow various 
manipulations in financial position and performance measurement, with the 
consequence that accounting quality will be reduced by adopting IFRS. Therefore, 
whether mandatory IFRS adoption will bring in higher quality of accounting 
information becomes an empirical question for research studies. There has been a wave 
of literature examining the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption since 2005. 
 
On the negative side, Beuselinck et al. (2009) argue that accounting quality does not 
improve by mandatory IFRS adoption. In particular, Beuselinck et al. (2009) use 
comparability as a proxy for accounting quality, and provide evidence that even though 
14 EU countries have used IFRS since 2005, the earnings comparability, proxied by 
accruals-cash flows association, across Europe does not improve. Instead, their research 
findings suggest that earnings comparability is influenced by business cycles and firm-
specific reporting incentives, not the accounting standards per se. 
 
In terms of proxies of accounting quality by earnings management for targets, timely 
loss recognition, and value relevance (similar to Barth et al., 2008), Paananen (2008) 
perform empirical tests for sample firms drawn from Sweden and claims that accounting 
quality not only does not improve, but even decreases after the mandatory IFRS 
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adoption. However, this study provides evidence based on a single-country study with 
only one year’s data following the mandatory adoption period. 
 
Instead of using a one-country sample, Ahmed et al. (2009) compare several accounting 
quality metrics for firms between the pre- (2002 to 2004) and post-mandatory (2005 to 
2007) periods. One sample consists of more than 1,600 IFRS adopting firms in 21 
countries, while the other sample is drawn from firms from 17 countries that have not 
adopted IFRS. The researchers conclude that mandatory IFRS does not translate into an 
improvement in overall accounting quality. They find that firms have an increase in 
income smoothing, a decrease in the asymmetric timeliness of loss recognition in the 
post adoption period for the IFRS adopters compared to the non-adopter sample. In 
addition, the reporting conservatism practices do not improve after the mandatory IFRS 
adoption when the timelines for bad news recognition has decreased, but for good news 
recognition has increased. To address country and institutional effects, Ahmed et al. 
(2009) proxy the strength of (i) legal system by the Rule of Law scores from Kaufman 
et al. (2007); and (ii) reporting incentives by the private control benefits (PCB) scores 
from Dyck and Zingales (2004 A problem with their paper is that the measurement 
metrics for both legal strength and reporting incentives are neither conceptually correct 
nor comprehensive in scope.   
 
Dobler (2008) conjectures that when the German local accounting standard (HGB) has 
been converted into IFRS, earnings management practices do not necessarily decrease. 
Following the same argument, Aussenegg et al. (2008) also argue that accounting 
quality does not improve when earning management practices do not change. Their 
study tests and documents evidence from using comprehensive earnings management 
metrics (15 different proxies in measuring earnings management) in 17 European 
countries using more than 18,000 firm-year observations. However, the study only 
focuses on the transitional period for countries adopting IFRS. It is possible that the 
effect of unchanged earnings management could be short-term only and will change as 
IFRS becomes embedded over time. 
 
On the other hand, there are studies that show mixed results in accounting quality when 
mandatory adoption takes place. Guenther et al. (2009a) use Germany as a single-
country study on the relation between IFRS and earnings quality. They conclude that the 
tested results of earnings management proxies such as a decrease in income smoothing 
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have been recorded by voluntary, but not for mandatory IFRS adopters. They present 
results showing no decrease in discretionary accruals under voluntary; but decreases for 
mandatory IFRS adopting firms. Thus, empirical results concerning accounting quality 
have been mixed when comparing voluntary and mandatory IFRS adopters in Germany.  
 
A paper by Guenther et al. (2009b), who use the sample period from 1998 to 2008, 
examines the relative accounting quality between voluntary and mandatory adoption. 
They report ambiguous evidence on earnings management when income smoothing 
effect decreases, and conditional conservatism increases under voluntary, but not under 
mandatory adopters. For discretionary accruals, mandatory adopters exhibit some 
decreases, but not voluntary adopters. While they try to overcome the common issue of 
a limited time period (from 2005 to 2007), the study only uses Germany data, which 
implies that their empirical results may be unique to the German setting rather than 
generalizable to a wider diverse institutional environment  like the EU. 
  
Chen et al. (2009) find that using the five most important indicators to proxy earnings 
management to measure 15 European Union countries before and after the full adoption 
of IFRS produces mixed results, even though the overall accounting quality has been 
marginally improved. They comment that with IFRS adoption, opportunistic behavior 
may be restricted, but it does not imply any reduction in incentives to manage earnings. 
Merely changing the accounting standards will not necessarily enhance higher 
accounting quality. If IFRS cannot bring along capital market benefits to investors, 
transparency of financial information through accounting numbers is still weak due to 
the lack of sufficient disclosure, and financial reports would not reflect the firms’ 
economic performance and position accurately.  
 
Using incremental value relevance as another metric of accounting quality, Gordon et 
al. (2008) examine a sample of 83 cross-listed firms to analyze the associated effects of 
firms’ earnings as reported by local GAAP, IFRS and US GAAP with stock returns to 
firms’ operating cash flows before (2004) and after (2005) the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS. In 2004, local GAAP earnings and accruals recorded the highest explanatory 
power for stock returns. In 2005, after mandatory IFRS adoption, the reconciliation 
between U.S. GAAP and IFRS suggests that U.S. GAAP exhibit both incremental and 
relative value relevance, while IFRS-reconciled earnings show only incremental value 
relevance. ,.The researchers argue that even earnings attributes are comparable under 
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both U.S. GAAP and IFRS, IFRS does not produce higher quality of financial 
information. 
 
Following the Barth et al. (2008) study of accounting quality with voluntary adoption in 
using US firms as the matched samples; Giner and Iniguez (2007) examine and compare 
the earnings quality of 119 cross-listed firms in the US reporting IFRS in the EU. When 
the earnings quality proxies are used as per prior studies (Lang et al., 2006a; Lang et al., 
2006b; Leuz et al., 2003), Giner and Iniguez (2007) could not measure any identified 
differences in earnings quality between IFRS and US GAAP, but the results appear to 
be preliminary and suggestive due to data limitations.  
 
However, given different opinions concerning the accounting quality in the literature, 
recent studies have sought to extend the quality of the analysis. Chen et al. (2010) 
examine five proxies for accounting qualities for the EU, comparing the pre- and post-
mandatory periods and conclude that most of the accounting quality indicators 
improved after the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005. Specifically, accounting 
quality is higher when researchers can measure significantly less targeted earnings 
management, lower magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals, and higher accruals 
quality. Another study performed by Chen et al. (2009) measures the mean scores of six 
indices from institutional environments, (namely, regulatory quality index (RQI), rule of 
law index (RLI), control of corruption index (CCI), voice and accountability index 
(VAI), political stability and absence of violence index (PVI), and government 
effectiveness index (GEI)) to proxy financial reporting environment associated with 
managerial incentives. In the post- (2005 to 2007) relative to the pre-adoption (2000 to 
2004) period, they do not find any statistically significant differences, implying that 
improvement in accounting quality is not associated with any improvement in 
managerial incentives from mandatory IFRS adoption. While data availability is 
improved and measurements on earnings managements have been more comprehensive 
in this study, it is questionable if it is theoretically sound to use these six macro-level 
indices (similar to legal enforcement characteristics) to proxy managerial incentive, and 
to draw any empirical conclusion when firm-specific characteristics are totally ignored.  
 
Horton, et al. (2008) examine the effects of mandatory IFRS on firms’ information 
environments, represented by analyst forecast accuracy (proxied by the accuracy of 
analyst forecasts, number of analysts following, dispersion of forecasts and volatility of 
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revisions) by comparing between voluntary adopters, mandatory adopters and non-
adopters. This study provides evidence on improvements in information environments 
for non-financial firms.  Besides the study by Horton et al. (2008), other value-relevance 
studies defending the higher quality view produce different results.  Morais and Curto 
(2007) argue that financial reporting under mandatory IFRS adoption increases the 
value relevance of accounting numbers of EU firms. Their finding is further supported 
by Bellas et al. (2007) who document evidence that compared to earnings prepared by 
Greek GAAP, IFRS earnings have higher value relevance.  
 
Similar to studies for voluntary IFRS adoption, prior empirical results of mandatory 
IFRS adoption still need more work because the extant literature is limited by its sample 
size and the data available. For instance, Christensen et al. (2008) examine if there is 
less income smoothing, and more timely loss recognition for both voluntary and 
mandatory IFRS adopters. The study concludes that voluntary IFRS adopters have 
higher incentives than mandatory adopters, and therefore dominate the effect of 
accounting standards in determining accounting quality. However, this study only 
covers Germany from 1993 to 2006, with mostly voluntary adopters and only a few 
mandatory firms in the sample. Meanwhile, when Perramon and Amat (2006) argue that 
IFRS adoption would be costly for German companies domiciled in code-law regimes, 
it is possible that any significant economic consequences and improvements in 
accounting quality from such relatively weak legal and investor protection mechanisms 
will not be material in the preliminary transition period. This learning curve effect for 
some countries adopting IFRS is also supported by other literature (Cuijpers and 
Buijink, 2005). In other words, empirical conclusions drawn from evidence gathered 
around the transition period of IFRS adoption is not necessarily going to be conclusive, 
suggesting that more time post adoption is needed to give meaningful results.  
In summary, most prior studies do not support the view that higher accounting quality is 
associated with mandatory IFRS adoption. Some studies have mixed results while 
others conclude that there should be a link. Overall, the empirical studies with 
accounting quality effects from mandatory IFRS adoption are still inconclusive (Daske 
et al., 2007), and are probably confined to measuring the transition effect with the 
limited data available (i.e. with only one or two years following mandatory adoption) 
and have a limited sample size. As the mixed and inconclusive empirical results of 
mandatory IFRS adoption suffer the same issues as voluntary IFRS adoption, the 
present research applies the IPOO model to test whether the influence of IFRS adoption 
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alone s can produce higher quality accounting output. As it is possible that reporting 
incentives influence the process of adoption of accounting standard; which ultimately 
determines the accounting quality that lead to better outcome this will be a major area of 
examination.  
 
Several prior studies try to address whether reporting incentives play a role in 
mandatory IFRS adoption to influence managers’ commitment in the process and 
receive desirable outcomes from the capital market. However, what differs from the 
voluntary IFRS adoption stage is that researchers begin to understand by consensus that, 
equivalent to the IPOO model by Rahman et al. (2002), that maybe the influence 
component is more than just mandatory IFRS. Other importance influences may also 
have an effect on managers’ incentives in mandatory reporting.  In other words, IFRS 
adoption alone is not sufficient, but requires other significant factors to enhance 
reporting incentives, which in turn determine whether there are discernible economic 
consequences (outcomes). In the following section, the literature on reporting incentives 
in IFRS adoption will be discussed. 
 
2.5 Incentive View: Economic consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption driven 
by reporting incentives  
Prior studies (Hail & Leuz, 2006) recognize that IFRS, being a principle-based 
accounting rule, provides managers with substantial discretion to influence information 
about earnings, but this private incentive cannot be observed directly. Incentive-view 
proponents contend that IFRS involves a considerable level of managerial judgment and 
the use of private information (e.g., in exercising the fair values versus impairment of 
goodwill, and property, plant and equipment). To what extent firms apply this 
discretionary judgment into their IFRS adoption and disclosure strategy likely depends 
on their reporting incentives, which are shaped by many factors (Daske et al., 2008).  
 
Moreover, Krivogorsky, Chang and Black (2010) argue that as long as firms can 
recognize that the potential benefits of adopting IFRS will outweigh the costs of 
adoption and compliance, more firms and countries will use IFRS as their international 
reporting strategy. According to economic theory, the network effect will expand these 
net benefits to more participants. As more and more players participate, more firms will 
gain more benefits.   However, receiving the net benefits depends on the firms having 
strong commitment incentives to convergence to IFRS. Therefore, researchers like Ball, 
30 
 
Robin, and Wu (2003), Burgstahler, et al. (2006), Cairns (1999), and Street and Gray 
(2001), document evidence that there are substantial non-compliances with IFRS among 
firms who have purportedly adopted IFRS. It highlights the fact that because some firms 
adopting IFRS do not have the reporting incentives to do so, it is possible that 
mandatory IFRS adoption may not lead to uniform quality of accounting reports across 
firms.  
 
Recent literature shows that high quality accounting standards do not automatically lead 
to improvements in high quality accounting practices (Ball et al., 2003, and Beuselinck 
et al., 2009). In fact, there are other possible key firm and institutional variables 
essential for IFRS to be beneficial to adopting firms. So, the relevant empirical question 
becomes: what factors drive incentives for firms to strategically adopt, and make a 
strong commitment in mandatory adoption of IFRS to achieving the expected economic 
benefits, if any? 
 
If the incentive-view is valid for mandatory IFRS adoption, any capital market benefits 
to firms will be unevenly distributed and dependent upon the firms’ reporting incentives 
in exercising their transparency and disclosure strategy. In this regard, Daske et al. 
(2008) study the economic consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption in 26 countries. 
On the one hand, these researchers find that market liquidity (as proxied by calculating 
the bid-ask spreads of common shares) improves around the mandatory IFRS adoption 
period. On the other hand, a decrease in the cost of capital and increase in equity 
valuations (proxied by an increase in Tobin q) do not take effect unless firms have 
strong incentives to be transparent, and countries have concurrently improved the 
respective legal enforcement and government regimes. This study provides a convincing 
case that both firm-specific factors and institutional environments provide strong 
incentives to transparency, similar to many European Union efforts to improve 
governance and enforcement, without which adopting IFRS simply replaces one set of 
standards with another (Hail & Leuz, 2007).  
 
Christensen et al. (2007) study the economic consequences for UK firms in mandatorily 
adopting IFRS in 2005. Using the variables of voluntary adopting firms in Germany as 
the proxy for UK firms’ willingness to adopt IFRS, this study empirically proves that 
the intended proxy of commitment to adopt IFRS in Germany predicts cross-sectional 
differences in both the short-run market reactions and the long-run changes in the cost 
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of equity of U.K. The results suggest that mandatory IFRS adoption does not benefit all 
firms in a uniform way, but results in relative winners and losers. This study notes that 
where the literature generally suggests that the relative reductions in cost of capital are 
associated with the quality of the legal framework, in fact, firm-specific factors of 
reporting incentives (i.e., willingness and commitments to adopt IFRS) can explain 
some of the relative benefits.  
 
In addition, even though Daske et al. (2007) do not find any significant changes in the 
cost of equity for mandatory IFRS adoption, firms with higher reporting incentives have 
a significantly lower cost of equity than those firms with lower reporting incentives. 
  
While a single-country study does not provide conclusive empirical support for the 
incentive-view, the extant literature following mandatory IFRS adoption has in turn 
focused on testing samples from a cross-country perspective. Some of these studies 
document positive economic consequences; however, others have given mixed results. 
For instance, Daske et al. (2008) examine a variety of economic implications for 26 
countries (18 are in the European Union) following the mandatory adoption of IFRS for 
the period between 2001 and 2005, but find mixed evidence on the effect of cost of 
equity. Similar research conducted over a longer time may find different results but 
when Li (2010) undertakes identical research covering an two additional years (i.e., 
2005 and 2006), Daske et al extends only until 2005,  Li documents a significantly 
lower cost of equity for mandatory adopters (48 basis points) when comparing to the 
pre-adoption period (1995 to 2004). Consistent with the finding of short-lived benefits 
for voluntary IFRS adopters, Li (2010) provides evidence that voluntary adopters could 
benefit from a lower cost of equity compared to mandatory adopters, but only in the pre-
mandatory adoption period, and this difference becomes insignificant after mandatory 
adoption. In fact, voluntary adopters experience no significant change in the cost of 
equity after the mandatory period. However, it should be noted that Li’s study covers 
only a two-year post-mandatory period.  A longer period following the transition might 
provide different results. Also, Li (2010) finds that the reduced cost of equity is present 
only in jurisdictions with strong legal enforcement, increased disclosures and better 
information comparability.   
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Overall, while there is growing conjecture that mandatory IFRS adoption alone does not 
contribute to significant capital markets effects, it is apparent from the empirical 
evidence of prior studies that the incentive-view may be more convincing than the 
quality-view. However it is still too early to assess the negative link between reporting 
incentive effects and the cost of equity, since there is, as yet, no strong consensus. To 
gain a better understanding about the determinants and consequences of reporting 
incentives and the relationship to the cost of equity comprehensively, it is useful to 
consider reporting incentives as the “Influences” of the IPOO model (Rahman et al. 
2002). In the next section the literature on the roles of institutional-specific (macro) 
factors, firm-specific (micro) characteristics in both business and corporate 
governances, and their joint effects to any association with subsequent capital market 
consequences is reviewed.  
 
2.5.1 The roles of Institutional Environment Factors (IEF)  
With regard to the association between institutional factors and financial reporting, in 
their pioneering study La Porta et al. (1998) explore the link between a country’s legal 
system and financial information quality. La Porta et al. argue that common law 
countries, on average, have better accounting systems and better investor protection 
structures than code law countries. Since then, there have been numerous studies on the 
association between financial reporting quality and other institutional factors such as tax 
systems, ownership structures, political system, and capital structure, and capital market 
development (Ali &Hwang, 2000; Ball & Shivakuman, 2005; Burgstahler et al., 2006; 
Fan & Wong, 2002; Guenther & Young, 2000; Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Sun, 
2006). The new institutional environment approach makes the point that such external 
factors can affect firms’ reporting and disclosure practices regardless of the accounting 
standards (Ball et al., 2000; Fan & Wong, 2002; Leuz et al., 2003).  
 
The extant literature shows that strong laws protecting investors as well as extensive 
corporate governance recommendations may shape incentives in a firm’s decision to 
adopt IFRS. For instance, Renders and Gaeremynck (2005) have found that adopting 
IFRS requires substantial corporate disclosures with fewer accounting choices, and 
information between management and shareholders becomes less asymmetrical than 
when using the local GAAP. This results in less opportunity for insider trading at the 
expense of the shareholders. However, the extent of private benefits that insiders 
relinquish due to the IFRS adoption depends on the level of investor protection offered 
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by countries. If the countries have strong investor protection laws in place, managers 
will not have much room for accounting manipulations, therefore, IFRS does not result 
in huge losses in private benefits. Thus, the European companies most likely to have 
adopted IFRS are those in countries with strong investor protection and /or extensive 
corporate governance recommendations. However, countries with weak investor 
protections will have less incentive to adopt IFRS.      
 
Even though a firm’s institutional environment may influence reporting incentives in 
adopting IFRS, strong institutions could reduce the risk premium demanded by 
investors, and subsequently have a lower cost of equity than weak institutions. For 
instance, after controlling for various risk and country factors, Hail and Leuz (2006) 
employ a cross-sectional sample of 40 countries to examine the impacts of legal 
institutions and securities regulations in the firms’ cost of equity, and conclude that 
countries with extensive securities regulation and strong enforcement mechanisms 
experience lower levels of cost of equity than those with weak institutional settings. 
Together, Hail and Leuz provide evidence of about 60% for country-level and close to 
40% for firm-level variation in the significantly lower implied cost of equity for higher 
legal institutions around the world. In spite of the significantly negative relationship 
between legal and securities regulations and implied cost of equity, Hail and Leuz 
(2006) also indicate that these effects are small, and even become insignificant with the 
degree of integration in capital markets.  
 
The important role of the legal system has been further highlighted by a study by 
Bushman and Piotroski (2006) which explores the extent to which financial reporting is 
influenced by an economy’s institutional environment. Specifically, factors such as a 
country’s legal and judicial system, securities laws and political economy act as 
incentives to influence corporate executives, investors, regulators and other market 
participants, especially with regard to reported accounting numbers (which are proxied 
by conditional accounting conservatism). To stress the significance of legal systems, 
Bushman and Piotroski show that firms in countries with high quality judicial systems 
will reflect bad news in reported earnings faster than firms domiciled in low quality 
judicial regimes. These conservative accounting and disclosure practices will be similar 
in nations with traditions of strong public enforcement, low risk of expropriation, and 
little state ownership of businesses.   
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Other studies show that institutional environment factors also influence reporting 
incentives in financial reporting (Ali and Hwang, 2000; Ball et al., 2000; Ball et al., 
2003; Joos and Lang, 1994; Leuz et al., 2003).  For instance, Burgstahler, et al. (2006) 
provide evidence that there are fewer (more) earnings management practices in their 
sample of firms that are associated with strong (weak) legal systems. The study 
highlights the importance of capital market pressures and institutional factors in 
influencing incentives in reporting earnings that in turn reflect economic performance. 
Regarding the joint effects from both institutional and firm-specific factors, Burgstahler 
et al. argue that, while private and public firms respond differently to some institutional 
factors such as investor protection, there is evidence that legal institutions and capital 
market forces always seem to have a reinforcement effect on each other.  
 
Ball et al. (2003) further emphasize the link between incentives and institutions by 
arguing that common law countries are more effective than code law countries in 
shaping reporting incentives, and preparing high quality accounting reports regardless 
of their accounting standards. Their study examines firms from Hong Kong, Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Thailand to study the factors that determine recognition of timing loss 
(as proxy for accounting quality). The study shows that even though the accounting 
standards for these countries derived from the common law system and therefore are 
similar to IAS, the accounting quality of such financial reporting is no better than it is 
for firms in code law countries, mainly because of the differing incentives for firms and 
auditors.  Ball, et al. (2003) point out that to produce high quality financial reports from 
high quality accounting standards, proper incentives must be in place as well. More 
importantly, this study supports the pro-incentive view to argue that high quality 
accounting standards do not guarantee high quality accounting practices. However, the 
question is whether using timely recognition of economics losses as proxy for 
accounting quality is sufficient to draw this conclusion. Also, the division of 
institutional structures simply by classifying them into common-law and code-law 
countries appears to be too broad. In addition, Ball et al. (2003) also ignore the possible 
significance of inter-dependencies and inter-relatedness between firm-specific and 
institutional factors that may lead to different financial reporting output quality 
(Wysocki, 2010).  
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Moreover, Lang et al. (2006b) compare the properties of US GAAP accounting numbers 
across cross-listed and US firms, demonstrating that cross-listed firms’ accounting 
numbers are not comparable. The study provides evidence to show more earnings 
management practices, less timely loss recognition, and lower value relevance than US 
firms even though cross-listed firms use the same high quality accounting standards as 
US firms. The study concludes that this is mainly because cross-listed firms have 
relatively weaker investor protection mechanisms. 
 
Leuz (2006) extends the study by Lang, et al. (2006b) by investigating the reasons for 
the incomparability between cross-listed and US firms. Leuz conjectures that 
accounting standards provide discretion, and that cross-listed and US firms are likely to 
have differential incentives to use this discretion. The driver for incentives, according to 
Leuz, is the more concentrated ownership for the cross-listed firms compared to US 
firms (which make market discipline a weak force for ensuring firms’ high quality 
financial reporting) even with a higher level of legal enforcement. As a result, these 
variations are associated with the level of earnings management in the home country of 
cross-listed firms. In addition, Leuz (2006) also documents evidence that home-country 
institutions continue to affect cross-listed firms’ reporting practices. Finally, Leuz 
(2006) points out the need for further research to explore the interactions between 
market forces and institutional factors in shaping firms’ reporting incentives. 
 
Earlier studies have established a positive link between institutional environment factors 
and reporting incentives, which influence the accounting information quality or the cost 
of equity. However, compared to firm-specific characteristics that have an effect on 
reporting incentives, institutional environments–such as law enforcement and securities 
regulations–prevent firms from shirking, not encouraging, reporting incentives in 
mandatory IFS adoption. It is possible that firm-specific factors such as profitability and 
size motivate firms to earn expected capital market benefits from mandatory IFRS 
adoption. In other words, it may be that firm-specific factors have a direct effect, while 
institution environment factors have indirect effects in shaping reporting incentives 
along with mandatory IFRS adoption. Thus, to understand reporting incentives, it is 
important to examine both firm- and institutional environments and how they interact. 
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2.5.2 Institutional Environment Factors are becoming more integrated along with 
IFRS adoption 
Recently, countries which support IFRS adoption have integrated their capital market 
operations and development to achieve more economies of scale and cost saving 
benefits. This effect may mitigate the influences of institutional environment on firms’ 
reporting incentives. For instance, Hail and Leuz (2006) argue that firms from countries 
with more extensive disclosure requirements, stronger securities regulation, and stricter 
enforcement mechanisms have a significantly lower cost of capital. However, it is 
possible that such a negative association becomes statistically insignificant as capital 
markets become more integrated (Hail and Leuz, 2006). Nevertheless, the measurement 
metrics of integration between countries by measuring the Morgan Stanley Capital 
International (MSCI) and portfolio flows across different EU countries may not be 
comprehensive and theoretically sound enough. Thus, the literature contends that 
measuring the integrity of many countries’ different institutional environment within a 
particular region like EU is not easy.  
 
On the contrary, Schipper (2005) explains that while the quality of financial reporting 
depends on the vigor of enforcement, the EU has been upgrading its regulatory power 
for implementing IFRS since 2005. In fact, efforts are underway to increase the cross-
jurisdictional consistency of securities regulation and financial reporting enforcement. 
For instance, the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) and European 
Enforcement Coordination (EEC) were created to strengthen coordination, with the goal 
of harmonizing regulatory practices. As a result, the institutional environment in EU 
should strengthen the negative association between the stronger IEF and the cost of 
equity during the post-mandatory period. 
 
There are thus two conflicting views about the importance of institutional environments 
in affecting firms’ reporting incentives along with mandatory IFRS adoption. My view 
is that, due to the lack of reliable measurement metrics, the integrity of capital markets 
in the EU still needs to be determined. However, institutional environment factors in the 
EU, such as enforcement mechanisms, have improved with mandatory IFRS adoption.  
With mandatory IFRS adoption, capital market consequences such as lower cost of 
equity in EU will continue to improve.   
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While institutional environment is an important influence in the IPOO model (Rahman 
et al., 2002), does it mean that mandatory IFRS adoption in a weak (strong) institutional 
environment alone will receive few or none of (large) capital market benefits? Earlier 
studies argue that if there are other substitute effects to strengthen the overall reporting 
incentive in the process of mandatory IFRS adoption for weak institution, firms may 
still receive desirable outcomes. 
 
2.5.3 Firm’s strong incentives for IFRS adoption to substitute weak institutional 
environment  
For countries with relatively weaker investor protections and securities regulations, 
prior studies demonstrate that, consistent with bonding theory, weaker institutional 
environments are more likely to adopt IFRS than stronger legal and investor protection 
countries in order to switch to higher level financial reporting standards like IFRS 
(Hope et al. 2006, Kim & Shi, 2007). As a result, those countries’ weak institutional 
mechanisms can be greatly improved. Also, signaling theory (Spence, 1993) holds true 
for countries. These are more likely to adopt IFRS voluntarily when firms, attempting to 
raise equity financing make their capital markets more accessible to overseas investors 
by opening up their equity markets, commit to better financial reporting and disclosures. 
In particular, Hope et al. (2006) argue that even countries with weaker investor 
protection mechanisms are more likely to adopt IFRS, as they will be perceived to be 
improving investor protection, and thereby making their capital markets more accessible 
to foreign investors. 
 
Bonding theory (Coffee, 2002) suggests that cross listing on a U.S. exchange motivates 
the listing firms to provide better and greater financial reporting and disclosure 
practices, suggesting that firms with strong reporting incentives and weak institutional 
environments may still benefit from a capital market effect. This hypothesis has been 
supported by recent empirical studies (Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz, 2004; Hail & Leuz, 
2006; Lang, Lins and Miller, 2003a; Reese & Weisbach, 2002) arguing that cross-
listings behavior by foreign firms (with relatively less strict legal enforcement and 
investor protection mechanisms) in the U.S. ( with  stronger institutional environments 
than foreign firms’ local regimes) experience more external equity financing, higher 
valuations, lower cost of capital and more critical oversight than their foreign 
counterparts.  
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Contrary to the Ball et al. (2003) argument that the institutional environment is more 
important in shaping reporting incentives, the literature highlights the importance of 
firm-specific governance as a substitute for legal and investor protection in IFRS 
adoption. For instance, Renders and Gaeremynck (2005) argue that voluntary adoption 
of IFRS is costly for company insiders, as there is then less managerial discretion. 
However, this study also shows that the costs of such private benefits by company 
insiders can be mitigated by both extensive disclosures of IFRS and institution 
structures such as a high level of jurisdiction’s investor protection (proxied by La Porta 
et al., 1998). As a result, IFRS is more likely to be adopted in countries with strong laws 
protecting investors and/or extensive corporate governance mechanisms (proxied by 
OECD CG principles). In other words, improving corporate governance codes can 
provide effective legal and investor protections to support IFRS adoption in countries 
with weak legal settings.  
 
Kim and Shi (2007) conduct a comprehensive examination for a large multi-period 
sample of 34 countries to test if the cost of equity has been reduced by voluntary IFRS 
adoption. The researchers have two important findings: First, they use non-IFRS 
adopting countries as the control group, and find that the cost of equity is significantly 
lower for the full IFRS adopting countries than for non-adopting countries, implying 
that IFRS benefits adopting countries from greater and better disclosures by reducing 
the cost of equity. This result holds true regardless of a country’s institutional factors 
(similar to Francis et al. 2005). Second, for countries with weak institutional 
environments (such as emerging markets), the cost of the capital-reducing effect from 
IFRS adoption is greater than for countries with strong environments.  
 
Following this line of logic, Bova and Pereira, (2009) and Fekete et al. (2008) base their 
empirical studies on firms in developing countries like Kenya, Turkey, Spain and 
Hungary. Under weaker investor protection and other legal institutional mechanisms, 
firms are actually more likely to adopt IFRS with great commitment because the 
perceived higher quality of accounting standards can improve investor protection and 
enhance the accessibility of foreign capital for local emerging markets.  
 
However, there are conflicting views from other studies arguing that in less developed 
countries, country-specific factors (instead of firm-specific) are more important in IFRS 
adoption. Francis et al. (2008) test two logistic models of multivariate regression (one 
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for firm-level and the other for country-level) on a large sample of 52 countries with a 
broad base of proxies using six country-factors (proxied by GDP, common or code law, 
level of financial development, strength of legal enforcement, judiciary function, 
corruption and general financing constraints). This study focuses on small and medium-
sized private enterprises, arguing that unlike large public firms which are subject to 
agency problems, smaller enterprises adopting IFRS are subject to contracting 
incentives, which are influenced by both firm-specific and country factors. They 
provide evidence that both firm-level (proxied by investment growth opportunity, 
external financing, foreign ownership, export sales and firm size) and country factors 
are important in influencing the decision to voluntarily adopt IFRS. However, when the 
samples are partitioned by the level of economic development, the researchers find that 
for more developed countries, firm factors dominate country factors. The reverse is true 
in less developed countries. The empirical results may be useful, but the setting is 
mainly applied to small and medium-sized private enterprises in a relatively large 
sample of 52 countries using only a small number of proxies. In fact, there are many 
variations of country-specific factors among those countries that Francis et al. do not 
control for.  
 
Even though the study by Francis et al. (2008) provides evidence that in less developed 
countries, country factors will dominate firm-specific factors, Holthausen (2003) argues 
that in IFRS research it is necessary to control for institutional variables in a single 
country. Lopes and Walker (2008) study the association between firm-level incentives 
in Brazil, which has poor accounting quality, code law legal tradition, and less-
developed capital markets, and come up with different conclusions from Francis et al. 
(2008). In particular, due to the significant investment growth opportunities and cross-
listing characteristics of Brazil firms that need more external funds, Brazilian firms are 
motivated to strive for firm-level improvements voluntarily in both corporate 
governance practices (measured by higher scores in the Brazilian Corporate Governance 
Index – BCGI) and higher quality financial reporting .In other words, Lopes and Walker 
(2008) prove that strong firm-specific incentives take over even in weak institutional 
environments, and produce high quality financial reports with superior governance in 
less developed countries like Brazil.  
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Therefore, such firm-specific factors, such as high demand for invested capital for 
growth, may provide strong incentives for implementing IFRS adoption in developing 
countries, even those with weak institutions and a lack of resources and financial 
infrastructure. As a result, firms can provide high quality financial reports, because of 
the strong firm-based incentives. This rationale is further supported by Bova and Pereira 
(2009) who examine the effect of IFRS compliance by Kenya’s public firms. Because 
public firms have widely dispersed shares, shareholders need high quality financial 
reports to reduce information asymmetry between shareholders and managers in order 
to limit agency conflicts through transparent financial communications (Barth et al., 
2009; Bushman & Smith, 2003). Using a sample from a developing country like Kenya, 
Bova and Pereira (2009) document evidence that the economic benefits that public firms 
(especially those with greater foreign ownership) expect from the capital markets will 
provide strong incentives to adopt IFRS with a high level of compliance despite low 
legal protection.  However, aside from foreign ownership and leverage, Bova and 
Pereira do not look into firms’ heterogeneity in business factors or characteristics in 
relation to the level of IFRS compliance, even though such factors may have given more 
insight into the firms’ internal demand for IFRS adoption.  
 
These studies demonstrate that firm-specific motivations can shape IFRS compliance 
despite factors such as weak legal and investor protection. This reinforces the view in 
section 3.4.1 that in the IPOO concept (Rahman et al., 2002) certain favorable firm-
specific characteristics will be effective in motivating reporting incentives in mandatory 
IFRS adoption, even in a relatively weak institutional environment. Even though 
influence from an institutional environment is not strong enough to enforce reporting 
incentive, firm-specific factors can influence managers to produce a high quality 
accounting output with the expectation of desirable outcome from the capital markets. 
To accomplish this, Bova and Pereira (2009) and Lopes and Walker (2008) point out 
that firms’ (internal) corporate governance mechanisms have been greatly improved9.  
However, few studies systematically investigate these dynamic effects between 
(internal) corporate governance and mandatory IFRS adoption. If (internal) corporate 
                                                 
9
 Corporate governance, according to the academic sources, can be classified into internal and external. 
Internal (external) corporate governance refers to firms’ boards of directors’(national regulators) 
mechanisms to regulate, manage and control managers’ behavior in order to mitigate agency problems. 
Thus, internal corporate governance is responsible by the board of directors and external corporate 
governance is actually similar to a country’s institutional environments such as securities regulations and 
law enforcements. This study finds that some literature confuses this difference and refers to corporate 
governance as only government control and regulations.  
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governance may be an important substitute for weak institutional environments, does it 
have a role as complement in strong institutional environments during mandatory IFRS 
adoption? Also, is there any relationship in the literature that supports a direct or 
indirect link between (internal) corporate governance and firm performance? 
 
2.6 Corporate Governance Mechanisms  
Corporate governance is a highly complex and interrelated concept which can be 
analyzed from accounting, finance and economics perspectives. Numerous scholarly 
studies have attempted to show that sound corporate governance is the foundation of a 
firm’s long-term success. So far, the empirical results are mixed. Researchers point out 
that the inconsistent evidence from the extant literature could be due to methodological 
differences (Klein, et al. 2005), for instance, in using either publicly available data or 
survey data. Others prove that performance metrics such as accounting-based variables 
(Singh & Davidson, 2003) or market-based metrics as stock return, market value of 
equities could be determinants (Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Brickley at al., 1994; Cotter, 
Shivdasani, & Zenner, 1997; McWilliams & Sen 1997). 
 
Holm and Schoeler (2008) argue that in terms of corporate governance mechanisms, 
transparency is more important than board independence in firms with international 
orientation, while board independence is becoming more important than transparency in 
firms with dispersed ownership. Analyzing 100 companies listed on the Copenhagen 
Stock Exchange (using a Danish dataset), they assert that to reduce the agency problem 
due to asymmetric information, a high level of transparency is required to reduce the 
cost of capital and is more significant factor for firms with an international orientation. 
This is because multi-international enterprises need to provide a higher level of 
disclosure to overseas investors.  
 
Other study conjectures that board independence may be enhanced by foreign board 
membership, resulting in higher firm value. Oxelheim and Randoy (2003) point out that, 
due to globalization, there is a positive and significant relationship between foreign 
(Anglo-American) board membership and firm value. Their study uses a sample of 
firms with head-offices in Norway and Sweden. They proxy corporate performance by 
Tobin’s q, after a variety of firm-specific and corporate governance related factors have 
been controlled for.  
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In terms of methodology in measuring the effectiveness of corporate governance of 
managers, various scholars have attempted to use cross-sectional assessments based on 
scoring and indexing systems such as checklists used by rating agencies, namely 
Standard and Poor’s Governance Services and Institutional Investor Services (ISS) on 
7,000 companies within the FTSE Global Equity Index Series. However, most, if not 
all, of them are compromised by subjective perceptions and lack of scientific rigor and 
methodology, which could result in misleading conclusions (Schmidt & Brauer, 2006; 
Sonnenfeld, 2004). As a result, such structural aspects may lead to questionable 
reliability and validity (Black et al., 2006, Gascoigne, 2004). 
 
2.6.1 The roles of Corporate Governance to Firm Performance  
Though a cross-sectional assessment of corporate governance effectiveness may be 
flawed, empirically, there are numerous research studies relying on external cross-
sectional data to assess this relationship such as Renders et al., (2010). However, the 
direct association between better corporate governance and stock price performance still 
remains unclear with mixed results. Other schools of thought apply firm-level variables, 
claiming that time-series level data may be a better indicator. For instance, Black et al. 
(2006) endeavor to measure the relationship between firm-level corporate governance. 
The proxy consists of combined governance indices from the six corporate governance 
sub-indices. These are Brunswick (Brunswick UBS Warburg), Troika Dialog (Russia’s 
largest and oldest investment bank), S&P Governance, S&P Disclosure, Institute of 
Corporate Law and Governance (ICLG) and Russian Institute of Directors (RID). Their 
study aims at measuring any substantial firm-index fixed effects and firm market value, 
proxied by Tobin’s q and, market-to-book and market-to-sales for Russian firms 
between 1999 and 2005.They show statistically significant and strong correlation 
between governance and market value both in ordinary least squares (OLS) and in fixed 
effects regressions. While Black et al. (2006) definitely shed some light on the modeling 
problem of omitted variables, endogeneity and using time-series data to track the impact 
of corporate governance on market share price, it lacks generalization to other 
institutional and country settings. It focuses on analyzing corporate governance matters 
in a specific institutional context (Russia) rather than comparing the phenomenon under 
investigation across different institutional settings.  
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In sum, the empirical results suggest that internal corporate governance mechanisms 
such as board diversity in general are positively related to organizational performance, 
but not directly. For example, Gani and Jermias (2006) focus on board independence to 
investigate its effect on corporate performance across two different strategies, namely, 
cost efficiency and innovation. Using data for 109 manufacturing firms in the S&P500 
(436 firm-year observations), they argue that a high level of board independence has a 
significantly more positive effect on firms’ performance (proxied by the calculation of 
ratios in ROE and ROI) in the cost-control strategy but not in innovation. Thus, it 
appears that board independence is essential for firms to succeed. Westphal (1999) 
points out that outside (external) dominated boards will be effective in mitigating 
managers’ self-interested opportunistic behavior. Also, independent boards can 
discipline bad managers, including termination of employment (Dallas, 2001), and 
pursue more financial control and monitoring (Baysinger & Hoskission, 1990; Zahra & 
Pearce, 1998).  
 
2.6.2 Internal corporate governance and reporting incentive for IFRS adoption  
Theories suggest that to mitigate the agency problem, 
10
and to ensure that managers will 
fulfill their roles in adopting IFRS efficiently with strong incentives, boards of directors 
have to exercise their fiduciary duties in maintaining an effective corporate governance 
and control opportunistic behavior. 
 
Aksu (2006) studies the impact of strong local corporate governance principles along 
with the voluntary adoption of IFRS on the transparency and disclosure level (proxied 
by the Transparency and Disclosure: T&D Index scores) for a sample of 52 large firms 
listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange. The study finds that the T&D Index scores 
improve when firms adopt IFRS voluntarily, indicating their commitment to such best 
practice in corporate governance. Similar to the Lopes and Walker (2008) study of 
Brazilian firm earnings quality, Turkey provides another example of a developing 
country with an inherent need for external capital.  However, the Asku study’s sampling 
period of two years is too brief.  
                                                 
10
 The agency problem or theory states that since Berle and Means (1932) has stressed that when 
ownership and control separates between shareholders and management, managers’ incentives 
(motivations) for financial reporting may be subject to opportunistic behavior, favoring their personal 
gains at the expense of shareholders’ benefit. As a result, even though there may be policies in place from 
shareholders who are willing to adopt IFRS for the firms’ well being, firms’ financial reporting and 
disclosure strategy is carried out by managers. Managers’ incentives (motivation) are subject to the 
temptation of opportunistic behavior, caring about their personal gains at the expense of the shareholders’ 
benefits. 
44 
 
 
Examining the effects from firm-specific factors, Durnev and Kim (2005) argue that 
firms with three attributes (investment opportunities, external financing and ownership 
structure) are positively identified with the quality of corporate governance and 
disclosure practice. More importantly, Durney and Kim document that good investment 
opportunities provide more incentives for firms to improve their internal corporate 
governance mechanisms, even domiciled in countries with weaker legal frameworks. 
While legal institutional factors matter for corporate governance practices (La Porta et 
al., 1998), this study indicates that firms with strong incentives seem to adapt to poor 
legal frameworks to develop efficient internal governance regimes, resulting in greater 
positive correlation with the valuation of firms in stronger legal regimes. This implies 
that even though a strong legal institution is important when the magnitude of the legal 
framework and firm values are positively related, the positive relation becomes 
insignificant when transparency and governance scores are included in the regression 
model. Their study indicates that strong firm motivations are important in creating 
better governance and disclosure practices in weak legal environments. That internal 
corporate governance dominates the institutional environment has been noted by Hail 
and Leuz (2006) whose empirical findings show that the cost of capital reducing effects 
in countries is significantly associated with extensive disclosure requirements, but not 
with strong securities regulation and stricter enforcement regimes.  
 
To protect shareholders’ interests against improprieties in mandatory IFRS adoption, it 
becomes important to monitor internal corporate governance and oversee management 
behavior.  This monitoring requires independent board members with financial expertise 
to control the audit committee and remuneration committee, separation of duties 
between the chairman and CEO, and good risk management and control. Therefore, a 
broad assessment index including comprehensive internal corporate governance is 
important to measure the board of directors’ commitment to mandatory IFRS adoption. 
At present there appears to be no study addressing this empirical issue. Thus, this study 
integrates the variable of firm-specific internal corporate governance mechanism as one 
of the influences in the IPOO model. It will be tested to examine the extent of such 
“Influence” to the firms’ reporting incentives in implementing mandatory IFRS 
adoption. 
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Above all, the literature review summarizes the progressive studies of IFRS adoption 
from voluntary to mandatory setting as the Influence; and how such influence may 
relate to benefits such as higher quality of accounting information and lower cost of 
equity. However, due to the limitations of data and sample size, as well as transitional 
period, there is, so far, lack of consistent empirical results. Moreover, besides the 
accounting standard, the IPOO model suggests that reporting incentives may exert as a 
significant factor in mandatory IFRS adoption which results in differential capital 
market benefits. Since this topic has not been examined thoroughly and therefore it 
leads to the following potential research gap for the study 
 
2.7 Potential Research Gap 
Taken together, the above literature review discusses and shows the different stages and 
elements in the research on IFRS adoption. It indicates that prior studies from both 
voluntary and mandatory IFRS (i) have no consensus as to whether accounting quality 
has been enhanced; and (ii) have not documented uniform capital market benefits for all 
adopting firms. This latter point arises mainly because simply adopting IFRS on its own 
does not guarantee high accounting quality for all adopters.  
 
The extant literature gradually recognizes the importance of reporting incentives in 
mandatory IFRS adoption. Translated into the IPOO model (Rahman et al. 2002), this 
study’s view is that there may be different firm- and country-specific forces that 
“influence” reporting incentives.  When strong reporting incentives drive high 
commitment on mandatory IFRS adoption, the output will be a set of high quality 
financial reports, which leads to positive capital market outcomes. However, due to the 
limited data availability, non-comprehensive proxies and single-country studies in prior 
research, the academic community still does not know if reporting incentives determine 
accounting quality in mandatory IFRS setting. Therefore, with more cross-sectional data 
available in the post-adoption period and better metrics for proxies for both the cost of 
equity and reporting incentives, this study can extend, modify and validate prior studies 
by examining if the cost of equity for mandatory adopters is lower and what factors 
affect this result. After testing the overall effect of mandatory IFRS adoption, this study 
will investigate the relationship between reporting incentives and capital market 
consequences in mandatory IFRS adoption. 
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The next chapter will develop and examine the theoretical framework which underpins 
the empirical analysis introduced in the later on. 
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Chapter3 - Basic Theory and Theoretical Framework 
To follow up the literature review, this chapter provides explanation of the 
philosophical and methodological choices open to the researcher and justification for 
the specific choices made. Also, Chapter 3 reviews the relevant literature and identifies 
the research gap in studying reporting incentives for mandatory IFRS adoption. This 
chapter explores and integrates the IPOO concept (Rahman et al. 2002) into the 
theoretical framework that underpins the study of reporting incentives on mandatory 
IFRS adoption.  
 
3.1 Explanation of the philosophical and methodological choices open to the 
researcher and justification for the specific choices made. 
When undertaking any research decisions have to be made as to the appropriate method 
to address the research question. This means understanding the philosophical 
foundations of the research methods that are proposed and, in particular, the 
epistemological and methodological assumptions that underlie the different research 
traditions. Whatever choice of research method, knowing the philosophical framework 
is important in that the chosen method significantly influences the choice of the research 
design and methodology. This extends to the choice and type of sample data and 
collection process, research models used to analyze the data, and the subsequent 
interpretation of the research findings. Basically, there are two main streams of research 
paradigms that this study can choose from: empiricism, which includes the positivist 
paradigm, and the interpretive approach. 
  
Positivism 
Positivist researchers contend that logical reasoning and empirical observation are 
important criteria to conduct research. Logical reasoning mainly relies on the 
interpretation by mathematical and statistical calculation, such as multiple regression 
models. Alternatively, empirical observation argues that the knowledge discovery 
process can be achieved by direct observation, measurement and analysis, and finally 
conclusions can be drawn.  
 
Overall, the positivism approach is more suitable for research studies in scientific 
environments that require a rigorous and high degree of predicted certainty, such as 
forecasting. The findings from various tests become more reliable and can be 
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generalized to similar conditions. However, the positivist approach may become 
difficult to measure and predict human behavior. 
 
Phenomenology 
Another group of researchers said that in studying human behavior, there are numerous, 
unpredictable factors involved that may be neglected by the positivist models. Thus, the 
phenomenologist takes a totally different approach to discover new knowledge. The 
strong belief is that when the researcher(s) is (are) involved in the research process to 
see each event and activity as unique, each person’s personality and belief system may 
not be similar to others. Such uniqueness may influence the research outcome and 
conclusion. Because of the focus, phenomenology therefore is take smaller sample 
sizes, comparing to positivist approach 
 
Obviously, both positivist and phenomenologist approaches have their strong and weak 
areas. Research study always philosophical preference based upon the nature of the 
study. Table 1 summarises the advantages and disadvantages of the two approaches.  
 
 
Table 3-1: Advantages and disadvantages of the positivist and phenomenological approaches 
    Positivism     Phenomenology 
Advantages • Applicable for establishing simple 
causal  
relationships 
  • Applicable for establishing more 
complex and interrelated causal 
relationships 
  • Good where straightforward 
objective research is required 
  • Preferable where subjective 
assessment is required 
  • Good where purely quantitative 
analysis is required 
  • Good where purely or largely 
qualitative analysis is required 
  • Good where the sample size has to 
be large and large amounts of data 
have to be  
processed 
  • Applicable for generating theories 
based on a few complex 
observations 
  • Appropriate if the question is about 
‘how often‘’ or ‘how quickly’ 
something happens 
  • Preferred where the researcher wants 
to develop a detailed understanding 
  • Results can be replicated   • The researcher can modify the 
research to allow for what he or she 
has learned 
  • Results tend to be highly reliable   • Better at making explanations as to 
why things happen 
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Disadvantages • Not applicable for research based on 
people 
  • Not applicable for research based on 
purely scientific or mathematical 
principles subject to immutable laws 
  • The reductionist approach may be 
too restrictive in some cases 
  • Highly complex 
  • The research design cannot be 
modified in any way to allow for 
what the researcher has learned 
  • May be difficult to replicate findings 
  • Produces only a snapshot of basic 
knowledge 
   Results may be relatively unreliable 
  • When using operationalisation may 
fail to measure numerous important 
variables 
  • There is a limit to how much 
understanding the researcher can 
develop within time limits 
        • Results may be open to 
interpretation 
        • May lack scientific rigour and be 
affected by dilution 
        • Data classification and analysis can 
be very complex and time 
consuming 
 
 
Based upon the  advantages and disadvantages of the two approaches, the research 
presented in this thesis lends itself to the positivist approach since it lends itself to the 
quantitative-oriented positivist approach since the research question can be studied 
using a large sample size, and relatively reliable inferences can be drawn from the 
research findings. Hence, given the research question, it naturally lends itself to the 
positivist approach. That is not to say, the phenomenological approach would be totally 
inappropriate, but stronger inferences can be derived from the positivist approach. This 
is the case since this study examines the individual and interrelated causal relationships 
for reporting incentives in mandatory IFRS adoption. 
 
3.2 Explanation of the terminology of ‘incentives’ in the study. 
An agency relationship is established when there is a separation between ownership and 
management. The principal engages the agent to perform some service on their behalf 
which involves delegating decision making authority to the agent (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). However, when both the principal and agent aim at maximizing his or her own 
benefits, it is possible that the self-interested agent will not always act in the best 
interests of the principal. This is known as the agency problem. 
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The agency problem may also apply to mandatory IFRS adoption. Since IFRS is a set of 
principle-based standards which allow a certain amount of discretion to managers on 
how to report financial performance and positions, self-interest managers may not have 
strong reporting incentives when adopting IFRS. Whether reporting under IFRS, or any 
other standard, is done in full disclosure with transparency or with cosmetic adoption 
without the intention to reduce information asymmetry will determine the quality of the 
“Output”. Reporting incentives are an integral element for managers to commit to the 
mandatory IFRS adoption process. To incorporate the concept of Rahman et al. (2002), 
reporting incentives and accounting regulations (from mandatory IFRS adoption) will 
become the “Influence” on how managers process their financial reports. This study 
stresses that without such incentives, accounting standards alone are not sufficient to 
exercise strong influence in the IFRS adoption process. In turn, good quality of financial 
output will not be possible. As a consequence, the desired capital market outcome is not 
achievable.  
 
Due to the requirements of more and greater disclosures and the use of fair value 
accounting, mandatory IFRS adoption may be considered higher quality reporting. 
However, it is questionable as to whether the mere adoption from domestic GAAP to 
IFRS will necessarily lead to improved financial reporting quality (i.e. better output) 
with the subsequent desired capital market benefits (i.e. better outcome). Extant 
literature still debate on if the actual financial reporting outcomes are in part or mainly 
shaped by reporting incentives (e.g. Leuz et al., 2003, Ball et al., 2003). The IPOO 
model provides a framework for understanding the drivers of improved financial 
reporting quality that distinguishes the internal and external factors that contribute to a 
better output. 
 
A key issue within this framework is that the reporting discretion that underpins IFRS 
Principles means managers and their auditors have to exercise their professional 
judgements (e.g. decision in determining the required impairment of goodwill and 
property, plant and equipment). Hence, this research study explores if such reporting 
discretion is shaped by reporting incentives that are influenced substantially by different 
internal and external factors. This research study argues that such influences include 
both individual and joint effects of firm-specific (CBF and ICG) and country level 
institutions (IEF). These feed into the IPOO framework to drive the observable 
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outcome, which is measured in the case of this study, through a reduction in firms’ cost 
of equity. 
 
Even though Agency Theory dominates the paradigm that managers interests diverge 
from that of the principal’s, there are alternative interpretations of the relationship. 
Stewardship theory argues that the assumptions in agency theory about individual 
benefit maximization may not hold for all managers (Davis, et al., 1997). It puts forward 
the proposition that, in contrast to the agent’s self-interest orientation, some managers 
may become the stewards who are motivated to act in the best interests of their 
principals (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). Davis, et al. (1997) find distinct differences 
between the two theories of management behavior and these are summarized in Table 2 
 
TABLE 3-2 
Comparison of Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory 
 
 Agency Theory Stewardship Theory 
Model  of  Man Economic man Sell-actualizing  man 
Behavior Self-serving Collective serving 
 
Psychological Mechanisms 
  
Motivation Lower  order/economic Higher order needs (growth, 
 needs (physiological, achievement, 
 security, economic) self-actualization) 
 Extrinsic Intrinsic 
Social Comparison 
Identification 
Other managers 
Low value commitment 
Principal 
High value commitment 
Power Institutional  (legitimate, coercive, 
reward) 
 
Personal (expert, referent) 
Management Philosophy Control oriented Involvement oriented 
Risk orientation Control mechanisms Trust 
Time frame 
Objective 
 
Cultural Differences                             
Short term Cost control 
Individualism  
 
High power distance 
Long Term 
Performance Enhancement 
Collectivism  
Low power distance 
 
 
What Table 2 demonstrates is that when managers are stewards, they will see that given 
specific firm-specific company business factor (CBF) the firm will benefit from 
adopting IFRS. For instance, if managers are aware that business growth will be 
benefitted by using equity financing for such projects, there will be a greater need for 
external communications with outside equity investors about the company’s financial 
52 
 
performance and position (Ball et al., 2003).  Since mandatory IFRS adoption promotes 
greater and better disclosures, managers may align the needs of equity financing with 
substantive efforts in fully comply with mandatory IFRS adoption. Therefore, a 
particular set of firm-specific characteristics will become the CBF that may be 
positively associated with reporting incentives in IFRS adoption. 
 
However, such strong reporting incentives may be challenged by managers’ self-
interested behavior. Because of the room for professional judgement under IFRS, 
managers may use the flexibility provided by the standards to undertake opportunistic 
behavior in order to maximize their own benefits rather than maximising the firms’ 
CBF. As a result, mandatory IFRS adoption may become simply a label-type of 
reporting standard which has little or even negative impact on the firm (Daske et al., 
2008). To resolve this issue, the board of directors who represent the interests of 
shareholders may need to implement effective internal corporate governance (ICG) 
mechanisms to mitigate the agency problem. The extant literature argues that the board 
of directors is important in controlling and regulating managers’ commitment in 
mandatory IFRS adoption so that managers will implement such accounting regulation 
seriously (Daske et al., 2008).  
 
In addition, users of financial information at the institution level may also play a role in 
influencing reporting incentives in mandatory IFRS adoption. In British origin (BO) 
firms, most users of financial reporting are domiciled in Anglo Saxon market-based 
economic environment; therefore, such users will demand substantial disclosure from 
IFRS adoption. On the other hand, the French origin (FO)’s government-based; German 
origin (GO)’s tax-based and Scandinavian origin (SO)’s socialist-based economy may 
differentiate their needs for the level of disclosures in IFRS-based financial reports. 
Therefore, it is possible that differences in legal origins within the EU may exert 
different influences on reporting incentives in mandatory IFRS adoption. 
 
 
3.3 IPOO Model 
For full compliance of IFRS adoption to give more and better disclosures relies on 
managers’ reporting incentives. Strong reporting incentives will act as a commitment to 
transparency of IFRS financial reporting by providing better and more disclosures. 
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Investors will be able to make better decisions with such high quality of financial 
information.   
 
Specifically, the IPOO model from the literature review is incorporated into the concept 
of reporting incentives in the following Figure 3.1. Unlike Rahman et al. (2002), 
“Influences” are expanded to three different and distinct forces. First, there are external 
(or macro) effects from institutional environment factors (such as cultural, social, 
economic and legal aspects) that are uncontrollable by firms but potentially have major 
impacts on financial reporting and disclosure practices. Second and third are internal 
(micro) effects from firm-specific (core business factors, henceforth, CBF) and internal 
corporate governance (ICG by the board of directors) that influence the mandatory IFRS 
adoption “Process”. In other words, both internal and external effects shape the 
commitment and motivations of firm managers, both individually and interactively in 
performing the IFRS financial reporting and disclosure practices. Accordingly, 
“Output” is the quality of financial reports and disclosure that comply with IFRS; and 
finally “Outcomes” refers to the economic consequences/benefits from capital markets, 
such as a lower cost of equity.  
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Figure 3.1- Extended IPOO Framework  
To follow the conceptual diagram by Rahman et al. (2002), this study develops and 
extends it 
11
from international accounting and reporting incentives into the following 
simplified graphic depiction of the IPOO relationship. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 Mandatory IFRS Adoption 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
11
 Adapted IPOO framework, based on Rahman et al. (2002). In this version of the model, ‘Influences’ 
are expanded into three distinct effects: institutional environment (a macro influence) and core business 
and corporate governance (micro or firm-specific influences). 
Influences (reporting incentives shaped by forces from 
macro- (institutional environment) and micro-(core 
business and internal corporate governance) level factors)   
Process in which managers preparing financial 
reports using IFRS  
Output: financial reports using IFRS with higher 
perceived quality to capital market users 
Outcome: Desirable economic consequences 
(e.g. Lower costs of equity) 
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The literature review stresses that results from recent studies document significantly 
lower cost of equity (ROE) from mandatory IFRS adoption, but that such empirical tests 
are based on limited data availability.  This research study hereby uses more extensive 
and detailed cross-sectional data to re-examine the question whether mandatory IFRS 
adoption can be associated with lower COE. The reason for this re-examination is that 
when the “Process” of adoption of high quality accounting standards alone does not 
automatically translate into high quality financial reports (i.e. Output), a positive 
economic “Outcome” from the capital markets is not guaranteed. Thus, the lower COE 
measured by prior studies (e.g. Li, 2010) cannot be generalized to the view that 
mandatory IFRS adoption is more beneficial than local accounting standards. This is 
because “Process” cannot be linked with “Outcome”, unless there are “Influences” from 
reporting incentives. However not all mandatory IFRS adopting firms have the same 
high level of reporting incentives (i.e. they have different “Influences”). Thus, when 
prior studies record that the average COE is lower for mandatory IFRS adopting firms, 
this study gathers evidence to prove that the lowering effect may be largely attributed to 
those firms with strong rather than weak incentives. Hence, when reporting incentives 
can be comprehensively proxied and carefully controlled for, more insight on the 
relationship between the COE effect and mandatory IFRS adoption can be revealed.  
 
Therefore, to examine the underlying economic outcomes from mandatory IFRS 
adoption, reporting incentives may be the important factor for mandatory IFRS adopters 
that determine if firms can have significantly lower COE. Differential reporting 
incentives can systematically result in different levels of the COE effect for mandatory 
adopters. 
 
Why reporting incentives may be more important for mandatory adoption than 
voluntary adoption? When comparing reporting incentives between voluntary and 
mandatory IFRS adoption, prior studies (e.g. Hail and Leuz, 2007) support the view that 
firms that voluntarily choose to comply with and adopt IFRS should have stronger 
incentives than firms that are forced to do so. It is because serious voluntary adopters 
may explicitly and credibly commit themselves to more transparency or signal this to 
the capital markets by bonding with other voluntary adopters (Coffee, 2002). Thus, 
during the voluntary period, firm-specific motivation mainly shapes reporting incentives 
(Bova 2009 and Lopes 2008). Later, when IFRS adoption becomes mandatory, this 
study argues that reporting incentives are even more important to motivate managers to 
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achieve full compliance with IFRS in order to produce high quality financial reports. It 
is because when IFRS adoption becomes mandatory, it is possible that not all firms have 
the motivation to produce high quality financial reports since as an accounting 
regulation, firms are required to do so no matter whether they want to or not. According 
to the IPOO model, such “Process” (i.e. mandatory IFRS adoption) is important, but not 
sufficient to achieve the desirable capital market “Outcome”, unless managers are really 
motivated to have strong reporting incentives. 
 
Mandatory IFRS adoption is supposed to enhance comparability of financial 
information across different jurisdictions so that investors can assess and evaluate 
investment alternatives in a cheaper and better way. More cross-country investments by 
a broader set of investors globally will increase liquidity and risk-sharing among 
investors. As a result, with IFRS, firms will be able to (i) present better pictures of their 
firms’ underlying economic performance and financial positions; and (ii) become more 
transparent by disclosing more relevant information. 
 
Besides firm-specific characteristics, the literature also stresses the role of institutional 
environment factors that may also influence reporting incentives in mandatory IFRS 
adoption. In addition, recent literature shows that improved corporate governance 
ratings may lead to better firm performance and higher financial reporting quality 
(Renders et al. 2010 and Verriest et al. 2009). Corporate boards of directors have 
recognized the need to develop firm-specific internal corporate governance mechanisms 
for monitoring managers’ behavior in IFRS adoption.   
 
Therefore, in mandatory IFRS adoption, it needs both individual and joint-efforts from 
firm-specific business factors and internal governance systems, and country-specific 
institutional factors to shape reporting incentives in mandatory IFRS adoption that may 
be associated with a reduced COE. To achieve an effective “Process” in mandatory 
IFRS adoption, empirical results show that both firm- and country-specific components 
are important factors on the level of reporting incentives as “Influences”. However, the 
study of the links between the COE and institutional environment or internal corporate 
governance in mandatory IFRS adoption has been rare in the literature. In the following 
sections, this study will continue to examine the three influences of reporting incentives 
in mandatory IFRS adoption. 
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3.4 The Components of Reporting Incentives 
To comprehensively examine the IPOO model, this study looks into individual and 
combined effects on reporting incentives from the “Influences”. Accordingly, the 
following sections discuss each element of the reporting incentives in turn. 
 
3.4.1 The Importance of Firms’ Core Business Factors (CBF)  
How do we know managers are motivated by strong incentives? Prior studies on 
voluntary IFRS adoption tend to proxy strong reporting incentives by certain firm-
specific characteristics such as size, growth opportunities and ownership concentration. 
These factors may motivate firms to adopt IFRS voluntarily and result in a lower COE. 
Similarly, for mandatory adopters this study argues that there are also certain factors 
that can proxy as strong reporting incentives and which also associate with lower COE.   
Since those business factors may lead firms to expect capital market benefits, it 
strengthens the commitment to implement IFRS financial reporting process, even 
though it is mandatory to do so. In addition, since IFRS is a principle-based accounting 
standard which allow managers’ an element of discretion to report and disclose certain 
financial information, it is highly possible that some firms may disclose more and better 
in full compliance with the spirit of IFRS, rather than cosmetically adhere to the new 
standards. If firm managers believe that their particular CBF’s are more aligned with the 
net expected benefits of mandatory IFRS, firms have stronger reporting incentives to 
adopt IFRS, relative to other firms without such CBF (Daske et al. 2007). However, as 
the literature review mentions, reporting incentives are not directly observable, 
therefore, the proposition is that certain firms’ strong CBF can be proxied as high 
reporting incentives and this systematically leads to a differential COE effect for 
mandatory IFRS adopting firms.  
 
However, just depending on firms’ CBF is not sufficient to ensure strong reporting 
incentives, since managers still have discretion to exercise judgments in the process of 
mandatory IFRS adoption. To regulate and monitor managers’ behavior, this study 
discusses the importance of firm-specific internal corporate governance mechanisms. 
 
3.4.2 The Importance of Firms’ Internal Corporate Governance (ICG) 
Strong CBF is important to reporting incentives in mandatory IFRS adoption, provided 
that managers exercise their discretion to work hard with full commitment. Since IFRS 
is a principles-based standard, managers are given a certain amount of flexibility to 
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interpret and apply IFRS. Agency theory argues that managers may “abuse” their 
discretion by exercising opportunistic behavior to maximize their personal benefits.
12
  
To mitigate agents’ insider benefits at the expense of shareholders’ interests, boards of 
directors (elected by the shareholders) are expected to exercise their fiduciary duties and 
employ effective ICG mechanisms to control, monitor and regulate managers’ behavior, 
including mandatory IFRS adoption. 
 
In addition, corporate scandals in the past decade revealed (i) the existence of agency 
problems; (ii) that there is an emerging need to reform corporate governance, especially 
internal corporate governance regimes. For instance, countries like the U.K. have 
already mandated corporate governance recommendations into regulatory requirements 
such as firms’ reporting ‘Comply or Explain’ (C or E) in corporate governance practices 
(Enriques and Volpin, 2007). 
 
Therefore, this study will use corporate governance data provided by Deminor Rating 
which assesses the companies included in the FTS Eurofirst 300 index –based on a 
corporate-governance grid comprising over 300 criteria, including board structure and  
anti-takeover mechanisms, shareholder rights, and disclosure. The use of the Deminor 
Ratings has been common in the literature, as a comprehensive measure for the strength 
of corporate governance (Bauer et al. 2004, Khanna et al. 2006, Bozec 2007, Florou and 
Galarniotis 2007, Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008 and Renders et al. 2010).  
 
Moreover, in seeking to understand reporting incentives, in addition to , the micro-level 
factors discussed previously, macro-based country-specific institutional factors cannot 
be ignored. In the following section, the theoretical link between the institutional 
characteristics of mandatory IFRS adoption and the COE effect in the IPOO model are 
described.  
 
3.4.3 The Importance of Institutional Environment Factors (IEF) 
Numerous research papers claim that IEFs, such as the economic system and legal 
enforcement, can influence significantly firms’ reporting incentives in IFRS adoption 
(Chen et al. 2010, Christensen et al. 2008, and Christensen et al. 2007). Even though 
                                                 
12
 Agency theory argues that when agent engaged as a steward to perform some service on the behalf of 
others, often involving safeguarding assets belonging to them.  The principal delegates decision making 
authority to the agent. However, Agent may be able to act in ways unfavorable to or not approved by the 
principal – shirking, fraud, etc. (Watts, R.L., & J.L. Zimmerman, 1978) 
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mandatory IFRS adoption is a regulation, the effectiveness of full compliance is 
determined to some extent by cultural, economic and social factors, enforcement and 
other differences in IEFs among EU countries.  By using comprehensive proxies for 
different national legal origins and institutional characteristics, it will be possible to 
investigate how IEFs influence the economic consequences of IFRS adoption.  
 
Wang and Yu (2009) and Bushman et al. (2004) argue that corporate transparency is not 
only associated with, but is a product of high quality reporting standards (such as IFRS) 
and an appropriate level of reporting incentives, as measured by a country’s level of 
investor protection and its political structure. However, without looking into the aspects 
of corporate characteristics, Wang and Yu only associate the relevant institutional 
factors as important in explaining reporting incentives as (i) minority shareholders’ 
protection against expropriation by corporate insiders and majority shareholders 
(proxied by the index of anti-director rights); (ii) legal origin (measured by a 
dichotomous variable indicating whether a country’s laws originated from the common-
law or code-law tradition); and (iii) the level of legal enforcement (measured by a 
country’s judicial efficiency, rule of law and government corruption).   
 
Together with CBF and ICG, this study thereby measures if differences in country-
specific IEF can individually and interactively influence reporting incentives that are 
associated with the lower COE following mandatory IFRS adoption.   
 
Thus, the theoretical framework of this study points out that joint effort from firm-
specific and institutional environmental factors, and shareholders’ monitoring efforts 
(represented by board of directors’ internal corporate governance mechanisms) together 
with IFRS adoption may be associated with substantial differences in capital market 
outcomes.  
 
Regarding the proxies of institutional factors, this study argues that IFRS research may 
need to examine the more “sticky” and fundamental base in institutions. In addition, 
prior studies broadly classify IEF with a simple binary approach in terms of code and 
common-law countries (e.g. Ball et al. 2003). As a result, significant driver(s) such as 
arms lengths contracting, timely loss recognition and other accounting quality variables 
from institutions that shape variations in reporting incentives become unclear (Wysocki, 
2010). Hence, a greater spectrum of proxies with a more differentiated and 
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comprehensive approach will allow a greater insight into the effect of IEF on mandatory 
IFRS adoption.  
 
This study examines if there are relationships between a group of countries, defined by 
their legal origins which broadly capture legal, economic and cultural perspectives 
across the EU (La Porta et al. 1999), and capital market benefits due to mandatory IFRS 
adoption. Hence, EU countries can be divided into four distinct groups with their own 
origins: (1) British-origin (BO) (2) French-origin (FO) (3) German-origin (GO) and (4) 
Scandinavian-origin (SO). These four legal origins are still a new concept to accounting 
research; and prior studies (such as Krivogorsky et al. 2010) mostly study the 
relationship between legal origins and motivation for firms to voluntarily adopt IFRS. 
To the best of my knowledge, so far, there is no study to directly examine the COE 
effect from mandatory IFRS adoption under differential legal origins in the EU.  
 
Early studies based on cultural differences primarily test if there is a significant link 
between cultural values and their impact on accounting practice and disclosure (Jaggi, 
1975; Gray, 1988; Perera, 1989, Doupnik and Salter, 1995; Zarzeski, 1996) and claim 
that the relative importance of the impact in empirical studies is fading due to 
globalization. However, even though there is capital market integration and a one-for-all 
accounting standard adoption in one single economic unit such as the EU, the four 
distinct legal origins show that there are still national diversities at the institutional 
environment level that may affect managers’ accounting practices. Therefore, it is 
possible that such dynamics among different institutional factors of a united but diverse 
community such as the EU (including regulatory, political, social customs, cultural and 
contracting practices) will have differential reporting incentives on mandatory IFRS 
adoption.  
 
This argument is supported by a recent study that even though the EU is in the process 
of capital market integration and institutional differences in terms of enforcement and 
regulations in capital markets may be becoming smaller, fundamentally long-lasting and 
deeply-rooted legal and cultural differences do still exist (Krivogorsky et al. 2010). 
Historically, legal origins of British origin (BO) (i.e. U.K. and Ireland) belong to Anglo-
Saxon groups while many others come from Continental Europe. In the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, the role of financial reporting is more emphasized in providing information 
for equity investors’ decision-making. On the other hand, with the introduction of IFRS, 
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the Continental jurisdiction is gradually changing from its traditional purpose for 
accounting information to regulate companies to be more used in business and equity 
investment purposes (Bebbington and Song, 2003). Similar to BO, French origin (FO) 
has gradually established its equity markets, which requires more transparent financial 
information from for the needs of investors. When such origins adopt IFRS, the 
additional disclosure may lead to a lowering in the COE. On the other hand, 
Scandinavian origin (SO) is regarded as an environment of significant governmental 
involvement in the economy and in the way firms operate (i.e. Sweden, Demark and 
Finland). German origin (GO) previously adopted its Handelsgesetzbuch (HBG – the 
German Commercial Code as the national GAAP) for preparing financial reports 
primarily to reflect the needs for tax compliance. The information need in preparing 
accounts under HBG therefore substantially differs from IFRS, which mainly provide 
information for investors. Hence, this study argues that such differences in IEF may 
systematically shape mandatory firms’ incentives in IFRS financial reporting and lead 
to non-uniform COE effects individually and interactively with CBF and ICG.   
 
In addition, Krivogorsky et al. (2010) argue that national diversity in terms of 
jurisdictional differences and national levels of bureaucratic administrative formalities 
pertaining to accounting measurements and practices should not be ignored. Another 
way to test the institutional effects on the cost of equity (COE) along with mandatory 
IFRS adoption is to comprehensively look at national levels of bureaucratic and 
administrative formalities. By retrieving the partitioning of EU countries based on the 
approach adopted by Institutional Profiles database (www.cepii.fr/ProfilsInstitutionels 
Database.htm), 18 EU member countries can be classified into A, B, C & D sectors. 
 
Sector A being the higher-than-average score for countries with developed public 
institutions and civil society. It estimates each country’s such factors as public rights 
and liberties, transparency, corruption control, efficiency of administration, 
independence of the justice system  Sector B captures the higher scoring for goods and 
service area such as regulation of competition and trade openness, privatization, 
nationalizations, freedom of prices, and intellectual property protection. Sector C 
belongs to the development of capital markets in areas like interest rates freedom, 
financial openness, micro-lending and regulations. Finally, sector D are those estimates 
on labor market and social relations, which are about trade union freedom and 
pluralism, respect for labor laws, and the circulation of workers. 
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In order to test how mandatory IFRS firms’ interact with diverse institutional profiles 
from the EU in relation to the COE effect, it can be hypothesized that jurisdictions with 
focuses on sector A (i.e. public institutions and civil society), sector B (i.e. goods and 
services) and sector C (capital market) will be in reinforcement with mandatory IFRS 
adoption towards the lowering COE, because all of these activities can facilitate along 
with the mandatory IFRS process. However, sector D with its emphasis on labor market 
and social relations, then mandatory IFRS adoption may not lead to any significant COE 
effect.  
 
As discussed, in an effort to overcome various limitations and caveats from prior studies 
on IFRS research, this study uses more data availability to cover a longer time period, 
uses a cross-countries comparative study and develops comprehensive proxies of 
reporting incentives. In doing so it undertakes by the following: 
 
(1) Focuses on firm-specific factors (i.e. CBF) as a driver for reporting incentives;  
 
(2) Employs additional firm-specific factors for internal governance effectiveness 
(i.e. ICG) as an influence on reporting incentives;  
 
(3) Uses two different but more comprehensive proxies for IEF (i.e. legal origins: 
BO, FO, SO and GO; and different national Institutional Profile sectors: A, B, C and 
D). 
 
This study therefore examines if and how CBF, ICG and IEF individually and 
interactively determine reporting incentives in the IPOO process, with the consequences 
measured by differences in the COE reducing effect.  In the following section, this study 
will continue to discuss the proxy for ex-ante cost of equity as the measure of capital 
market benefits, which also becomes the dependent variable in the models used to 
analyze the data. 
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3.5 Cost of equity (COE) as a measure of capital market outcomes  
To measure capital market benefits from IFRS adoption, the literature always refers to 
changes in the COE (e.g. Li, 2010; Daske et al. 2008; Hail and Leuz, 2004). To 
integrate with basic theory, Figure 4.2 provides a simple illustration about measuring 
the COE. 
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Figure 3.2 – Proxies of Reporting Incentives 
The proxies for “Influences” (two micro and one macro levels) on manager incentives 
will be: Core Business Factors (CBF), Internal Corporate Governance (ICG); and 
Institutional Environment Factors (IEF).  
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Reporting 
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CBF – Core Business Factors are particular firms’ characteristics and profiles that 
interact with mandatory IFRS adoption and may be associated with the expectations of 
capital market benefits. 
 
ICG – firms’ Internal Corporate Governance mechanisms and systems to regulate, 
monitor and control managers so that they will exercise their full commitment in 
implementing mandatory IFRS adoption; and mitigate their opportunistic discretionary 
decisions.  
 
IEF – Institutional Environment Factors are those country-specific legal, economic, 
social, and cultural aspects that interact with mandatory IFRS adoption; and possibly 
relate to substantial capital market benefits. 
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To quantify the effects of IFRS adoption, what are termed economic consequences, 
Daske et al. (2007) argue that (1) due to different managerial incentives, the exists 
heterogeneity of economic consequences by IFRS adoption; and therefore (2) high 
quality accounting standards per se (such as IFRS) do not, of themselves, ensure high 
quality financial reporting practices.  
 
Equity markets will recognize which firms have made a serious commitment to 
mandatory IFRS adoption. Economic theory argues that information asymmetry 
between the firm’s managers and investors will be reduced and consequently the COE 
will be lowered. Hence, more and better disclosure via IFRS improves information 
flows, increasing transparency, and may result in investors’ having a lower required 
return, which leads to a lower observed COE. (Covrig, DeFond and Hung, 2007). A 
lower COE is one of the key expected benefits from IFRS adoption. ( Leuz and 
Verrecchia, 2000; Lambert et al. 2007). The link between firms’ differences in reporting 
incentives and benefits attributed to shareholders will be examined by following prior 
studies such as Li (2010) and Daske et al. (2006) and use as a proxy for this the change 
in the COE. 
 
Thus, any change in COE is measured between (i) voluntary and mandatory IFRS 
adopters and (ii) mandatory adopters in the pre- and post-mandatory periods. After that, 
tests on the effect of COE on the mandatory adopting firms from each component of 
CBF, ICG and IEF and interactions between these, to find out if these substitute or 
complement each other. This conceptual framework can be illustrated by Figure 3.3.  
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Figure 3.3 – Reporting Incentives to Influence Mandatory IFRS 
Adoption  
 
In the mandatory IFRS setting, this model conceptualizes the research framework to test 
the proxies of reporting incentives for CBF, ICG and IEF individually and  any 
interactions between them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This framework of incentives/IFRS adoption/capital market performance sequence 
reflects prior studies that report that (i) IFRS per se is not the sole determinant of capital 
market effects, and (ii) there is heterogeneity of capital market effects from different 
firms in different countries, probably due to the variations in firm incentives for 
financial reporting after the adoption of IFRS.  
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By treating CBF, ICG and IEF in an inter-connected manner, this holistic research 
context may be able to measure any significant direct association between these 
influences on incentives in mandatory IFRS adoption and the corresponding 
consequences of changes in the COE.  
 
So far, there are prior studies suggesting that the role of accounting standards per se is 
much more limited than previously thought, even if such standards become uniformly 
regulated (Wysocki, 2010). Overall, given the inconclusive results from the prior studies 
on mandatory IFRS adoption, this study aims at replicating, validating and adding to 
previous studies to add to the extant knowledge about the important roles of reporting 
incentives in mandatory adoption of IFRS (e.g. Daske et al., 2007, Bova 2009, Bova 
and Pereira, 2009).The underlying theory argues that such reporting incentives can be 
systematically shaped by firm-specific CBF and ICG and country-specific IEF. The 
results will call attention to the joint effort and commitment from management, the 
board of directors and government in successful implementation of mandatory IFRS 
adoption. The ultimate objective of IFRS is to prepare and communicate high quality 
financial information with sufficiently detailed disclosures for global equity investors to 
make decisions in the capital markets. To achieve this objective, firms need strong 
reporting incentives to fully comply with IFRS when it is adopted. The present study 
emphasizes that in the IPOO model, mandatory adopters are faced with different firm-
specific CBF and ICG, and country-specific IEF which will influence IFRS reporting 
incentives. From the users of IFRS financial reporting perspective, such differences in 
reporting incentives will be associated with substantial variations in their information 
content and hence in capital market effects (proxied by a lower COE). Various tests will 
be undertaken to show that, to achieve strong reporting incentives and capital market 
effects, a firm’s management needs to interact among the dynamics of these three 
forces. 
 
After the basic theory and theoretical framework have been discussed, the next chapter 
will outline this study’s research questions, aims and objectives.  
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Chapter 4 - Research Questions, Aims and Objectives and 
Hypotheses  
To advance the argument of chapter 3, the following research questions, aims and 
objectives have been developed. Then this will be followed by establishing a set of 
relevant research and operating hypotheses.  
 
4.1 Research Aims 
The major aim for this research study is that mandatory IFRS adoption has a dissimilar 
effect on the cost of equity compared to voluntary IFRS adoption, when comparing any 
differences in the COE for mandatory adopters between the pre- and post-mandatory 
periods. The second research aim is to examine the relationship between mandatory 
adopters’ proxies of reporting incentives and any significant association with the COE. 
 
To accomplish the above research aims, the following formal research objectives have 
been developed. 
 
4.2 Research Objectives 
Research Objective 1 
To examine if there are changes in the COE for mandatory IFRS adopters when (i) 
compared to voluntary IFRS adopters for the whole sampling period; and (ii) between 
the pre- and post-mandatory IFRS adoption periods . 
 
Research questions for research objective 1 
The initial test is to find out if the average COE for mandatory adopters is significantly 
lower than that of non-mandatory adopters, regardless of the mandatory adopters’ 
reporting incentives. In addition, empirical tests are performed to study if it is 
empirically evident that mandatory IFRS adoption by itself will associate with lower 
COE for mandatory adopting firms between the pre- and post-mandatory adoption 
period (i.e. between 2000 to 2004 and 2005 to 2009).  
 
1
st
 Research Question for objective 1: Are there any changes in the COE for mandatory 
IFRS adopters when compared to non-mandatory adopters for the period 2000 to 2009? 
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2
nd
 Research Question for objective 1: Are there any changes in the COE associated 
with mandatory IFRS-adoption in the post-2005 than that of pre-2005 period?  
 
After the first stage, there will be initial evidence to show if there is any “average” 
capital market effects of mandatory adoption of IFRS through changes in the COE 
between the pre- and post-mandatory period.  
 
Research Objective 2 
To study if differences in firms’ reporting incentives in relation to mandatory IFRS 
adoption that are related to dissimilar effects in their COE. This objective can be 
achieved by examining both the individual and interactive effects of firms’ reporting 
incentives, proxied by CBFs, ICG and IEFs, in the overall mandatory IFRS adoption 
based on the results of the first research questions. 
 
Research question for research objective 2 
Research question for objective 2: Are changes in the COE associated with firms’ 
reporting incentives, as proxied by core business factors (CBFs), internal corporate 
governance (ICG) and institutional environmental factors (IEFs)? 
 
To continue this study, in the next section, the relevant research and operating 
hypotheses pertaining to the above-mentioned research questions will be discussed in 
detail.  
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4.3 Research Hypotheses 
Given the above research aims and objectives, it is an empirical question whether and 
how the COE reducing effect of mandatory IFRS adoption is affected by firms’ 
particular characteristics, corporate governance regimes and countries’ institutional 
environment. To conduct empirical tests, the following research and operating 
hypotheses have been cultivated: 
 
4.3.1 Research Hypotheses 1 to 3 (RH1 to RH3) 
The rationale of Research Objective #1 from above section exploits that even with the 
mandate to adopt IFRS, it is still unclear if firms adopt IFRS mandatorily experience 
any COE effect when compare to voluntary adopters. Also, for mandatory adopters, it is 
inconclusive to be evident that if their COE is different between the pre- and post-
mandatory period. Therefore, the following RH1 and RH2 test for any overall difference 
in the COE, irrespective of reporting incentives. 
 
RH1:  There are significant differences in the firms’ implied COE in the EU between 
voluntary IFRS adopters and mandatory IFRS adopters  
 
Using limited data from January 1, 2005, Li (2010) measures lower COE for mandatory 
adopters during transition period only. However, this study argues that with differential 
reporting incentives for mandatory adopters, mandatory IFRS adoption alone is not 
sufficient to warrant higher quality, which leading to lower COE. Thus, this hypothesis 
expects that using more data beyond the transition period to test if, on average, the COE 
for mandatory IFRS adopters is actually not different between the pre and post-
mandatory period. 
  
RH 2: The COE for mandatory IFRS adopting firms does not differ between the post 
(2005 – 2009) and the pre-adoption period (2000 – 2004). 
 
Previous chapters argue that in IPOO concept, even though IFRS adoption becomes 
mandatory, reporting incentives is important (Influences) to determine how managers 
perform financial reporting (Process), prepare financial reports in accordance with IFRS 
(Output); and subsequently lead to different COE (Outcome). Earlier chapters explore 
that due to the possible differences in reporting incentives, whether the COE is reduced 
in mandatory IFRS setting is still an open question. Accordingly, the following research 
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hypothesis #3 is developed to test if different CBF, ICG and IEF as proxies of reporting 
incentives play significant roles in reducing COE in mandatory IFRS adoption. 
 
RH3: The higher the level of firms’ CBF, ICG and IEF to adopt IFRS mandatorily, the 
higher the reducing effect of the COE.  
 
4.4 Operating Hypothesis for Research Hypotheses 
To carry out various empirical tests and gather statistical evidence for the above-
mentioned research hypotheses, the following operating hypotheses are developed 
(summarized in Table 4.1). 
 
4.4.1 Operating Hypotheses 1 and 2 for Research Hypotheses 1 and 2 (RH1 & 2) 
As indicated in Table 4.1, both operating hypotheses 1 and 2 are designed to test the 
first research hypotheses 1 and 2 that if the COE for mandatory IFRS adopting firms 
have been different (1) from voluntary IFRS adopting firms; and (2) between the pre 
and post-mandatory IFRS period.  
 
4.4.2  Operating Hypotheses 3 to 7 for Research Hypothesis 3 (RH3) 
For mandatory IFRS adopting firms, this study tests if there are certain high level of 
firm-specific characteristics may become the statistically significant micro-level 
influence, proxies as CBF, ICG and their interaction, to associate with different effects 
in the COE (operating hypotheses # 3, and 4).   
 
In addition, the country-specific IEF that can be proxied by the country’s legal origin 
(namely BO, FO, GO and SO) and Sectors (namely Sector A, B, C and D) respectively. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, legal origins may influence managers’ reporting incentives 
even though the adoption is mandatory. IFRS is essentially a set of standards developed 
for stock-market-based economies such as the U.K. and France (i.e. BO and FO); 
managers in other countries with major debt-markets such as Scandinavian Origin (SO) 
may not have strong incentives to commit in IFRS adoption. To test for the effects of 
mandatory adopters’ IEF and respective interactions with CBF on COE, this study 
develops operating hypotheses #5 to 7 accordingly.  
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4.4.3 Operating Hypotheses 8 for Research Hypothesis 3 (RH3) 
The results from testing the above-mentioned operating hypotheses #3 to 7 will exhibit 
if CBF and ICG are both significant components to have influences to reporting 
incentives which result in different effects in the COE. Then, operating hypothesis 8 is 
designed to test if various IEFs interact with high level of CBF and ICG in mandatory 
IFRS adoption will also work together in the lower effects of COE. However, as per the 
discussions in above chapter 3 that there may be substantial variations in the COE effect 
from different cultural, administrative, legal and business practices of IEF. Hence, even 
though it is a mandate to adopt IFRS by law and even mandatory IFRS firms are with 
strong CBF and ICG, It is expected that the COE effect to be different in various legal 
origins. 
 
After the discussion of research questions and hypotheses, in next chapter, sample 
design and data collection process will be presented. Then, it will be followed by 
Chapter 6 to develop the research models before examining various empirical results in 
Chapter 7.   
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Table 4.1 
Summary of Research Questions, Research and Operating Hypotheses, Empirical Tests 
and Test Tables 
 
Research Questions Research Hypotheses Operating Hypotheses 
1st Research Question for objective 1:  
Are changes in the cost of equity for 
mandatory IFRS adopters compared to 
voluntary IFRS adopters for the period 
2000 to 2009? 
RH1: There are significant 
differences in the firms’ cost of 
equity in the EU between 
voluntary IFRS adopters and 
mandatory IFRS adopters  
 
OH1: The cost of equity for 
mandatory IFRS adopting firms 
is different from voluntary 
IFRS adopting firms for the 
whole period from 2000 to 
2009. 
 
2nd Research Question for objective 1: 
Are changes in the cost of equity 
associated with mandatory IFRS-
adoption in the post-2005 than that of 
pre-2005 period?  
RH 2: The cost of equity for 
mandatory IFRS adopting firms 
does not differ between the post 
(2005 – 2009) and the pre-
adoption period (2000 – 2004). 
 
OH2: For mandatory IFRS 
adopting firms, the cost of 
equity in the post-mandatory 
period is not different from the 
pre mandatory period. 
Research question for objective 2: Are 
changes in the cost of equity 
associated with financial reporting 
incentives, proxied by core business 
factors (CBFs), internal corporate 
governance (ICG) and institutional 
environmental factors (IEFs)? 
RH3: The higher the level of 
firms’ CBF, ICG and IEF to adopt 
IFRS mandatorily, the higher the 
reducing effect on cost of equity.  
 
OH3:  
The cost of equity effect of 
mandatory IFRS adopting firms 
is negatively associated with 
strong CBF, other things being 
equal. 
  OH4a:    
The cost of equity effect of 
mandatory IFRS adopting firms 
is negatively associated with 
high ICG, other things being 
equal. 
  OH4b:  
Ha: The cost of equity effect of 
mandatory IFRS adopting firms 
is negatively associated with 
strong CBF and ICG, other 
things being equal. 
   OH5: The cost of equity effect 
for mandatory IFRS firms is 
negatively associated with legal 
origins of BO and FO, but 
positively associated with legal 
origins of GO and SO, other 
things being equal. 
 
   
OH6: The cost of equity effect 
for mandatory IFRS firms 
differs between strong CBF and 
their legal origins, other things 
being equal. 
 
  OH7: The cost of equity effect 
for mandatory IFRS firms is 
negatively associated with 
countries from sectors A, B, C 
but not from sector D, other 
things being equal. 
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  OH 8: The cost of equity effect 
for mandatory IFRS firms 
differs between the legal 
origins, and strong CBF and 
ICG, other things being equal. 
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Chapter 5 – Sample Design and Data Collection Process 
As illustrated in the research questions and hypotheses detailed in the previous chapter, 
the selection of a relevant sample in IFRS research studies is an important element to 
provide reliable empirical results. In this chapter, the sample selection beyond the 
transition period will be examined and details of the data collection process will be 
discussed. 
 
5.1 Sample Selection from the EU  
This study follows Beuselinck et al. (2009) who argue that examining the influences 
from mandatory IFRS effects in European firms provides researchers with an unique 
setting because the EU capital markets are getting more integrated, there is a high 
degree of capital mobility and economic harmonization and cooperation are well 
developed.  However, companies in the EU still have a certain level of variation in firm-
specific factors and institutional environments, consequently implementing reporting 
incentives for such a one-size-fits-all IFRS set of standards may not be the same across 
countries and firms. To address this issue, this study uses financial statement data from 
the listed companies of the 18 EU member states where data is available from 2000 to 
2009. This is different to other studies that examine the change of accounting standards 
through the implementation of IFRS in 2005.  For instance, Li (2010) uses the data from 
1998 to 2006, to test if the COE is reduced following mandatory IFRS adoption. Li’s 
study, however, just has only two years post-mandatory data (i.e. 2005 and 2006). 
 
As discussed earlier in previous Chapter 4 and to follow the approach used in prior 
studies (e.g. Li, 2010), each sample firm will be used as its own benchmark to compare 
any changes in their COE from before and after the mandatory IFRS adoption.  
Therefore, firms that do not have data available for both the pre- and post-mandatory 
IFRS adoption periods are excluded from the sample. 
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In addition, the practice that prior studies exclude financial institutions (i.e. those with 
four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes between 6000 and 6999) is 
followed (e.g. Hung 2001; Leuz et al. 2003; Francis & Wang 2008), mainly because 
banking, insurance, financial and credit institutions are subject to particular regulation 
and disclosure requirements, as well as the controversial issues in fair value reporting
13
. 
 
5.2 Database and Proxies  
Different international accounting databases offer different coverage and characteristics 
of financial data for accounting research. Garcia Lara et al., (2006) argue that the choice 
of database has an effect on the results of empirical studies due to the differences in 
classification and measurement methods of samples from different databases. The data 
used in the thesis is obtained from the following sources: Compustat Global, 
Institutional Brokers Estimate System, and national levels of bureaucratic and 
administrative formalities from Institutional Profiles database 
(www.cepii.fr/ProfilsInstitutionels Database.htm). 
 
The Compustat Global is normalized according to country accounting principles, 
disclosure methods and specific data item definitions and is the one used in the most 
recent IFRS research studies (e.g. Li, 2010). Therefore, this study uses Compustat 
Global as the primary source of data and which provides the best cover for European 
listed companies’ accounting and financial information.  As mentioned earlier, the main 
objective of this research is to test the IFRS effect on firms’ COE under different 
reporting incentives covering a longer time periods following mandatory IFRS adoption 
than previous studies. Accordingly, data is available for the variables to be used in 
estimating the COE measures, including the dividend payout ratio and the book value of 
equity from 2000 to 2009, as well as other control variables used in the models.  
 
 
 
                                                 
13
  The literature discusses the controversial issues of IAS 39. Armstrong et al. (2008) argues that as the 
two provisions of IAS 39 prescribes the recognition requirements for financial instruments with fair 
values option and hedge accounting rules. Banking and insurance sectors responded with great resistance 
against such provisions because of their fluctuated market values of assets and liabilities. As a result, 
European Commission (EC) carved-out these two provisions of IAS39. 
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The Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) is a global financial information 
business widely recognized as the premier source of global earnings estimates and other 
financial data. It contains the most comprehensive data on live, high-quality earnings 
expectations. Having been used by most IFRS research studies, I/B/E/S offers high-
quality earnings forecasts by analysts. From the I/B/E/S database, analyst forecasts and 
price information for all EU public companies for the period 2000 to 2009 are extracted. 
Other inputs for the cost of capital estimation, including dividend payout ratio and book 
value of equity, are obtained from Compustat Global.  
 
5.3 Identification of IFRS Adopting Firms 
To test for the capital market effects from mandatory IFRS adoption, the practice of 
prior studies is followed (Luzi et al. 2007, Daske et al. 2007 and Kim and Shi 2007) that 
a conservative approach is more appropriate to classify IFRS firms, i.e. firms that adopt 
IFRS completely, not partially (e.g. IFRS with some EU or IASC/IASB guidelines). 
14
 
 
5.3.1 Stock Prices and Forecast Data as Proxies 
To avoid look-ahead bias in the estimation of the COE, this study follows prior studies 
(e.g. Hail and Leuz, 2006; Li, 2010; Daske et al. 2007) that use accounting data for 
estimating earnings variables by estimating this seven months after the fiscal year-end 
in order to make sure that annual audited financial data are publicly available and 
incorporated in the stock price at the time of estimation.  
 
5.4 Estimation of the COE: ex-ante implied cost of equity 
In measuring the COE as the dependent variable, prior studies debate on whether an ex-
ante (i.e. expected) metric or realized returns should be used in the calculation (e.g. 
Claus and Thomas, 2001; Gebhardt et al. 2001, etc.). With the limitations of not being 
able to capture the firms’ risk measure, the literature in general supports the use of the 
expected return, proxied by analysts’ earnings forecasts. The fundamental rationale is to 
estimate the ex-ante COE as the internal rate of return that equates the current stock 
price (e.g. Francis et al. 2005). To do this, financial data will be obtained from 
                                                 
14
 The literature identifies that different databases have inconsistent approaches in classifying levels of 
IFRS adopters. For instance, Worldscope classifies different levels of IFRS adoption by examining details 
of the firms’ disclosures and financial reports, from a firm’s reporting strategy as IFRS, partially 
compiled to fully compiled IFRS adoption. Kim and Shi (2007) argue that their significant association 
between IFRS adoption and cost of equity capital vs. the insignificant association done by Daske et al. 
(2007) is mainly because Daske et al. (2007) use a broader classification of IFRS adopters in their source 
of data, while Kim and Shi (2007) use a stricter classification (i.e. full adoption), suggesting that the full 
(partial) adoption is a more (less) credible factor.    
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Computstat and price, trading volume data, analyst forecasts and share price data from 
I/B/E/S. 
 
Regarding the estimate of the ex-ante, expected COE, there are different calculation 
models used by prior studies. However, recent research by Hail and Leuz (2006) argues 
that alternative estimates from different models are highly correlated with each other 
and are identical within a reasonable range. Botosan and Plumlee (2005) compare the 
six most widely used measures of the COE based on financial analysts’ forecasts and 
conclude that the target price method and the PEG ratio method perform the best. In 
addition, other researchers such as Kim and Shi (2007), Francis, et al. (2005) and 
Prather-Kinsey et al. (2008) also illustrate that the Easton (2004) price-earnings-growth 
(PEG) model is the most suitable to estimate the implied COE in their research papers. 
 
In addition, Kim and Shi (2007) use the Easton (2004) PEG model to find that the COE 
is significantly lower for the full IFRS adopters than for the non-adopters, suggesting 
that the IFRS adopters benefit from greater and better disclosures via IFRS by having a 
lower cost of equity capital. This study therefore follows Hail and Leuz (2006) and Kim 
and Shi (2007) to use the Modified PEG ratio model developed by Easton (2004) as 
shown in Equation 5.3: 
 
                   _____________ 
Coe PEG = √ EPS2 – EPS1 
                  P0     Equation 5.3 
 
Where:  
Coe PEG = ex-ante COE, where PEG refers to price-earnings growth model; 
EPS 1 = the one-year ahead mean analysts’ earnings forecast per share; 
EPS2 = the two-year ahead mean analysts’ earnings forecast per share; 
P0 = the market price per share at fiscal year-end. 
 
To calculate the COE, market price, dividend and analyst forecasts from I/B/E/S are 
substituted into Equation 5.3 and solved for the COE that equates the current stock price 
and the expected future earnings. 
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Concerning the share price at fiscal year-end (i.e. P0 in Equation 5.3), this study follows 
the approach used by Francis et al. (2005) and applies the common stock price as of the 
firm-year observations’ fiscal year ending date. According, for both EPS1 and EPS2, 
earnings forecasts available on I/B/E/S database as of consensus (i.e. mean) projected 
EPS in one-year ahead and two-year-ahead after the fiscal year-ending date are 
collected. In order to make the estimate for this study consistent in the valuation model 
and avoid any look-ahead bias, this study follows the literature and uses the share price 
at year-end plus 7 months in the COE calculation model to make sure audited financial 
statement data of each listed company in the sample is available after the fiscal year 
end. In addition, the two-year-ahead consensus earnings forecast exceed the one-year-
ahead one; and any negative forecast of earnings will be removed from the database 
(Easton, 2004, Kim and Shi, 2007). 
 
To summarize, the Modified PEG ratio model requires t+1 and t+2 forecasts of earnings 
per share and dividends per share. Therefore, to be included in calculating the COE, this 
study looks for:  
 
(i) Each firm-years’ current stock price data and analyst mean-consensus 
earnings forecasts for at least two periods ahead.  
(ii) All necessary analyst mean-consensus earnings forecasts must be positive 
 
To determine the influence of mandatory IFRS adoption on the COE will be tested by: 
(1) Regressing the COE on:  
a.     A dummy variable indicating the type of adopter (mandatory or 
voluntary adopter).  
b. A  dummy  equal to one when the firm-year observation falls in the post-
mandatory (i.e. 2005 or later), and zero otherwise 
c. Any interaction between the dummies at (a) and (b) above.  
d. A set of (firm-specific and country-specific) control variables and 
interaction between variables. 
Following the literature review and basic theory from chapter 2 and 3, 
this study includes the sets of control variables that proxy firm-specific 
CBF, firm-specific ICG and country-specific IEF that are expected to 
influence the COE in mandatory IFRS adoption. 
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5.5 Full sample and Data Issues:  
Li (2010) collects 6,456 firm-year observations from 1995 to 2006. With the longer 
time period used for this study, the full sample has more than 7,000 firm-year 
observations to estimate the pooled regression model, and uses data from the 
Computstat Global database for: 
 
-18 EU countries 
-2000 to 2009. 
 
5.5.1 Sample Period Selection  
This study follows the rationale of the prior study by Chen et al. (2009) that in 2000, 
IFRS is endorsed and recommended by the International Organization of Securities 
Commission (IOSCO, 2000) to allow foreign issuers to use IFRS for cross-border 
offerings. Thus, the sample covers the pre-mandatory period from 2000 to 2004 and the 
post-adoption period from 2005 to 2009 for the 18 EU countries in this study.  
 
5.5.2 Issues with the Sample Data  
During the data collection process, there are some outliers with extremely large and 
small continuous variables in the sample. Outliers may potentially create strong 
skewness in distributions which compromises the integrity of the regression models. For 
the large sample size used in this research, this study follows the literature and identifies 
univariate outliers with their respective numbers of standard deviation (i.e. Z score) with 
+ - 3.0, or beyond. Prior studies state that usually there are a few techniques to handle 
outliers. The most common way is to delete all of them. However, this approach is not 
always desirable since the removal of extreme observations may reduce but not entirely 
correct for data integrity problem or distortions in the data.  Thus, this study follows the 
literature (e.g. Li, 2010) and transform or winsorize all firm-level continuous variables 
at the top and bottom 1% of their distributions (i.e. 99% at the top and 1% at the 
bottom).  Such adjustments to the observed data are able to mitigate the effects from 
outliers on the regression model analysis. Finally, the normal probability plots, scatter 
plots and histograms (not tabulated) are run to confirm that all continuous variables and 
residuals are reasonably normally distributed.  
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In addition, endogeneity may be a potential issue when the dependent variable, the 
COE, is observed for all observations in the sample data. It is because when the decision 
for firms to adopt IFRS mandatorily may be also correlated with some unobservable 
variable that also affects their COE. For example, prior researchers always points out 
that large-sized firms are more likely to adopt IFRS voluntarily, relative to small to 
medium-sized businesses (Daske et al. 2007).  Therefore failure to control for this issue 
will yield an estimated mandatory effect on the COE that is downward biased. 
 
To remedy the potential problem of endogeneity, this research study follows prior 
studies and applies the 2-stage least square (2 SLS) method. Consider a simple 
regression model: 
 
Y = α + βX + ε     Equation 5.4. 
 
 
The following two stages are required to run the 2-stage SLS regressions: 
1) OLS regress x on z and get predictions for x, say x^ 
2) OLS regress y on x^ 
 
In the first stage it is required to estimate the dependent variable as the likelihood of 
sample firms to select IFRS adoption mandatorily (Kim and Shi, 2007). Specifically, a 
dummy variable is used to predict the probability of being a mandatory adopter (i.e. 1 
being mandatory adopter, otherwise 0). To implement this first stage, one or more 
instruments for x are included in the OLS regression. Then in the second stage, the 
variable from predicted mandatory adopters (derived from the first stage, i.e. x
^
) is 
included as an additional explanatory variable to control for potential endogeneity issue 
in the model. In addition, due to the fact that when the sample contains as many firms as 
possible from 2000 to 2009 in the EU, and the same company’s data are included, 
measured and compared before and after the mandatory IFRS adoption period, 
technically there is no sample-selection bias issue.  
 
After the sample design and data collection process, in the following chapter, this study 
continues to develop research models that perform various empirical tests and gather 
results for discussion.  
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Chapter 6 - Research Methodologies and Models 
Having discussed the research propositions and data collection process in Chapter 4 and 
5, this section aims at outlining the statistical methods used to collect the sample data 
and test all the above-mentioned research questions. In doing so, a set of regression 
models are developed to address the relevant empirical modeling issues. 
 
6.1 Research Method 
The methods used in international accounting research have been evolving in order to 
improve the robustness of the estimates, the representativeness of cross-sectional 
sources of data and the validity of data modeling. In this context, Tay and Parker (1990) 
investigate the research methodologies used in accounting harmonization and find that 
the major modeling issues stem from (1) sample selection, (2) data sources; and (3) the 
statistical methods used. From the review of the literature, these are the major reasons 
for researchers to come up with mixed and inconsistent empirical results in prior 
studies. 
 
Recent international accounting literature (such as Barth et al. 2007) also stresses that 
findings from prior research studies comparing the quality of accounting between IFRS 
and domestic accounting standards are mixed, which could be due to the result of using 
different metrics, drawing data from somewhat different time periods, and using 
different control variables. 
  
To overcome the issue of the lack of an appropriate benchmark for IFRS research (Hail 
and Leuz, 2007), this study follows the approach used by recent studies such as Li 
(2010) and Daske et al. (2007) and uses the same firm in the sample as the yardstick for 
comparison purposes. Specifically, when the same company is measured for changes in 
its COE in the post-mandatory period relative to the pre-mandatory period, it acts as its 
own benchmark for the effects of mandatory IFRS reporting. 
 
To tackle the problem of the short-lived effects during the transition period, the data 
availability in the present study is maximized by including a five-year pre-mandatory 
period, from 2000 to 2004, and a similar post-mandatory one from 2005 to 2009. Hence, 
more data, especially in the post-adoption period, will be used to measure whether the 
COE effect from the mandatory IFRS adoption in the EU is transitory or permanent. 
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As mentioned in Chapter 3, managers can exercise their discretion on IFRS disclosure 
strategies based upon their own particular corporate characteristics. This study tests if 
firms’ CBF is the initial dominant factor on the COE. Also as per prior studies, the 
relationship between institutional effects and managers’ incentives on IFRS adoption 
and disclosure strategy will be examined. To do this, three different research models are 
developed and these incorporate all three forces as proxies of reporting incentives for 
mandatory IFRS adopters in order to investigate if there are significant individual and 
combined effects on the COE.  
 
6.2 Use of regression models 
Multiple regression techniques are a very useful method in research that allow several 
variables to predict the values for a quantitatively measured dependent variable. As a 
method, it provides insights to help researchers explain the dynamics underlying a 
particular construct by indicating which combination of variables may be strongly 
associated with it (Meyers et al. 2006). In doing so, the model that emerges from the 
analysis can serve both in an explanatory as well as a predictive function. To illustrate 
the variables of a multiple regression model, consider the following: 
 
Y = α + β1X1 + β2X2  + β3X1X2 + ε   Equation 6.1 
 
Equation 6.1 presents that Y is the dependent, the β’s are the regression coefficients for 
the corresponding X (independent) terms, where α is the constant or intercept, and ε is 
the error term reflected in the residuals. Both the dependent variable (Y) and the 
independent variables (X’s) are the predicted variable and predictor variables 
respectively assumed to be continuous, interval variables. The X1X2 variable is an 
interaction term that incorporates the joint effect, that is either a complementary or 
substitute effect of the two variables X1 and X2 on a dependent variable over and above 
their separate effects. An example of such an interactive effect would be the way a 
person’s experience and education would complement each other in relation to the 
individual’s income. In the context of the present research on firms mandatorily 
adopting IFRS, multiple regression models are useful to determine which variable(s) of 
a larger set is (are) better predictor/explanation of some criterion variable than others. 
More importantly, multiple regression models can statistically examine the relationship 
of one variable with a set of other variables, which is appropriate for measuring any 
COE effects from mandatory IFRS adoption and reporting incentives. 
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Recently, some prior IFRS studies apply the Structural Equation Model (SEM) to 
construct many unobservable variables (Guerreiro et al., 2008 and Landsman et al., 
2011). However, SEM mainly focuses on explaining phenomena rather than a model 
predicting specific empirical outcomes from variables such as Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) models. Moreover, SEM in IFRS research studies may suffer from possible 
measurement errors. This happens when the sample size is less than the required large 
number of observations that the approach requires (Steenkamp and Baumgartner, 2000). 
While SEM can address the problems of unobservable variables it needs a large number 
of observations, for this study—which has limited data—OLS is the appropriate method 
on technical grounds. Therefore, when multiple regression models allow several 
individual and inter-related variables to predict the values for a quantitatively measured 
dependent variable, it is more suitable to use multiple-regression modeling techniques to 
test the effect of COE along mandatory IFRS adoption when examining the variation in 
the explanatory proxy variables CBF, ICG and IEF and their interactions.  
 
6.3 Potential modeling issue 
Prior studies on voluntary IFRS adoption primarily select samples of firms which 
willingly implement IFRS based on particular firm characteristics. This may lead to 
self-selection bias and consequently affects any findings (e.g. Harris and Muller, 1999). 
However, when this study focuses on mandatory IFRS adoption, all EU firms in the 
post-2005 period have to adopt IFRS as their accounting standards; therefore, there 
should not be any self-selection bias issue in the sample.
15
  
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, when most prior studies apply regression models to examine 
if and how IFRS adoption (the independent variable) influences any economic 
consequences such as the COE (the dependent variable), one should be cautious in 
drawing empirical conclusions due to the fact that the COE effect may influence firms 
decision to adopt IFRS mandatorily. Therefore, there may be an endogeneity issue in 
the regression.  To resolve the potential problem, this study follows the literature by 
using a two-stage-least squares (2 SLS) regression modeling method (Ashbaugh and 
Pinus, 2001). In the first stage, the likelihood of a firm’s decision to become mandatory 
IFRS adopters is predicted using certain instrumental variables such as size, leverage 
                                                 
15
  Self-selection bias should not be an issue for mandatory IFRS studies. For example, Li (2010) applies 
the Heckman (1979) two-stage regression procedure to control for the self-selection effect and finds 
evidence that the empirical results are quantitatively similar for the sample without the transition period. 
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and profitability. Then, this predicted dependent variable derived from the first stage 
will replace the dummy variable of mandatory IFRS adopters in the second stage 
regression model. In doing so, the endogeneity problem can be controlled for and a 
better independent variable included to test the impacts on the desired dependent 
variable (Li, 2010, Soderstrom and Sun, 2007).  
 
With more disclosures available following the mandatory adoption of IFRS, capital 
markets will eventually be able to differentiate the financial reporting and disclosure 
practices from managers’ incentives, and this will lead to a change in firms’ COE 
(Daske et al. 2007). As a result of differing incentives, the reduction in information 
asymmetry from IFRS financial reporting will vary among firms. When investors 
recognize such difference in reporting transparency, they will react by corresponding 
changes in the required COE. Thus, with more data available and better proxies, this 
study will achieve the objectives that (i) it is more evident to discern winners or losers 
from IFRS adoption by their COE effect; and (ii) it is also possible to validate, compare 
and contrast with prior findings (e.g. Daske et al. 2007; Hail and Leuz, 2006; Li, 2010). 
Moreover, a longer series of data allows both firms and analysts to learn how to comply 
with the new standards and eventually to materialize the benefits of mandatory IFRS 
adoption (e.g. Cuijpers and Buijink (2005). Therefore, the present research will provide 
more reliable empirical results than prior papers that focus on the immediate post-
adoption period (Hail and Leuz, 2006). 
 
In order to control for the above-mentioned modeling issues, the following section 
discusses the details of the two-stage regression models, as well as the explanations of 
related variables.  
 
6.4 Empirical Models and Potential Specification Errors 
To test the hypotheses and to address those potential sample data issues mentioned in 
the previous sections, the following regression models are developed to gather evidence 
to support the following research questions. 
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6.4.1 Regression Models and Hypotheses 
1
st
 Stage:  
As discussed, before testing for the first stage of research hypothesis, it is necessary to 
control for the potential endogeneity issue by performing the 2-SLS test. Accordingly, 
the following Tables 6.1 and 6.2 are constructed.  
 
Table 6.1 
First stage regression model to develop the Possible Mandatory Adopters (PMAdopters)  
 
This model is developed to control for the possible endogeneity issue in estimating the 
effect of mandatory IFRS adoption  
 
PMAdopters = β0 + β1Size +β2(Log of BM) + β3(ROE) + country 
dummy variables + industry dummy variables + year dummy 
variables + error terms 
Equation 
6.2 
Equation 6.2 is composed of the following variables: 
 
1. PMAdopters:  a dummy variable is used to predict the probability of being a 
mandatory adopter (i.e. 1 being mandatory adopter, otherwise 0); 
2. Size = Firms’ size, calculated by the natural logarithm of total assets as of year-
end; 
3. Log of BM = Log of Book-to-Market ratios for each firm-year observation as 
of year-end; 
4. ROE = Return on Equity calculated as the ratio of Earnings Before Interest Tax 
(EBIT) to Common Equities as of year-end for each firm year observation; 
5. Country dummy variables = All18 EU countries dummy (=1 if yes, 0 
otherwise); 
6. Industry dummy variables = Industry dummy specified by sectors determined 
by Standard & Poor (If yes =1, 0 otherwise); 
7. Year dummy variables = Year dummies from 2000 to 2009 (=1 if yes, 0 
otherwise). 
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As illustrated in Equation 6.2, in the first stage, instrumental variables for size, ROE and 
book-to-market ratios are included that are seen to be most likely to influence firms’ 
decisions to become mandatory adopters (e.g. Barth et al. 2005), As a result, the 
instrumental variable predicted mandatory IFRS adopter called Possible Mandatory 
IFRS Adopters (PMAdopters) is estimated in order to capture the likelihood of 
becoming a mandatory IFRS adopter for each firm-year observation. Similar to prior 
studies, country dummies are included to control for differences of cross-country factors 
that may be important to mandatory IFRS adoption, and with year dummies and 
industry dummies to control for the year and industry fixed effects. 
 
In the second stage, the PMAdopters (derived from the 1
st
 stage) are included as an 
additional explanatory variable in the research model to control for potential 
endogeneity problems associated with the feedback response between mandatory 
adoption and the COE. Therefore, Equation 6.3 becomes the main regression model to 
perform all operating hypotheses stipulated in Table 4.1. 
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Table 6.2 
Second stage regression model to include the Possible Mandatory Adopters 
(PMAdopters)  
 
This model is derived from Table 6.1 in estimating the cost of equity effect from 
mandatory IFRS adoption 
 
2
nd
 Stage: 
COE = β0 + β1PMAdopters + Control variables + Firm-specific CBF variables + 
Firm-specific ICG variables + Country-specific IEF variables + Real GDP Growth + 
Stock Market Capitalization + Industry Dummies + Year Dummies + Country 
Dummies + error terms                                                                                        
Equation 6.3                                                                                                                                                                                
Where:  
1. COE PEG = ex-ante cost of equity, where PEG refers to price-earnings growth 
model; 
2. Control variables include:  
Size = Firms’ size, calculated by the natural logarithm of total assets as of 
year-end; 
Log of BM = Log of Book-to-Market ratios for each firm-year observation as 
of year-end; 
ROE = Return on Equity calculated as the ratio of Earnings Before Interest 
Tax (EBIT) to Common Equities as of year-end for each firm year 
observation; 
3. Firm-specific CBF = Sum of seven key dummy variables (i.e. max. = 7) to 
proxy for each firm-year observation’s particular characteristics as Core 
Business Factor to reporting incentives. Thus, each variable of   dummies 
equals one if any firm-year observation’s CBF is above average for it is in 
larger size, more equity-based capital structure, more profitable, higher 
TobinQ, larger market value of equity, more capital-intensive assets and 
more analysts followed. 
4. Firm-specific ICG variables = Deminor Corporate Governance score to proxy 
for firms’ internal corporate governance (ICG) quantity and quality rating for 
firms of each country. Deminor CG Score based on FTSE Eurotop 300 
companies with a grid consisting of over 300 corporate governance criteria. 
The maximum score is 40. 
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5. Country-specific IEF variables have two different proxies: 8.A and 8.B 
5.A1 Legal Origin -  GO = GO means German-origin countries (La Porta et 
al. 2002) 
5.A2 Legal Origin -  FO = FO means French-origin countries (La Porta et al. 
2002). 
5.A3 Legal Origin -  SO means Scandinavian-origin countries (La Porta et al.  
2002) 
            5.A4 Legal Origin -  BO means British- origin countries (La Porta et al.   
2002) 
5.B1 Sector A: Public Institutions & Civil Society= Composite scores 
measured areas of political institutions; security, law & order; and 
functioning of public administration. 
5.B2 Sector B: high business activities: Composite scores captured areas of 
functioning and regulations of goods/services market; security of transactions 
& contracts; and openness to outside world. 
5.B3: Sector C: high capital activities which is the composite indices 
measured areas of capital market functioning; 
5.B4: Sector D: high labor/social activities which are the composite scores 
measured the level of labor market and labor relations; social cohesion  and 
social mobility. 
Note of 5.B1 to 5.B4: All these composite scores are extracted from Profiles of 
Institutional Characteristics of 85 Developed & Developing Countries in 2010 
(http://www.cepii.fr) 
 
6. Country dummy variables = All 18 EU countries dummy (=1 if yes, 0 
otherwise); 
7. Industry dummy variables = Industry dummy specified by sectors determined 
by Standard & Poor (If yes =1, 0 otherwise); and 
8. Year dummy variables = Year dummies from 2000 to 2009 (=1 if yes, 0 
otherwise). 
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6.3.2 Specification Error Test (RESET) for 2 SLS Omitted Variables Problems 
When various functional variables are specified in the regression model, prior studies 
highlight that another possible issue for running 2 SLS is the potential specification 
errors when an independent variable in the regression model is correlated with the error 
term. The two possible causes for specification errors are incorrect functional form and 
a variable omitted from the model which may have a relationship with both the 
dependent variable and one or more independent variables. Pesaran and Taylor (1999) 
propose to use the RESET general specification error test for appropriate functional 
form and/or omitted variables in the 2 SLS regression model. If the 2 SLS model 
functions well, the predicted variable of mandatory adopters derived in the first stage 
from the model should not have any explanatory power in the original OLS model. In 
order to perform the RESET for the 2SLS, basically, it is necessary to create another 
variable which is computed from squaring the forecasted variable in the first stage OLS 
regression and test if it has any significance.  
 
6.3.3 Control for potential multicollinearity issues in independent variables 
In multivariate regression models, multicollinearity is a condition that exists when two 
and more than two predictor (independent) variables correlate very strongly. Predictors 
with multicollinearity would distort the interpretation of multiple regression results 
because the variables are largely confounded with one another. That is, they are 
essentially measuring the same characteristics. As such, it would be difficult to know 
which of the two is the more relevant. To control for this problem, all independent 
variables in the regression model (Table 6.2) will be tested with (i) tolerance parameter 
and (ii) variance inflation factor (VIF). A tolerance parameter for each independent 
variable of 0.1 or below and a VIF for each independent variable of more than 10 will 
be considered to be problematic. 
 
Specifically, a 2SLS model is used to control for potential endogeneity issue. To 
improve the reliability of the model due to problems from omitted variables, a RESET 
test is conducted. In addition, tolerance parameter and VIF tests are used to remedy the 
potential multicolinearity issues for the predictor variables. The next few chapters 
present the empirical results for all the hypotheses discussed earlier, together with the 
various descriptive, univariate and multivariate tests. 
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Chapter 7 – Sample Data Distribution and Correlation Analysis 
In the previous chapters this study progressively introduces and argues the importance 
of the IPOO model in examining the reporting incentives for mandatory IFRS adoption, 
as well as the data and research methodology to test those hypotheses. Chapters 7 to 10 
detail the empirical tests and results from the various descriptive and inferential 
statistics that hypothesized in the earlier chapters. In this chapter, univariate and 
correlation analysis for the variables in the sample distribution will be introduced. In 
Chapter 8, evidence on both the descriptive statistics and the 2-stage OLS model 
illustrating any differences of the average COE between voluntary and mandatory 
adoption will be presented. Then, it will be followed in Chapters 9 and 10 where a 
comprehensive multivariate analysis from the different empirical models that test for the 
differential COE effects from both individual and interactions among CBF, ICG and 
IEF. Also, an additional analysis on the effects of specific IEF to the COE will be 
evaluated as well.  
 
7.1 Sample Distributions and Country-level Descriptive Statistics 
Table 7.1 Panel A reports the sample country distribution of IFRS adoption between full 
sample adopters, early and voluntary IFRS adopters, and mandatory IFRS adopters. 
There are a total of 7,294 firm-year observations gathered from 18 EU countries for the 
period 2000 to 2009 that fulfill the criteria of data collection, as discussed in the 
previous chapters. As expected, Germany has the highest percentage of early and 
voluntary IFRS adopters, followed by France. Since the U.K. had a policy of not 
allowing voluntary IFRS adoption only, it has the largest percentage of mandatory IFRS 
adoption.  
 
In addition, Table 7.1 Panel B describes the average cost of equity (COE) for different 
IFRS adopting firms by EU country.  It shows that voluntary IFRS adopters have 
12.25% average COE, ranging from the lowest 7.84% (Czech Republic) 
16
to the highest 
13.64% (Hungary). Mandatory adopters, however, have an average COE of 12.13%, 
which is only 0.12% lower than that of the voluntary adopters. Thus, the preliminary 
results show that there is not much difference in the average COE between mandatory 
and voluntary adopters. 
 
                                                 
16
  However, the lowest average cost of equity is computed from Czech Republic, which represents the 
smallest sample size in all 18 E.U. state members. 
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7.2 Outliers in the data 
Outliers are observations that have extreme values relative to other data and are 
considered to be potentially erroneous. .  
 
In Section 5.5.2, it points out that the issue of outliers of data may potentially bias and 
distort estimates of the COE for multiple regression models. To maintain the data 
integrity, it is essential to resolve the issue of outliers. Prior studies show that outliers 
can be measured by the extent of the distribution’s kurtosis. Thus, this study follows the 
literature of IFRS studies to (1) identify univariate outliers with their respective 
numbers of standard deviation (i.e. Z score) with +/-3.0 or beyond. Then, (2) Winsorize 
all firm-level continuous variables at the top and bottom 1% of their distributions (i.e. 
99% at the top and 1% at the bottom). After that, (3) re-run the descriptive statistics and 
find that the COE has a skewness of 1.3, while most of the other variables lie between 
+1 and -1. Accordingly, by truncating the data and removing outliers, the COE is now 
acceptable for regression analysis.  
 
  
93 
 
Table 7.1 Panel A: Sample Distributions and Country-level Descriptive Statistics: 
Country Level Distribution by IFRS Adopters  
 
This Table illustrates the distribution of sample countries in accordance to Early/Voluntary & Mandatory Adopters 
for the full period, and the pre- and post-mandatory adoption periods. 
       
             
           
             
  
Both Early / Voluntary & 
Mandatory IFRS Adoption 
Early / Voluntary 
IFRS Adoption  
Mandatory IFRS 
Adoption 
  In the Full Adoption Period  
in Pre-Mandatory 
Adoption Period  
in Post-Mandatory 
Adoption Period 
   (2000 to 2009)   
(2000 to 
2004)   (2005 to 2009) 
  N  
% 
adopting 
IFRS  N  
% 
adopting 
IFRS  N  
% 
adopting 
IFRS 
Austria  159   2.18%   112   8.70%   47   0.78% 
Belgium  296  4.06%  89  6.92%  207  3.45% 
Czech Republic  11  0.15%  11  0.85%  0  0.00% 
Denmark  246  3.37%  50  3.89%  196  3.26% 
Finland  399  5.47%  54  4.20%  345  5.74% 
France  958  13.13%  139  10.80%  819  13.63% 
Germany  1264  17.33%  729  56.64%  535  8.91% 
Greece  130  1.78%  22  1.71%  108  1.80% 
Hungary  12  0.16%  12  0.90%  0  0.00% 
Ireland  83  1.14%  0  0.00%  83  1.38% 
Italy  342  4.69%  0  0.00%  342  5.69% 
Luxembourg  16  0.22%  7  0.54%  9  0.15% 
Netherlands  174  2.39%  0  0.00%  174  2.90% 
Poland  41  0.56%  20  1.55%  21  0.35% 
Portugal  101  1.38%  0  0.00%  101  1.68% 
Spain  289  3.96%  37  2.87%  252  4.20% 
Sweden  471  6.46%  17  1.32%  454  7.56% 
United Kingdom  2302   31.56%   
         
47   0.00%   2268   38.05% 
  7294  100.00%  1333  100.00%  5961  100.00% 
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Table 7.1 Panel B: Sample Distribution and Country-level Descriptive Statistics – 
Country Level Distribution by Average Cost of Equity of IFRS Adopters  
 
This Table illustrates the COE for sample countries by Early/Voluntary & Mandatory Adopters for the full period, 
and the pre- and post-mandatory adoption periods. 
 
    
        
       
        
 
Both Early / Voluntary & Mandatory 
IFRS Adoption 
Early / Voluntary 
IFRS Adoption 
Mandatory IFRS 
Adoption 
  
In the Full 
Adoption Period 
in Pre-Mandatory 
Adoption Period 
in Post-Mandatory 
Adoption Period 
  (2000 to 2009)  
(2000 to 
2004)  
(2005 to 
2009) 
  N=7294   N=1333  N=5961 
  Cost of Equity  
Cost of 
Equity  
Cost of 
Equity  
Austria  12.46%   12.58%   12.19%   
Belgium  12.06%  11.91%  12.12%   
Czech Republic  7.84%  7.84%  0.00%   
Denmark  12.56%  13.16%  12.41%   
Finland  13.66%  12.03%  13.92%   
France  11.75%  11.07%  11.86%   
Germany  12.96%  12.64%  13.39%   
Greece  12.14%  11.28%  12.31%   
Hungary  13.64%  13.64%  0.00%   
Ireland  11.00%  0.00%  11.00%   
Italy  11.96%  0.00%  11.96%   
Luxembourg  14.04%  10.84%  16.52%   
Netherlands  12.27%  0.00%  12.27%   
Poland  12.05%  11.27%  12.79%   
Portugal  11.06%  0.00%  11.06%   
Spain  10.13%  11.23%  9.97%   
Sweden  12.68%  12.25%  12.70%   
United Kingdom  11.83%   11.87%   11.83%   
Average  12.15%  12.25%  12.13%  
Median  10.84%  10.98%  10.82%  
Standard 
Deviation  5.45%  5.27%  5.49%  
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7.3 Univariate Data Analyses by IFRS Adopters 
Table 7.2 presents the descriptive characteristics for the variables used in the empirical 
models. A t-test is conducted to estimate any mean differences for the variables between 
early/voluntary and mandatory IFRS adopters. As shown, though the mandatory adopters 
have a slightly lower average COE, the t-test result between the full sample’s IFRS 
adopters (at 12.15%), the early/voluntary adopters (at 12.25%) and the mandatory adopters 
(at 12.13%) indicates that this is not statistically significant..  
 
Comparing firm-specific characteristics between early/voluntary and mandatory adopters 
for significant differences, Table 7.2 also shows that mandatory adopters are usually 
smaller-sized, a little less levered, have smaller amount of market value of common equity, 
are more profitable, have higher returns to common equity, followed by fewer number of 
analysts and have lower overall composite CBF scores.  
 
From the internal corporate governance perspective, mandatory adopters have significantly 
higher Deminor CG scores, more independent audit committees and lower ownership 
concentration relative to voluntary adopters. It suggests that mandatory adopters are usually 
better governed internally by boards of directors than those of voluntary counterparts. For 
specific IEF, mandatory firms belong to those with higher exchange disclosure 
requirements and investor protection, even though they are a little less in securities 
regulations. Since more established capital markets will require more stock market 
exchange disclosure for companies,  this results correspond with the fact that  most 
mandatory adopters belong to those countries with high level of capital market activities 
(i.e. Sector C) in institutions’ bureaucratic and administrative formalities 
 
For legal origins, as expected from the previous discussion, most mandatory firms are 
British (BO) and French (FO), while voluntary IFRS firms are mainly from Germany (GO).   
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Table 7.2 Descriptive Statistics of CBF, ICG and IEF by IFRS Adopters and Variables Definition  
 
Univarite Data Analysis by IFRS Adopters  
 
This table provides summary statistics for the COE, CBF, ICG and IEF variables broken down by All IFRS Adopters, 
Early/Voluntary Adopters and Mandatory Adopters for the full period, and the pre- and post-mandatory adoption periods.   
 
 
 ALL IFRS Adopters   Early / Voluntary IFRS Adoption  Mandatory IFRS Adoption     
  In the Full Adoption Period  in Pre-Mandatory Adoption Period in Post-Mandatory Adoption Period    
  (2000 to 2009)    (2000 to 2004)   (2005 to 2009)     
  N=7294     N=1333    N=5961      
Dependent Variable  Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev.  Mean Median Std. Dev.  Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev.  
Test for Mean 
differences 
Cost of Equity  12.15% 10.84% 5.45%  12.25% 10.98% 5.27%  12.13% 10.82% 5.49%  -0.724   
                 
Proxies for Core Business Factors 
(CBF)                
Size  2.813 2.729 0.986  3.072 3.029 1.026  2.755 2.692 0.967  -10.701 ***  
Leverage  0.560 0.575 0.179  0.568 0.585 0.171  0.558 0.574 0.180  -1.962 **  
Common Equity (log)  2.694 2.628 0.915  2.911 2.876 0.949  2.646 2.586 0.901  -9.624 ***  
Book-to-Market Ratio  2.117 0.509 10.114  2.363 0.549 10.350  2.062 0.498 10.061  -0.967   
ROA  0.078 0.075 0.084  0.073 0.068 0.083  0.079 0.077 0.084  2.339 **  
ROE  0.216 0.201 0.267  0.197 0.189 0.243  0.221 0.203 0.272  2.941 ***  
Analysts  8.190 5.500 7.625  10.715 7.500 8.949  7.626 5.000 7.176  -13.540 ***  
Capital Intensity  0.248 0.191 0.210  0.252 0.219 0.193  0.247 0.186 0.214  -0.660   
Debt-to-Equity Ratio  1.852 1.354 1.857  1.844 1.408 1.682  1.854 1.348 1.894  0.182   
Tobin-Q  2.607 1.355 5.270  2.703 1.296 5.400  2.586 1.374 5.241  -0.720   
Overall CBF Score  3.491 3.000 1.668  2.377 2.000 1.393  2.093 2.000 1.302  -5.558 ***  
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Proxies for Internal Corp. 
Governance (ICG) 
Deminor CG score  24.470 22.440 5.012  20.882 20.320 2.573  25.246 23.440 5.073  29.983 ***  
 
Ownership Concentration  37.027 38.900 13.930  50.683 55.600 8.971  34.061 29.200 13.018  -43.664 ***  
Board Independence  37.620 35.000 18.623  38.079 44.000 15.645  37.521 35.000 19.206  -0.974   
Chair&CEO Separation  87.111 97.000 19.141  90.595 100.000 18.454  86.358 97.000 19.206  -7.211 ***  
Audit Committee 
Independence  33.598 22.000 26.588  10.698 4.000 14.155  38.552 26.000 26.049  37.131 ***  
 
 
                 
Proxies for Institutional  Environment 
Factors (IEF)                
Stock Exch. Disclosure  0.640 0.670 0.178  0.472 0.420 0.145  0.676 0.750 0.164  41.400 ***  
Investor Protection  59.257 52.530 21.625  46.982 41.650 12.539  61.912 79.120 22.254  23.244 ***  
Securities Regulations  86.396 97.000 19.257  87.765 100.000 19.277  86.100 97.000 19.242  -2.804 ***  
Legal Origin -  GO  0.204 0.000 0.403  0.663 1.000 0.473  0.101 0.000 0.302  -54.667 ***  
Legal Origin -  FO  0.316 0.000 0.465  0.221 0.000 0.415  0.338 0.000 0.473  8.338 ***  
Legal Origin -  SO  0.153 0.000 0.360  0.091 0.000 0.287  0.167 0.000 0.373  7.002 ***  
Legal Origin -  BO  0.327 0.000 0.469  0.026 0.000 0.158  0.394 0.000 0.489  27.235 ***  
Sector A: Public Institutions & Civil 
Society 6.040 6.210 0.243  6.085 6.210 0.160  6.030 6.210 0.251  -7.558 ***  
Sector B: high business 
activities  6.066 6.190 0.266  6.058 6.230 0.233  6.068 6.120 0.273  1.179   
Sector C: high capital 
activities  6.123 6.150 0.395  5.890 5.800 0.257  6.175 6.190 0.402  24.641 ***  
Sector D: high labor/social activities 6.005 5.920 0.415  6.340 6.570 0.418  5.931 5.920 0.376  -35.139 ***  
                 
** and *** = 5% and 
1% levels of significance 
 
Variable definitions & data sources:                
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Cost of Equity: Measured by Eatson (2004) model (IBES).             
Size: 
Natural log of total assets (CompuStat 
Global)             
Leverage: Ratio of total debts to total assets              
Common Equity: Natural log of market values of common equity (IBES, CompuStat Global)         
Book-to-Market: Ratio of total Book Values of Common Equities to Market Values of Common Equities (IBES, CompuStat Global)     
Return to Assets (ROA) Ratio of EBIT to Total Assets (IBES, CompuStat Global)           
Return to Equity (ROE) 
Ratio of EBIT to Common Equities (IBES, CompuStat 
Global)           
Analysts: Average # of analysts covering the firm in two forecasted EPS periods (IBES, CompuStat Global)       
Capital Intensity: 
Ratio of PP&E (net) to Total 
Assets              
Tobin-Q: Ratio of (Total Assets - Common Equity Book Value - Market Value of Common Equity) to Total Assets (CompuStat Global)    
Overall CBF Score: Sum of following seven dummy variables which are proxies for higher CBF (if > average=1, otherwise 0):      
 
-Larger 
size              
 -More equity-based capital structure            
 -More profitable (i.e. higher than average ROE)            
 -Higher Tobin-Q               
 -Larger market value of common equity             
 
-More capital 
intensity               
 
-More Analysts 
followed               
Deminor CG Score: Average company corporate governance rating per country as per 2003 obtained from Deminor Corporate Governance Index.   
 Deminor CG Score based on FTSE Eurotop 300 companies with a grid consisting of over 300 corporate governance criteria. The maximum score is 40. 
                 
Ownership Concentration Composite index developed by Heidrick & Struggles, Corporate Governance Report, 2009, European Department, International Monetary Fund 
Board Independence Composite index developed by Heidrick & Struggles, Corporate Governance Report, 2009, European Department, International Monetary Fund 
Chair&CEO Separation Composite index developed by Heidrick & Struggles, Corporate Governance Report, 2009, European Department, International Monetary Fund 
Audit Committee 
Independence Composite index developed by Heidrick & Struggles, Corporate Governance Report, 2009, European Department, International Monetary Fund 
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Stock Exch. Disclosure Exch. Disclosure index represents the strength of a country's stock exchange-mandated disclosures ranging from 0 to 1.    
Investor Protection 
A composite score measured by combing three indices pertaining to investor protection: anti-director rights, efficiency of judicial system and rule of law 
(La Porta et al., 1998, 2002) 
Securities Regulations 
Securities regulations is a composite index to average the three indices: disclosure requirement index, liability standard index and public enforcement index 
(Hail and Leuz, 2006; Kim and Shi, 2007) 
Legal Origin -  GO GO means German-origin countries (La Porta et al. 2002)           
Legal Origin -  FO FO means French-origin countries (La Porta et al. 2002).           
Legal Origin -  SO SO means Scandinavian-origin countries (La Porta et al. 2002)          
Legal Origin -  BO BO means British-origin countries (La Porta et al. 2002)           
 
 
Sector A: Public Institutions & Civil 
Society Composite scores measured areas of political institutions; security, law & order; functioning of public administration and etc.  
 
Sector B: high business 
activities  
Composite scores captured areas of functioning and regulations of goods/services market; security of transactions & contracts; openness to 
outside world & etc. 
 
Sector C: high capital 
activities  Composite indices measured areas of capital market functioning;         
 
Sector D: high labor/social activities Composite scores measured the level of labor market and labor relations; social cohesion & social mobility & etc.   
  
All these composite scores are extracted from Profiles of Institutional Characteristics of 85 Developing & Developing Countries/2010 
(http://www.cepii.fr) 
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7.4 Descriptive Statistics of variables by Legal Origins 
The descriptive statistics test is performed in two steps. First, the following Table 7.3 
presents the general distribution of the sample by the four distinct legal origins, German 
origin (GO), French origin (FO), Scandinavian (SO) and British origin (BO) (La Porta 
et al. 1991). As Table 7.3 indicates, most EU countries belong to French origin (FO), 
followed by German origin (GO), with only two countries Ireland and the United 
Kingdom in British origin (BO).  
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Table 
7.3 Country Sample Distribution by Legal Origins  
 This table introduces the sample country distribution by the nature of their legal origin. 
        
        
        
 
 
 
German Origin 
(GO) 
French Origin 
(FO) 
Scandinavian 
Origin 
(SO) 
British Origin 
(BO) 
Austria 
Czech Republic 
Germany 
Hungary 
Poland 
 
Belgium 
France 
Greece 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
 
Denmark 
Finland 
Sweden 
 
Ireland 
United Kingdom 
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The second step is to conduct a detailed and comprehensive descriptive statistic test for 
the COE variables and proxies for Core Business Factors (CBF) by legal origins. Table 
7.4 gives these results for COE, CBF, ICG and IEF grouped by legal origins. For the 
average COE, it highlights that even though French firms have the lowest average COE 
(at 11.66%) for the full sample period, it shows the least reduction in the average COE 
between the pre- and post-mandatory period (by -0.1%), while German firms (GO) have 
the second highest average COE for the full sample period, but has greatest reduction 
(by -1.53%), followed by British firms (BO) (by -0.76%).   
 
Table 7.4 also presents IFRS firms’ characteristics (CBF) by legal origins. As shown, 
even though Scandinavian (SO) adopters are reported as the largest and most profitable, 
they have the second lowest return on equity and the lowest long-term growth. This is 
an interesting result. SO firms are larger and more profitable than the sample as a whole 
and have the highest average COE for the full sample period but only the second least 
reduction in their average COE between the pre- and post- mandatory periods.  This 
suggests that there may not be an automatic link of such firm characteristics with the 
benefits of lowering the average COE by such firms. On the other hand, British (BO) 
IFRS adopters employ the largest amount of capital assets in their business (i.e. have the 
largest capital intensity ratio), have the second highest in return to common equity and 
but are second lowest in terms of leverage. This indicates they rely more in relative on 
equity. In turn this may result in enhancing the incentives for British firms (BO) in 
mandatory IFRS adoption.  
 
Contrary to Scandinavian (SO) firms, German (GO) firms enjoy the greatest reduction 
in the average COE even though they have the lowest level of profitability and are 
second smallest-sized. On the other hand, Germany (GO) adopters have the largest 
number of voluntary IFRS adopting firms (56.64% of the total from Table 7.1 Panel A). 
With a lot of differences between German local accounting standards (HGB) and IFRS, 
such largest number of voluntary adopters may attract the largest number of analysts to 
follow. Similar to Scandinavian (SO), French origin (FO) adopters are on average the 
second largest-sized and have second largest market value of common equity but have 
the lowest reduction in the average COE.  Moreover, French (FO) firms have the largest 
book-to-market ratio and debt-to-equity ratio, and highly leveraged in their capital 
structure.  
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For IEF conditions, British (BO) firms, with long-established equity capital markets, 
have the most developed investor protection mechanisms and stock exchange disclosure 
requirements. However, French (FO) firms are operating in a mixed institution setting 
where they have the lowest investor protection but the second highest stock exchange 
disclosure. On the other hand, Germany (GO) IFRS adopters’ have the lowest stock 
exchange disclosure and the second lowest investor protection, implying that their 
reduction in their average COE may be primarily attributable to the firms’ CBF rather 
than IEF factors. 
 
From the administrative formality perspective, British (BO) firms have the highest 
Sector A (high level of public institutions and civil society), Sector B (high level of 
business activities) and Sector C (high level of capital market activities) relative to 
German (GO) firms, which have a focus on Sector D (high level of labor and social 
activities). In addition, British (BO) firms have the highest ICG comprehensive results, 
lowest ownership concentration, as well as highest level of audit committee 
independence.  
 
The above descriptive statistics highlight the importance of British (BO) IFRS adopters’ 
strong IEF and Germany (GO) firms’ strong CBF which may constitute the underlying 
drivers for high reporting incentives in adopting IFRS that relate to the post-adoption 
reduction in their average COE.  
 
In addition to the above-mentioned analysis of the descriptive statistics given in Table 
7.4, Table 7.5A and B below provide the results of correlation between all the variables. 
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Table 7.4: Descriptive Statistics by legal Origins, CBF, ICG and IEF sample distribution by 
Legal Origins  
This table provides a breakdown for COE, CBF variables, ICG and IEF in accordance to firms’ legal origin. 
 
          
                  
 Legal Origin BO     FO     GO     SO     Total     
 N  2385   2306   1487   1116   7294    
 %  32.70%   31.62%   20.39%   15.30%   
100.00
%    
                                 
 Cost of Equity Mean 
Media
n 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Media
n 
Std. 
Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean 
Media
n 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Media
n 
Std. 
Dev. 
   Full sample period 0.118 0.1032 0.0555 0.1166 0.1063 0.0502 0.1285 0.1157 0.0558 0.1298 0.1177 0.05698 0.1215 0.1084 0.05446 
   Pre-mandatory Period 0.1223 0.1072 0.0588 0.1172 0.1075 0.0472 0.1369 0.1209 0.0609 0.1334 0.1206 0.0575 0.1254 0.1113 0.0562 
   Post-mandatory Period 0.1147 0.1007 0.0525 0.1162 0.1054 0.0525 0.1216 0.1102 0.0502 0.1266 0.1158 0.0564 0.1183 0.1061 0.0528 
   
 
Difference in post- & pre period 
 
-0.0076    --0.001    -0.0153    -0.0068    
 
-0.0071    
                                   
 Proxies for Core Business Factors (CBF)                               
 Firm-size 2.4109 2.3187 0.923 3.0243 2.9008 0.9245 2.8327 2.6758 1.0148 3.2046 3.2174 0.8957 2.813 2.729 0.986 
 Leverage 0.5428 0.5522 0.1941 0.5966 0.616 0.1637 0.561 0.5808 0.1821 0.518 0.5384 0.1536 0.560 0.575 0.179 
 Common Equity (log) 2.3739 2.3253 0.8822 2.8074 2.6891 0.8218 2.6575 2.5825 0.9244 3.1956 3.1786 0.884 2.694 2.628 0.915 
 Book-to-Market Ratio 1.0903 0.4649 5.453 3.388 0.5239 13.9287 2.8898 0.5853 12.1112 0.6489 0.4725 0.64 2.117 0.509 10.114 
 ROA 0.0798 0.0797 0.0896 0.0784 0.0714 0.0681 0.0679 0.0667 0.0908 0.0887 0.0859 0.09156 0.078 0.075 0.084 
 ROE 0.2312 0.2026 0.3199 0.2347 0.2139 0.2144 0.1793 0.1804 0.2742 0.1957 0.1948 0.224 0.216 0.201 0.267 
 Analysts 6.131 4 5.985 9.2045 7 7.7358 9.7751 6 9.2528 8.3926 6 7.1596 8.190 5.500 7.625 
 Capital Intensity 0.2588 0.1822 0.2369 0.237 0.1808 0.1961 0.2423 0.2066 0.1857 0.2561 0.2126 0.2088 0.248 0.191 0.210 
 Debt-to-Equity Ratio 1.9133 1.2331 2.2585 2.0291 1.6042 1.6854 1.8725 1.3847 1.8513 1.3303 1.1662 0.9235 1.852 1.354 1.857 
 Tobin-Q 2.6763 1.429 5.4064 2.4604 1.2848 5.207 2.9811 1.266 6.3041 2.2679 1.5044 3.1335 2.607 1.355 5.270 
 Overall CBF Score 2.5052 2 1.4953 2.82 3 1.5762 2.7747 3 1.6041 3.3827 3 1.5025 3.491 3.000 1.668 
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Proxies for Internal Corporate Governance (ICG) 
    BO   FO   GO   SO   Total 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proxies for Internal Corporate Governance (ICG)                     
BO 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FO          
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GO 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SO 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total 
  
Deminor CG score 30.98 31.02 0.2108 21.52 22.4 2.9672 20.1859 20.32 0.3782 22.0851 22.44 2.54266 24.470 22.440 5.012 
Ownership Concentration 21.3376 21 1.7781 44.8898 45.2 6.2121 55.8011 55.6 0.5673 30.3458 29.2 4.763 37.027 38.900 13.930 
Board Independence 35.1044 35 0.5499 24.3786 29 20.6028 40.3127 44 10.4 66.7305 68 1.4823 37.620 35.000 18.623 
Chair&CEO Separation 96.4432 97 2.933 63.1035 63 17.1458 100 100 0 100 100 0 87.111 97.000 19.141 
Audit Committee Independence 66.956 68 5.4994 19.221 21 12.4356 3.5531 4 1.2606 30.1752 26 14.8318 33.598 22.000 26.588 
 
 
Proxies for Institutional  Environment Factors 
(IEF)                                              
Stock Exch. Disclosure 0.8244 0.83 0.0293 0.638 0.75 0.1485 0.401 0.42 0.0536 0.5513 0.58 0.03835 0.640 0.670 0.178 
Investor Protection 79.5376 80.97 7.5452 39.2149 45.3 15.3983 42.8657 41.65 3.4289 77.9498 79.12 2.2229 59.257 52.530 21.625 
Securities Regulations 96.4432 97 2.933 63.1035 63 17.1458 96.3701 100 10.2779 100 100 0 86.396 97.000 19.257 
Sector A: Public Institutions & 
Civil Society 6.2172 6.22 0.0147 5.7759 5.74 0.2253 6.1689 6.21 0.1178 6.0298 6.07 0.1696 6.040 6.210 0.243 
Sector B: high business 
activities 6.3444 6.35 0.0293 5.8389 5.75 0.1784 6.1513 6.23 0.1922 5.8236 5.78 0.0658 6.066 6.190 0.266 
Sector C: high capital activities 6.5579 6.6 0.2218 5.9811 6.15 0.3443 5.8592 5.8 0.1849 5.8363 5.82 0.0733 6.123 6.150 0.395 
Sector D: high labor/social 
activities 5.9123 5.92 0.0403 5.6188 5.67 0.341 6.552 6.57 0.1628 6.267 6.23 0.23395 6.005 5.920 0.415 
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7.5 Correlation Analysis 
With respect to the correlation relationships between variables, Table 7.5A reports that 
even though the average COE is negatively correlated with mandatory IFRS adoption, this 
is not a significant relationship. On the other hand, it is consistent with our hypotheses and 
prior studies that the average COE is significantly and negatively correlated with most of 
the company-specific characteristics; namely, company size, profitability (ROA and ROE), 
capital intensity (-), analysts following , market values of common equity and long-term 
growth (Tobin Q). These initial results are important as those firm-specific CBFs will be 
the proxy for firm-specific incentives in the regression models used to test any COE effects 
in mandatory IFRS adoption.  
 
For the correlation between the average COE and ICG and IEF variables, Table 7.5B 
indicates that the specific ICG factors, such as board independence, are not negatively 
correlated with COE, with the exception of audit committee independence. This is 
consistent with the literature that finds there are mixed results for a direct link between 
corporate performance and individual corporate governance mechanisms. However, the 
composite ICG score, as measured by Deminor CG Rating, is still significantly and 
negatively correlated with COE. On the other hand, among all specific IEF measures, it is 
worth-noting that only Stock Exchange Disclosure is insignificant and negatively related 
with COE.  
 
However, there are some firm-specific variables, such as  ROA, ROE, firm size and equity 
market values have more than + or – 0.70 or more pair-wise correlation. It suggests that 
inclusion of those in the regression models may potentially lead to multicollinearity 
problems. As mentioned in the previous chapter, it is important to control for this by testing 
all independent variables in the regression models with (1) a tolerance parameter and (2) a 
variance inflation factor (VIF). Accordingly, in the following Chapter 9, empirical results 
of multivariate analysis will present that the tolerance parameter for the independent 
variables measured as 0.1 or below, and VIF is less than 10.  
 
Overall, the results of the correlation analysis for the entire sample show that certain 
relationships exist between the COE and the explanatory variables CBF, ICG and IEF.  
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Table 7.5A – Pearson Correlations between COE & various CBF variables  
The correlation analysis reflects the relationship between COE and various CBF variables of mandatory IFRS adoption that reflects the degree to which the variables are related. 
 
  
COE Size Leverage ROA ROE 
Cap. 
Intensity 
D-E 
ratio 
Anal
ysts 
Mkt 
Value 
Equity 
B-M 
ratio 
TOBI
NQ 
Inflat
ion 
GDP-
Growth 
StockMkt 
to GDP 
V&E 
Adopters M-periods CBF 
PM-
Adopters 
COE Pearson 
Correlation 
1                                   
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
  
                                  
Size Pearson 
Correlation 
-.219**                                   
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 
  
                                
Leverage Pearson 
Correlation 
.006 .327**                                 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.613 .000 
  
                              
ROA Pearson 
Correlation 
-.290** .059** -.108**                               
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 
  
                            
ROE Pearson 
Correlation 
-.249** .181** .297** .729**                             
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 .000 
  
                          
Cap. 
Intensity 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.096** .247** .081** .035** .052**                           
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 .003 .000 
  
                        
D-E ratio Pearson 
Correlation 
.005 .318** .995** -.103** .313** .079**                         
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.663 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
  
                      
Analysts Pearson 
Correlation 
-.206** .616** .182** .120** .171** .081** .178**                       
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
  
                    
Mkt Value 
Equity 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.314** .806** .167** .168** .208** .172** .162** .690*
* 
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Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
  
                  
B-M ratio Pearson 
Correlation 
.123** .296** -.063** -.120** -
.169** 
.130** -
.078** 
-
.106*
* 
-.270**                   
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
  
                
TOBINQ Pearson 
Correlation 
-.049** -.223** -.089** -.039** -
.054** 
-.070** -
.085** 
.080*
* 
.155** -.591**                 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
  
              
Inflation Pearson 
Correlation 
-.029* .051** .028* .059** .090** .037** .029* .027* .024* .035** -.013               
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.012 .000 .017 .000 .000 .002 .013 .020 .037 .003 .269 
  
            
GDP-
Growth 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.082** -.028* -.021 .053** .050** .053** -.020 -
.101*
* 
.034** -.105** .082** .261**             
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .015 .075 .000 .000 .000 .086 .000 .004 .000 .000 .000 
  
          
StockMkt 
to GDP 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.018 -.139** -.072** .050** .034** -.028* -
.067** 
-
.080*
* 
-.087** -.072** -.032** -
.092** 
.034**           
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.127 .000 .000 .000 .004 .015 .000 .000 .000 .000 .006 .000 .004 
  
        
V&E 
Adopters 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.008 .124** .022 -.027* -
.034** 
.008 .021 .157*
* 
.112** .025* .009 -
.032** 
-.040** -.341**         
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.470 .000 .058 .021 .003 .510 .074 .000 .000 .032 .464 .006 .001 .000 
  
      
Mperiods Pearson 
Correlation 
-.065** .029* .016 .087** .067** -.097** .016 .084*
* 
.053** -.032** -.048** .128** -.256** .100** .064**       
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .013 .168 .000 .000 .000 .163 .000 .000 .006 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
  
    
CBF Pearson 
Correlation 
-.305** .594** .007 .342** .310** .352** .014 .642*
* 
.749** -.189** .136** .024* .042** -.030* .090** .006     
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .578 .000 .000 .000 .219 .000 .000 .000 .000 .040 .000 .010 .000 .620 
  
  
PMAdopte
rs 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.002 -.207** -.064** .054** .057** -.015 -
.061** 
-
.240*
* 
-.178** -.042** -.029* .061** .099** .582** -.600** -.107** -.121** 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.853 .000 .000 .000 .000 .201 .000 .000 .000 .000 .013 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 7.5B - Pearson Correlations between COE & various ICG & IEF variables 
The correlation analysis reflects the relationship between COE and various ICG & IEF variables of mandatory IFRS adoption that reflects the degree to 
which the variables are related. 
 
  
COE Inflation 
GDP 
Growth 
Board 
Indep. 
Board 
Size 
Chair&CEO 
Separation 
AuditCom 
Indpepend 
StockExch 
Disclosure 
Investor 
Protect 
Securities 
Regulations 
CG 
Score 
COE Pearson 
Correlation 
1           
Sig. (2-tailed)             
Inflation Pearson 
Correlation 
-.029*           
Sig. (2-tailed) .012 
 
         
GDP Growth Pearson 
Correlation 
-.082** .261**          
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 
 
        
BoardIndepend Pearson 
Correlation 
.082** -.227** -.017         
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .148 
 
       
BoardSize Pearson 
Correlation 
.038** -.157** .061** .400**        
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .000 .000 .000 
 
      
ChairCEOSeparation Pearson 
Correlation 
.070** -.099** -.006 .483** .668**       
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .632 .000 .000 
 
     
AuditComIndpepend Pearson 
Correlation 
-.029* -.013 .100** .170** .481** .286**      
Sig. (2-tailed) .015 .275 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
    
StockExchDisclosure Pearson 
Correlation 
-.081** .043** .062** -.212** .142** -.208** .723**     
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
   
InvestorProtect Pearson 
Correlation 
.015 -.143** .073** .549** .689** .497** .820** .473**    
Sig. (2-tailed) .211 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
  
SecuritiesRegulations Pearson 
Correlation 
.068** -.099** -.008 .533** .665** .969** .331** -.125** .505**   
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .498 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
 
CGScore Pearson 
Correlation 
-.034** .042** .133** -.023* .593** .296** .903** .689** .660** .334** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .000 .000 .046 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000   
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
110 
 
Chapter 8 - COE Effects between Voluntary and Mandatory IFRS 
Adoption 
 
In the previous chapter, univariate descriptive statistics were presented for the whole 
sample. This chapter extends the analysis by looking at the descriptive and multivariate 
statistics for voluntary and mandatory adopters.  
 
8.1 Descriptive statistics for COE effects between voluntary and mandatory IFRS 
adoption 
As indicated in Table 8.1 Panel A, early adopters (i.e. firms that adopt IFRS voluntarily 
earlier or in 2000) have a COE that is 1.1% lower post-adoption compared to pre-
adoption (from 13.04% to 11.94%). On the other hand mandatory adopters’ average 
COE falls by 0.69% (from 12.50% to 11.81%). Firms that are voluntary adopters (firms 
which adopt IFRS before the mandatory date of 2005 but after 2000) have an average 
0.55% reduction (from 12.48% to 11.93%).When this study combines early and 
voluntary adopters in a group in Panel, the result is a 0.83% reduction in COE (from 
12.76% to 11.93%), which is very close to the 0.69% average for mandatory adopters 
(from 12.50% to 11.81%).  
 
In addition, Panel C contrasts the difference of the average COE in the pre- and post-
mandatory period for mandatory firms with different CBFs. The results show the strong 
influence of CBF on the COE. In particular, it shows that mandatory firms in countries 
which move from weak to strong CBF between the two periods show the largest 
reduction in the COE, which falls by 3.52% (from 14.05% to 10.53%). On the other 
hand, mandatory firms with strong CBF in the pre- but weak CBF in the post-mandatory 
period are associated with an increase of the average COE by 2.07% (from 11.11% to 
13.18%). Comparing these results to those in Chapter 7 which only shows the effects of 
overall IFRS adoption, these initial descriptive statistics highlight the importance of a 
link between mandatory adopters’ strong CBF and the reduction in the average COE.  
 
To test the joint effect of any change in the average COE between voluntary and 
mandatory IFRS adopters, the following Section 8.2 will examine the empirical results 
of the multivariate analysis.    
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Table 8.1: Univariate Analysis of Cost of Equity Capital across Early, Voluntary and Mandatory  
(strong and weak business factors) Adopters     
For the period between 2000 to 2009 across 18 EU countries 
 
Descriptive statistics illustrate the major differences between the cost of equity  
and mandatory, voluntary and early IFRS adopters and their respective reporting 
incentives.          
 
  
 
 
 
Panel A               
For the period between Pre- and Post-Mandatory Periods across Early, Voluntary and Mandatory IFRS Adopters      
  
EARLY 
ADOPTERS              
(N=507) N= 507  VOLUNTARY ADOPTERS N= 826 
MANDATORY 
ADOPTERS N= 5961 
Total 
N= 7294 
  
Pre-
Mandatory 
Post-
Mandatory   Pre-Mandatory 
Post-
Mandatory  Pre-Mandatory Post-Mandatory   
  Period Period    Change %.  Period Period 
Change 
%  Period Period 
    
Change 
%    
Average COE 
(%)  0.1304 0.1194 -0.0110  0.1248 0.1193 -0.0055 0.1250 0.1181 -0.0069   
N  252 255   263 563  2797 3164    
Panel B              
  
EARLY & VOLUNTARY  
ADOPTERS   MANDATORY ADOPTERS       
  
Cost of 
Equity  N= 1333  Cost of Equity  N= 5961      
  
 
Pre-
Mandatory 
Post-
Mandatory  Change %  Pre-Mandatory 
Post-
Mandatory 
 
Change 
%      
Average COE 
(%)  0.1276 0.1193 -0.0083  0.1250 0.1181 -0.007      
Sample size  515 818   2797 3164       
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Panel C 
  
 
 
 
 
MANDATORY  ADOPTERS           
  Average Cost of Equity (%)            
  
Pre-
Mandatory 
Post-
Mandatory  Change %  Total # of Mandatory N        
N  1324 1524   2848        
Pre = Weak CBF 0.1405             
Post = Weak CBF 0.1318 -0.0087           
               
N  1324 1640   1640        
Pre = Weak CBF 0.1405             
Post = Strong CBF 0.1053 -0.0352           
               
  1473 1640   1473        
Pre = Strong CBF 0.1111             
Post = Strong CBF 0.1053 -0.0058           
               
  1473 1524            
Pre = Strong CBF 0.1111             
Post = Weak CBF 0.1318 0.0207  5961        
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8.2. Multivariate analysis of COE effects between voluntary and mandatory IFRS 
adoption 
Following on from the previous section, the analysis now turns to the discussion of test 
results about hypothesis #1; namely whether the COE for mandatory adopters is 
different from that of voluntary adopters for the whole sample period 2000 to 2009.  
 
8.2.1 Two-stage Least Squares (2SLS) results to resolve potential endogeneity issue 
Before directly testing for hypothesis #1, recall that in Chapter 6 the importance of 
addressing the potential endogeneity issue in regression models was discussed. Also, as 
discussed in Chapter 6, Tables 6.3 and 6.4 illustrate, two-stage least squares (2 SLS) 
equations will be used in the regression models. In the first stage, the dependent variable 
representing the likelihood of becoming a mandatory IFRS adopter (i.e. not becoming a 
voluntary adopter) is regressed along with instrumental variables (Kim and Shi, 2007).  
Then, to control for potential endogeneity issues, the calculated variable for predicted 
mandatory adopters (derived from the first stage regression) is included as an additional 
explanatory variable in the second-stage model.  This section will discuss the test results 
from these two-stage regressions. 
 
Table 8.2A presents the results when the likelihood of mandatory adopters is estimated 
with the instrumental variables. Consistent with prior studies and the descriptive 
statistics in Table 7.4, the coefficient for size is significantly and negatively associated 
with the cost of equity. And the coefficient of returns to equity is significantly positively 
related with the cost of equity. Based on the result of the first stage OLS model, the 
dependent variable of predicted mandatory firms for each firm-year observation is 
estimated (for simplicity, labeled as PMAdopters). This variable will become the 
independent variable of mandatory IFRS adoption used in testing the effects of average 
COE in all the subsequent regression models. 
 
Table 8.2 B shows the results when the variable PMAdopters is included in the second 
stage regression model to estimate the average COE from overall mandatory IFRS 
adoption. It indicates that mandatory adopters experience a statistically significant 1.2% 
lower COE
17
. It suggests that, overall for the full sample period, mandatory IFRS 
adopters are associated with a statistically significant lowering of their COE. 
                                                 
17
This study also tests to see if there are differences between the original mandatory IFRS adopters 
(without running the 2-stage SLS model) and the predicted mandatory IFRS adopter. The results (not 
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In addition, Table 8.3 also exhibits that, when both mandatory and voluntary IFRS 
adopters are included in the regression model
18
, the coefficient for voluntary IFRS 
adopters becomes statistically insignificant.  On the other hand, the coefficient of the 
mandatory IFRS adopters shows a statistically significant negative sign to the COE. 
Thus, the initial test results support hypothesis #1 that the COE for mandatory IFRS 
adopters is different from voluntary IFRS adopters for the whole period 2000 to 2009. It 
also extends the empirical results from prior studies (Li 2010) that beyond the transition 
period, mandatory IFRS adopters still have a statistically different COE than voluntary 
IFRS firms. This result supports the theoretical framework (Chapter 3) that when IFRS 
adoption became mandated in the EU (as of January 1, 2005), such higher quality 
accounting standards required greater financial disclosure than most local accounting 
standards (Ashbaugh and Pincus, 2001). As a result, the increase in disclosure is 
associated with a reduced COE for the reasons discussed earlier in Chapter 3 (Barth et 
al. 2007, Lambert et al. 2007),   
 
8.2.2 Regression Specification Error Test (RESET) for omitted variables in the 
two-stage SLS model 
As discussed in Section 6.5.2 about the research methodology, it is important to justify 
and validate the independent variables in the 2 SLS model by testing if there are any 
specification errors. This study follows the literature (Pesaran and Taylor, 1999) and 
uses the Ramsey RESET for detecting if the 2 SLS model has omitted variables. To 
perform the Ramsey RESET, there are two stages of tests. The first test regresses the 
dependent variable (i.e. the predicted mandatory adopters: PMAdopters) on the 
independent instrumental variables. In the second test, it examines the dependent 
variable on all the independent ones and the square of the predicted dependent variable 
(i.e. PMAdopters) from the first stage regression. If the 2 SLS model functions well, the 
coefficient of squared PMAdopters should not have any explanatory power in the 
original OLS model. According to the test results (not shown here), the explanatory 
power (p-value) of the squared forecasted coefficient is not significant at the usual 
levels of confidence. The lack of significance in this test suggests that there is no 
                                                                                                                                               
reported here) show that the original mandatory term has -06% reduction COE effect, while using the 
predicted variable, this doubles it to -1.2%. This demonstrates the importance of controlling for the 
endogeneity issue in the regressions. 
18
 When both the voluntary and mandatory adoption variables are included in the regression equation, the 
potential singularity issue is controlled by testing both the Tolerance (more than 0.1) and VIF (less than 
10) for each variable (as indicated in Table 10.3). 
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omitted variable issue and the functional form of the two-stage SLS model is 
appropriate.  
 
So far, the test results show that when a longer period of data is available, mandatory 
adoption is statistically significantly related to changes in the COE, whereas this is not 
the case for voluntary adoption. Moreover, the reliability of the regression models used 
in the analysis is more robust since the 2SLS approach controls for potential issues both 
for endogeneity and any omitted variables. That said, the empirical tests performed in 
this chapter do not examine the effects of CBF, ICG and IEF in mandatory IFRS 
adoption on the COE, as put forward in the IPOO model.  In the next chapter, test 
results of mandatory IFRS adoption on COE between the pre- and post-mandatory 
period will be discussed first. Then, this will be followed by a multivariate analysis 
testing the magnitude of the individual and interactive effects of CBF, ICG and IEF on 
the COE.  More importantly, the empirical results in the following chapters will provide 
statistically significant support for the other hypotheses concerning the importance of 
reporting incentives in mandatory IFRS adoption.  
116 
 
Table 8.2: Full-sample Results of Two-stage Regressions of the Cost of Equity (COE) on 
Mandatory IFRS Adoption  
 
Panel A:First-stage Ordinary Least Square (OLS) results to estimate the predicted mandatory IFRS 
adopters  
         
         
PMAdopters = β0 + β1Size +β2(Log of BM) + β3(ROE) + country dummy variables + industry dummy 
variables + year dummy variables + error terms 
         
Variables   Predicted Sign   Coefficient   t-value     
                  
Intercept  ?  1.078 *** 61.212    
           
Size  -  -0.055 *** -11.396    
           
ROE  +  0.045 *** 3.071    
           
Log of Book-to-Market  +  0.031 *** 4.245    
           
Year Dummies    Included      
           
Country Dummies   Included      
           
Industry Dummies   Included      
           
N    7294      
R Squared    36%      
ANOVA (F-test)    104.778 ***     
Durbin-Watson    2.019      
Tolerance for each variable   
more than 
0.1      
VIF for each variable   less than 10      
Mean of residual   0      
Mean of standard predicted residual  0      
Mean of standard residual   0      
                  
*** = 1% p-value significant 
and ** =5% p-value 
significance 
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Table 8.2:  : Full-sample Results of Two-stage Regressions of the Cost of Equity (COE) on  
Mandatory IFRS Adoption  
 
          
Panel B: Second-stage Ordinary Least Square (OLS) results 
 
         
 
Second-stage Ordinary Least Square (OLS) results to estimate the COE based on the Full-sample 
from the Predicted Mandatory IFRS Adopters (from 2SLS), CBF variables and others. 
 
 
Cost of equity = β0 + β1 (PMAdopters) + β2(Size) +β3(Log of BM) + β4(ROE) + β5 (Capital 
Intensity) +β6 (Log of DE) + β7 (Analysts) + β8 (Ave. Inflation) + industry dummy variables 
+ year dummy variables + error terms 
   
          
Variables   
Predicted 
Sign   Coefficient   t-value      
                   
Intercept  ?  0.185 *** 50.666     
            
PMAdopters  -  -0.012 *** -4.681     
            
Size  -  -0.013 *** 
-
13.702     
            
ROE  -  -0.042 *** 
-
17.593     
            
Log of Book-to-Market  +  0.015 *** 11.099     
            
Capital Intensity -  -0.007 *** -2.218     
            
Average inflation rate -  -0.138 ** -1.831     
            
            
Year Dummies    Included       
            
Industry Dummies   Included       
            
N    7294       
R Square    20%       
ANOVA (F-test)    65.732 ***      
Durbin-Watson    1.982       
Tolerance for each variable   more than 0.1       
VIF for each variable   less than 10       
Mean of residual   0       
Mean of standard predicted residual  0       
Mean of standard residual   0       
                   
*** = 1% p-value significant and ** =5% 
p-value significance 
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Table 8.3: Full-sample Results of Two-stage Regressions of the Cost of Equity (Coe) on both  
Voluntary and Mandatory IFRS Adoption  
  
Full-sample Results of estimating the COE effects from the Predicted Mandatory IFRS Adopters 
(from 2SLS), Voluntary Adopters, CBF variables & others. 
 
Cost of equity = β0 + β1 (PMAdopters) + β2 (VAdopters) + β3(Size) +β4(Log of BM) + β5(ROE)  
+ β6 (Capital Intensity) +β7(Log of DE) + β8 (Analysts) + β9 (Ave. Inflation) + industry dummy 
variables + year dummy variables + error terms 
       
         
Variables   
Predicted 
Sign   Coefficient   t-value     
                  
Intercept  ?  0.183 *** 40.697    
           
PMAdopters  -  -0.011 *** -3.217    
           
VAdopters  ?  0.002  1.27    
           
Size  -  -0.013 *** -13.797    
           
ROE  -  -0.042 *** -17.653    
           
Log of Book-to-Market  +  0.012 *** 5.347    
           
Log of DE ratio +  0.027 *** 14.29    
           
Capital Intensity -  -0.007 *** -2.305    
           
Average inflation rate -  -0.14 ** -1.845    
           
Year Dummies    Included      
           
Industry Dummies   Included      
           
N    7294      
R Square    20%      
ANOVA (F-test)    65.732 ***     
Durbin-Watson    1.982      
Tolerance for each variable   
more than 
0.1      
VIF for each variable   
less than 
10      
Mean of residual   0      
Mean of standard predicted residual  0      
Mean of standard residual   0      
                  
*** = 1% p-value significant and ** =5% p-value significance     
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Chapter 9: COE effects for Mandatory IFRS Adoption along the 
IPOO Model 
 
After discussing the results for hypothesis #1on comparing voluntary and mandatory 
IFRS adoption, this chapter will examine the outcomes from the empirical tests for 
hypotheses #2 to 8 about the COE effects (i) for mandatory IFRS adoption between the 
pre- and post-mandatory period; and (ii) from proxies of reporting incentives in the 
IPOO model. 
 
9.1 COE effects for Mandatory IFRS adopters between the pre and post-
mandatory period: 
Li (2010) and other prior studies measure a significant reduction of the cost of equity by 
mandatory IFRS adopters during the post-mandatory period 2005 to 2006. The present 
analysis extends her study by testing for a longer post-mandatory period from 2005 to 
2009. Table 9.1 indicates that over this longer period mandatory adoption is still 
negatively associated with the COE (at -1.7% with two-sided p<1% vs. Li’s study at  
-0.48% with two-sided p<1%).  
 
On the other hand, mandatory adopters in the mandatory period show a very small 
positive coefficient (at +0.8%), but this is not significant at the usual levels (i.e. two-
sided p>5%). This results for the longer post-adoption period is contrary to prior studies 
that find that the change in the COE for mandatory IFRS firms following the post 
mandatory period is not statistically significant.
19
 Therefore, the result is consistent with 
hypothesis 2 that the cost of equity for mandatory adopters in the post-mandatory period 
is not associated with a significant lowering COE than that of the pre-mandatory period. 
 
In comparing these results with those of Li (2010), they indicate mixed results for 
hypotheses 1 and 2. Firstly, initial evidence is gathered that it is consistent to her study 
showing that mandatory adopters experience a significant reduction in the COE. 
Secondly, while her study only includes the transition period of mandatory firms (from 
2005 to 2006); this study covers the post-mandatory period from 2005 to 2009 and 
                                                 
19
 To test under what conditions mandatory adopters in mandatory period will be significantly associated 
with lower COE, This study gathers evidence (not tabulated here) that when year dummies are not 
included in the regression model, the coefficient for mandatory adopters in the mandatory period becomes 
significant at -0.006. It suggests that the reducing COE effect is probably not attributable to the 
mandatory IFRS adoption period itself. 
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shows that the mandatory period after 2005 does not associate with a reduction of the 
COE.  
 
Therefore, as discussed in Chapter 3 and 4, empirical tests on COE effects of mandatory 
IFRS adoption should be able to provide more updated and realistic results when this 
study measures such effects  for a longer period beyond the transition effects as 
indicated by prior studies. 
 
Since this research focus is on mandatory IFRS adoption and COE effects from 
reporting incentives, the empirical question now calls for evidence from testing if 
mandatory adopters’ reporting incentive is related to a significant reduction in the COE. 
The next section will present and discuss the results of examining the determinants and 
consequences of individual and interactions of firm and country-specific factors on the 
COE in mandatory IFRS adoption.  
  
121 
 
Table 9.1          
Full-sample Results Comparing the Cost of Equity for Mandatory IFRS Adopters between Pre- and 
Post-mandatory Periods 
 
After controlling for the post-adoption period, this model measures if mandatory IFRS adoption per se may 
associate with any change of the cost of equity when comparing to the pre-adoption period.  
 
          
Cost of equity = β0 + β1 (PMAdopters) + β2(PMAdopters*Mperiod) + β3 Size) +β4(Log of BM) + β5(ROE) 
+ β6 (Capital Intensity) +β7 (Log of DE) + β8 (Analysts) + β9 (Ave. Inflation) +  industry dummy variables + 
year dummy variables+ error terms 
  
      
          
Variables   
Predicted 
Sign   Coefficient   t-value      
                   
Intercept  ?  0.187 *** 40.852     
            
PMAdopters  ?  -0.017 *** -4.458     
            
PMAdoptersMperiod -  0.008  1.665     
            
Size  -  -0.013 *** 
-
13.728     
            
Log of DE ratio +  0.028 *** 15.589     
            
ROE  -  -0.042 *** 
-
17.566     
            
Log of Book-to-Market  +  0.015 *** 11.92     
            
Capital Intensity -  -0.007 *** -2.215     
            
Average inflation rate -  -0.153 ** -2.016     
            
Year Dummies    Included       
            
Industry Dummies   Included       
            
N       7294          
R Square    19%       
ANOVA (F-test)    63.499 ***      
Durbin-Watson    1.875       
Tolerance for each variable   more than 0.1       
VIF for each variable   less than 10       
Mean of residual   0       
Mean of standard predicted residual  0       
Mean of standard residual   0       
                   
*** = 1% p-value significant and ** =5% p-value 
significance       
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9.2 Mandatory IFRS adopters with strong CBF 
To test if the first component of the IPOO model - strong CBF has any statistically 
significant reduction on the COE, this study follows the literature to proxy mandatory 
adopters’ strong CBF as higher-than-average profitability, equity-based capital 
structure, long-term growth and numbers of analysts to follow. Accordingly, Table 9.2 
(Model 1) shows that, on average, mandatory adopting firms have -1% COE reduction 
effect in a highly significant manner (with two sided p-value< 1%
20
). More importantly, 
it highlights that for mandatory firms with strong CBF, the coefficient gives an 
additional -0.4% lowering of their COE (with close to a 1% significance level)
21
. 
Therefore, it is evident that a significant incremental reduction in the COE is related to 
mandatory firms who have above-average earnings, have more equity-based financing 
in their capital structure, have higher long-term growth and draw more analysts to 
follow. This is consistent with hypothesis 3 that proposes that the higher the level of 
CBF, the higher the reducing COE effect from mandatory adoption. The results imply 
that, as also argued by prior studies (e.g. Daske et al. 2009, Bova 2008, Street and Gray 
2002), when all public companies are subject to the same minimum mandatory IFRS 
reporting requirements, firms with strong CBF may enhance their reporting incentive 
(that is, a better Influence in the IPOO model) by exercising greater and better 
disclosures, and transparency in reporting financial results through IFRS to the capital 
markets (that is, higher quality of outcome).  Hence, the information asymmetry 
between investors and managers is reduced, because investors are better-informed. 
Eventually, due to the reduced risk, investors are willing to lower the required discount 
rate. As a result, the IPOO model proposes that strong CBF prompts higher reporting 
incentives in IFRS adoption and subsequently the production of better quality financial 
reports. As a result, as the results show, stronger CBF is related to lowering of the COE. 
 
However, while the results in Table 9.1 indicate that the mandatory period for overall 
mandatory adopters is not a significant factor for any COE reducing effect, this study 
continues to examine if there is a significant effect for mandatory IFRS adopters with 
strong CBF in the mandatory period. Table 9.2 (Model 2), provides consistent evidence 
with Table 9.1 in that the coefficient for CBF is positive but not significant. Therefore, 
                                                 
20
 This study follows most prior studies of IFRS that regression models are tested by the p-values 
measured by 1% and 5% level. 
21
 If this study uses the mandatory adopters as dummy variable before 2 SLS, it finds an insignificant 
0.2% reduction of the COE for Mandatory Adopters; and an insignificant 0.3% lower COE for Mandatory 
adopters with higher CBF in the mandatory period. This indicates the importance of applying the 2 SLS 
models to address endogeneity issues. 
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Table 9.2 results add further evidence to support hypothesis 3 that mandatory IFRS 
adoption and its interacting effect with strong CBF are associated with a statistically 
significant reduction in the COE for the full sample period, and not simply with the 
post-mandatory period. This initial result supports the existence of a joint effect 
between mandatory IFRS adoption and firm-specific strong CBF that relate to the 
ultimate reduction in the COE. 
 
 The following section extends the empirical tests to another component of the IPOO 
model – ICG, to determine if it is has a significant influence on a reduction in the COE 
during mandatory IFRS adoption. 
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Table 9.2:            
Comparing the Cost of Equity for Mandatory IFRS Adopters and the Effect of  
Strong CBF vs. the Effect of Strong CBF in the Mandatory Period 
This table gives the results for the effect of reporting incentives in mandatory IFRS adoption, the two models intend to  
test if there are reductions in the cost of equity when mandatory IFRS adoption interacts with: 
(1) Strong CBF, an influence of firm-specifics on reporting incentives; and 
(2) Strong CBF and mandatory IFRS in the adoption period. This differs from the result of Table 10.1  
where strong CBF is not controlled for. 
Model 1:            
Full-sample Results of Comparing the Cost of Equity for Mandatory IFRS Adopters and Effect of Strong CBF   
Cost of equity = β0 + β1 (PMAdopters) + β2(PMAdopters*StrongCBF) + β3 (Size) +β4(Log of DE) + β5(ROE) + β6 (Log of BM) 
+ β7(Capital Intensity) + β8 (Ave. Inflation) + year dummy variables+ industry dummy variables + error terms  
Model 2:            
Full-sample Results of Comparing the Cost of Equity for Mandatory IFRS Adopters and Effect of Strong CBF in Mandatory Period 
Cost of equity = β0 + β1 (PMAdopters) + β2(PMAdopters*StrongCBF*MAdoptoryPeriod) + β3(Size) +β4(Log of DE) + β5(ROE)  
+ β6 (Log of BM) + β7(Capital Intensity) + β8 (Ave. Inflation) + year dummy variables+ industry dummy variables + error terms 
 
     
Model 
1    
Model 
2   
Variables   
Predicted 
Sign   Coefficient   
t-
value   Coefficient   t-value  
Intercept  ?  0.187 *** 40.852  0.185 *** 43.076  
              
PMadopters  -  -0.01 *** -3.67  -0.013 *** -4.764  
              
PMadoptersStrongCBF -  -0.004 ** -1.975         
              
PMadoptersStrongCBFMperiod ?          0.002  
                   
0.928  
              
Size  -  -0.012 *** 
-
11.711  -0.013 *** -13.531  
              
Log of DE ratio +  0.027 *** 14.719  0.029 *** 15.633  
              
ROE  -  -0.041 *** 
-
17.114  -0.042 *** 
-
0.17606  
              
Log of Book-to-Market  +  0.014 ** 10.586  0.015 *** 11.9  
              
Capital Intensity -  -0.006 ** -1.833  -0.007 ** -2.295  
              
Average inflation rate ?  -0.147  -1.949  -0.133  -1.756  
              
Year Dummies    Included    Included     
Industry Dummies   Included    Included     
              
N       7294       7294      
R Square    20%    20%     
ANOVA (F-test)    63.499 ***   63.414 ***    
Durbin-Watson    1.875    1.874     
Tolerance for each variable   more than 0.1    
more than 
0.1     
VIF for each variable   less than 10    
less than 
10     
Mean of residual   0    0     
Mean of standard predicted residual  0    0     
Mean of standard residual   0    0     
                       
*** = 1% p-value significant and ** =5% p-value significance         
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9.3. Mandatory IFRS adopters with ICG 
After strong CBF is proven to be a significant complementary factor in reducing the 
COE, this section continues to test hypotheses 4a and 4b; namely whether ICG and the 
respective interaction between ICG and strong CBF have any effect on the COE. As 
shown in Table 9.3 (Model 1), when the metric of internal corporate governance (ICG) 
is included, it creates a statistically significant coefficient for the lowering COE effect 
(at -0.1%, with two-sided p-value <1%). However, the coefficient of mandatory IFRS 
adoption becomes insignificant. Thus, the explanatory power of ICG dominates the 
overall mandatory requirement to adopt IFRS and a lower COE. This initial result 
implies that, on average, equity investors attach more importance to the effectiveness of 
internal corporate governance (that may influence reporting incentives on how firms 
committed to reporting their financial results through IFRS) than simply to mandatory 
adoption.  
 
In addition, , Table 9.3 (Model 2) exhibits similar results as to Model 1, except that in 
this case the COE reducing effect is much stronger when mandatory IFRS adopters 
related to higher-than-average ICG (the coefficient equals  -1% and is significant at the 
two-sided p-value <1%). This reinforces the result from Model 1 that equity markets’ 
willingness to substantially lower their COE is significantly related to those firms which 
are relatively better governed.  
 
The role of higher ICG and its effect on lowering the COE are also evident from the 
results of Model 3. Table 9.3 reveals that mandatory firms with higher levels of ICG 
have more significant effects on the lowering COE than the overall mandatory firms 
when its coefficient becomes more negatively correlated with the COE (at-1.2% 
significantly at two-sided p-value <1%)
22
. Therefore, similar to the effects from strong 
CBF, the empirical results provide robust support for hypothesis 4a in that higher ICG is 
significantly related to COE reducing effects in mandatory IFRS adoption. 
 
Even though the literature says that there is mixed evidence on the association between 
corporate governance and financial reporting quality, the results from Table 9.3 shed 
light on the theoretical argument that high quality of financial reporting from better 
governed firms has a similar effect as strong CBF on the reporting incentive. In the 
                                                 
22
 The main reason to analyze by separating each pair of test variables is because it is easy for such related 
interaction terms to have high multicollinearity problem (i.e. VIF>10). 
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IPOO model, the reduction of the agency conflicts between shareholders and managers 
strengthens the reporting incentive for managers who practice IFRS adoption with 
greater and better disclosure over and above the minimum requirements. As a 
consequence, the average cost of equity for this group of firms is lowered. 
 
So far, the results show that when individual CBF and ICG variables are included in the 
models (Tables 9.2 and 9.3), each of them individually leads to a significant reduced 
COE effect for mandatory IFRS adopters. In the following section, results from testing 
the respective interaction effects between CBF and ICG will be presented.  
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Table 9.3 Comparing the Cost of Equity for Mandatory IFRS Adopters and the Effect of Internal 
Corporate Governance (ICG) 
 
The effectiveness of internal corporate governance (ICG) is hypothesized to enhance the reporting incentives of managers on 
mandatory IFRS adoption via a cost of equity effect. To examine this, the following three models are developed to test on any 
reductions in the cost of equity from both the ICG variable and the interaction between the ICG variable and mandatory IFRS 
adoption. 
Model 1:              
Full-sample Results of Comparing the Cost of Equity for Mandatory IFRS Adopters and Effect of ICG  
Cost of equity = β0 + β1 (PMAdopters) + β2(ICG) + β3 (PMAdopters*ICG) + β4(Log of BM) + β5(ROE) + β6 (Log of DE) + β7 (Ave. Inflation)  
+ industry dummy variables + year dummy variables + error terms   
Model 2:              
Full-sample Results of Comparing the Cost of Equity for Mandatory IFRS Adopters and Effect of High ICG  
Cost of equity = β0 + β1 (PMAdopters) + β2(PMAdopters*High ICG) β3 (Size) +β4(Log of BM) + β5(ROE) + β6 (Log of DE)    
 + β7 (Ave. Inflation) + industry dummy variables + year dummy variables + error terms      
Model 3:              
Full-sample Results of Comparing the Cost of Equity for Mandatory IFRS Adopters and Effect of ICG & High ICG 
Cost of equity = β0 + β1 (PMAdopters*ICG) + β2 (PMAdopters*High ICG) + β3 (Size) +β4(Log of BM) + β5(ROE) + β6 (Log of DE)   
 + β7 (Ave. Inflation) + industry dummy variables + year dummy variables + error terms      
              
     
Model 
1   
Model 
2   
Model 
3   
Variables   Predicted Sign   Coefficient   t-value Coefficient   t-value Coefficient   t-value  
                        
Intercept  ?  0.201 *** 41.797 0.199 *** 50.421 0.197  51.378  
                
PMAdopters  -  0.001  0.178 -0.002  -0.752        
                
ICG scores  -  -0.001 *** -5.703              
                
PMAdopters*ICG scores ?              0  0.838  
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PMAdopters*High ICG 
scores -        -0.01 *** -6.677 -0.012 *** -5.064  
                
Size  -  -0.016 *** -20.51 -0.016 *** -20.762 -0.016 *** -20.84  
                
Log of DE ratio +  0.029 *** 16.126 0.029 *** 16.094 0.029 *** 16.196  
                
ROE  -  -0.041 *** -17.208 -0.041 *** -17.448 -0.041 *** -17.21  
                
Log of Book-to-Market  +  0.016 *** 13.93 0.016 *** 13.917 0.016 *** 14.076  
                
Average inflation rate ?  -0.275 *** -3.359 -0.126 *** -1.679 -0.246 *** -3.026  
                
Year Dummies   Included   Included   Included     
                
Industry Dummies   Included   Included   Included     
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
              
N       7294     7294     7294      
R Square    20%   20%   20%     
ANOVA (F-test)   68.809 ***  69.962 ***  69.522 ***    
Durbin-Watson   1.881   1.879   1.885     
Tolerance for each variable  more than 0.1   more than 0.1   more than 0.1     
VIF for each variable   less than 10   less than 10   less than 10     
Mean of residual   0   0   0     
Mean of standard predicted residual 0   0   0     
Mean of standard residual  0   0   0     
                           
*** = 1% p-value significant and ** =5% p-value significance       
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9.4 Mandatory IFRS Adopters with strong CBF and ICG, and Interaction Effect 
To test for any effect on the COE by both the individual ICG and CBF and the 
interaction of these two effects following mandatory IFRS adoption, Table 9.4 (Model 
1) shows that—similar to the results of Table 9.3—both above-average CBF and 
individual coefficients of firms’ ICG index are negatively correlated with the COE  
(-0.4% at two-sided p-value 5% significance and -0.1% at two-sided p-value 1% 
significance, respectively). Moreover, without compromising the multicolinearity issue, 
Table 9.4 (Model 2) indicates that the coefficient of the interaction term (ICG-CBF) 
shows a significant negative effect on the COE of -0.6% (with a two-sided p-value 
<5%). This result supports hypothesis 4b that when both mandatory IFRS firms’ strong 
CBF and high ICG factors are taken together, it results in a significantly higher reducing 
effect on the COE. More importantly, Model 2 highlights that in mandatory IFRS 
adoption, the complementary effect from inter-acting both strong CBF and high ICG 
leads to a lower COE than strong CBF on its own.  
  
These initial empirical results are in line with the incentive-view that in order to achieve 
a reduction in the COE in mandatory IFRS adoption, both firms’ internal strong CBF 
and board of directors’ ICG mechanisms must work together to enhance reporting 
incentives. When managers are motivated by strong CBF and monitored by high level 
of ICG, the combination enhances the reporting incentive, which in turn will benefit 
investors by providing high quality financial reports (that is, a better output in IPOO 
model). As a result, the cost of equity demanded by investors may be reduced (i.e. better 
outcome).  
 
Nevertheless, even though strong CBF and higher ICG together are important firm-
specific factors to influence reporting incentives, the role of another component – an 
external and macro-level IEF in the IPOO model is still to be considered. Therefore, the 
empirical results related to hypothesis 5 about the effects of legal origins on the COE in 
mandatory IFRS adoption will be examined in the following section 9.5.  
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Table 9.4 
           Testing the Cost of Equity for Mandatory IFRS Adopters with Interaction between Internal Corporate Governance (ICG) and Strong Core Business Factors (CBF) 
 
When both strong CBF and ICG individually show their statistically significant effects with the reduced cost of equity (Table 9.2 and 9.3), these models test any complimentary effect 
of further reduced cost of equity when mandatory IFRS adoption interacts with both strong CBF and high ICG. 
          
            Model 1: 
           Comparing the Cost of Equity for Mandatory IFRS Adopters, Effect of Strong CBF and ICG  
 Cost of equity = β0 + β1 (PMAdopters) + β2(PMAdoptersStrongCBF) + β3(ICG) + β4(Size) +β4(Log of BM) + β5(ROE) + β6(Log of DE) + β7 (Ave. Inflation)  
+ industry dummy variables + year dummy variables + error terms 
   
     
            Model 2: 
           Comparing the Cost of Equity for Mandatory IFRS Adopters, Effect of Strong CBF and ICG  
 Cost of equity = β0 + β1 (PMAdopters) + β2(PMAdoptersStrongCBF) + β3(ICG) + β4(PMAdopters*StrongCBF*HighICG) +β4 (Size) +β5(Log of BM) + β6(ROE)  
+ β7(Log of DE) + β8 (Ave. Inflation) + industry dummy variables + year dummy variables + error terms 
   
            
            
     
Model 1 
   
Model 2 
  
Variables   
Predicted 
Sign   Coefficient   t-value   Coefficient   t-value   
                    
 
  
Intercept 
 
? 
 
0.201 *** 41.797 
 
0.199 *** 50.421   
  
          
  
PMadopters 
 
- 
 
0.003 
 
0.777 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.752   
  
          
  
PMAdopters*Strong CBF - 
 
-0.004 ** -2.637 
 
0   -0.23   
  
          
  
Firms' ICG score - 
 
-0.001 *** -5.681   -0.001 *** -4.703   
  
          
  
PMAdopters*HighCBF*High ICG  - 
 
        -0.006 ** -2.276   
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Size 
 
- 
 
-0.016 *** -20.51 
 
-0.016 *** -20.762   
  
          
  
Log of DE ratio + 
 
0.029 *** 16.126 
 
0.029 *** 16.094   
  
          
  
ROE 
 
- 
 
-0.041 *** -17.208 
 
-0.041 *** -17.448   
  
          
  
Log of Book-to-Market  + 
 
0.016 *** 13.93 
 
0.016 *** 13.917   
  
          
  
Average inflation rate ? 
 
-0.275 *** -3.359 
 
-0.126 *** -1.679   
  
          
  
Year Dummies 
   
Included 
   
Included 
  
  
  
          
  
Industry Dummies 
  
Included 
   
Included 
  
  
  
          
  
N       7294       7294       
R Square 
   
20% 
   
20% 
  
  
ANOVA (F-test) 
   
68.809 *** 
  
69.962 *** 
 
  
Durbin-Watson 
   
1.881 
   
1.879 
  
  
Tolerance for each variable 
  
more than 0.1 
   
more than 0.1 
  
  
VIF for each variable 
  
less than 10 
   
less than 10 
  
  
Mean of residual 
  
0 
   
0 
  
  
Mean of standard predicted residual 
 
0 
   
0 
  
  
Mean of standard residual 
  
0 
   
0 
  
  
                        
*** = 1% p-value significant and ** =5% p-value significance 
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9.5 Interaction between Mandatory IFRS Adoption and Four Legal Origins 
While strong CBF, ICG and the respective interactive effects on lowering COE have 
been discussed above, this study now examines the results of testing if mandatory IFRS 
firms in four different legal origins are significantly associated with variation in the 
COE (as per hypothesis 5). 
 
Table 9.5 Panel A (Model 1) finds that for mandatory IFRS firms domiciled in German 
origin (GO), there is a -0.5% effect on the COE, but this is insignificant at the usual 
levels of significance (i.e. at two-sided p-value >5%)
23
.  For German mandatory 
adopters, it suggests that a substantial reduction in their COE does not follow from the 
switch in accounting standards. It is different for mandatory adopters in British origin 
(BO), where the coefficient is statistically significantly related to the -1.3% COE effect 
(at the two-sided p-value <1%significance level in Model 2). These initial results are 
consistent with the literature in that when the local accounting standards in Common 
Law system such as British-origin countries are similar to IFRS; the information needs 
of investors will be promoted in a market-orientated economy through their social, 
cultural and business practices. Such interaction with the Common Law type legal 
origin may associate with lower COE. On the other hand, under Code Law regime, 
Germany’s previous accounting standard (the Handelsgesetzbuch -HBG) substantially 
differs from IFRS and was mainly used for satisfying stakeholder groups (Ball, et al., 
2000). Since adopting IFRS application, Germany has been developing its equity 
markets infrastructure 
24
 so that Germany is gradually transitioning to a market-based 
economy from an insider economy orientation (Ball, et al. 2000). As a result, it is 
possible that German-origin’s Code Law structure needs more time to adapt the capital 
market benefits from mandatory IFRS adoption and therefore is not yet related to the 
statistically significant lowering COE effect. 
 
On the other hand, when Scandinavian origin (SO) is regarded as heavy socialist 
economy involved (i.e. Sweden, Demark and Finland), the effect of mandatory IFRS 
may be different relative to the other legal origins. Accordingly, Table 9.5 Panel A 
                                                 
23
 Also, when the variable of German-origin mandatory IFRS adopters with strong CBF is included, it 
(not tabulated) has -0.9% COE effect but again this is insignificant. 
24
 A recent study by Lee et al. (2010) measures the index of Equity Market Importance in the EU by the 
mean rank across the three variables used in La Porta et al. (1997): aggregated stock market capitalization 
held by minorities relative to GNP; number of listed domestic firms relative to the population; and the 
number of IPOs relative to the population. German equity market has the least score among the 17 
European countries used in the present study. 
133 
 
(Model 3) documents that mandatory IFRS firms in SO, on average, are not negatively 
associated with their COE. Finally, Table 9.5 Panel A (Model 4) indicates that the 
dummy variable of French origin (FO) mandatory adopters is significantly negatively 
related with the COE with a coefficient of -0.4% that is statistically significant at the 5% 
level.  
 
Therefore, due to the diverse legal origins of the institutional environment in the 18 EU 
countries, such legal, cultural, social and economic differences may shape different 
levels of reporting incentive for firms in mandatory IFRS adoption. This, in turn, may 
result in a different capital market consequence in the IPOO model based on firms’ legal 
origin. Hence, the empirical results from Table 9.5 are consistent with hypothesis 5 that 
legal origins of British (BO) and French (FO) firms are significantly and negatively 
related with the COE, while Scandinavian (SO) and German (GO) firms are not. 
 
While the German (GO) is the only legal origin proved not to have a significant 
coefficient, this study further tests to see if the mandatory period in different legal 
origins, especially GO, may have different results of COE effects. Recall that previously 
in Table 9.1, overall mandatory period alone is not an important coefficient. 
Interestingly, evidence is found that in 4 legal origins only the German origin (GO) has 
a significant coefficient (as shown in Table 9.5 Panel B). This result shows that, on 
average, GO mandatory IFRS firms in the post mandatory period are associated with a 
coefficient of a -1.7% COE effect (significant at the 5% level). When prior studies 
focused on German voluntary adopters who were benefitted from the lower COE, the 
results in Panel B suggest that a significant reduction in the COE is also evident for 
German mandatory IFRS adopters in the post-2005 period. 
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Table 9.5 Panel A Comparing the Cost of Equity for Mandatory IFRS Adopters and their Legal Origins 
 
To examine the effect of Institutional Environment Factors (IEF) in mandatory IFRS adoption on the cost of equity, the four models 
proxy IEF using four legal origins: German-origin (GO), British-origin (BO), Scandinavian-origin (SO) and French-origin (FO), and 
test if there are reductions in the cost of equity related to the interaction between legal origins and mandatory IFRS adoption. 
  
                 
Model 1:                 
Full-sample Results of Comparing the Cost of Equity for Mandatory IFRS Adopters and Effect of German-origin (GO)   
Cost of equity = β0 + β1 (PMAdopters) + β2(PMAdopters*GO) + β3 Size) +β4 (Log of Book-to-Market) + β5 (Ave. Inflation) + industry dummy variables  
+ year dummy variables + error terms 
       
Model 2:                 
Full-sample Results of Comparing the Cost of Equity for Mandatory IFRS Adopters and Effect of British-origin (BO)   
Cost of equity = β0 + β1 (PMAdopters) + β2(PMAdopters*BO) + β3 Size) +β4 (Log of Book-to-Market) + β5 (Ave. Inflation) + industry dummy variables  
+ year dummy variables + error terms 
       
Model 3:                 
Full-sample Results of Comparing the Cost of Equity for Mandatory IFRS Adopters and Effect of Scandinavian-origin (SO)  
Cost of equity = β0 + β1 (PMAdopters) + β2(PMAdopters*SO) + β3 Size) +β4 (Log of Book-to-Market) + β5 (Ave. Inflation) + industry dummy variables  
+ year dummy variables + error terms 
       
Model 4:                 
Full-sample Results of Comparing the Cost of Equity for Mandatory IFRS Adopters and Effect of French-origin (FO)   
Cost of equity = β0 + β1 (PMAdopters) + β2(PMAdopters*FO) + β3 Size) +β4 (Log of Book-to-Market) + β5 (Ave. Inflation) + industry dummy variables  
+ year dummy variables + error terms 
 
 
       
         
   
Model  
1: GO    
Model 
2:BO    
Model 
3:SO    
Model 
4: FO  
Variables   
Predicted 
Sign Coefficient   t-value   Coefficient   t-value   Coefficient   t-value Coefficient   t-value 
                           
Intercept  ? 1.191 *** 28.193  0.187 *** 45.758  0.181 *** 43.773 0.186 *** 44.845 
                   
PMAdopters  - -0.015 *** -2.798  0 *** -0.125  -0.021 *** -8.099 -0.011 *** -4.078 
                   
PMAdopters*Legal + -0.005  -0.656  -0.013 *** -8.427  0.027 *** 14.22 -0.004 ** -2.385 
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Origin 
                   
Size  - -0.014 *** -17.562  -0.016 *** -20.891  -0.017 *** -22.876 -0.014 *** -19.048 
                   
Log of Book-to-
Market + 0.015 *** 13.584  0.015 *** 13.776  0.017 *** 15.451 0.015 ** 13.878 
                   
Average inflation 
rate ? -0.183 ** -2.43  -0.193 *** -2.59  0.001  0.011            -0.145  -1.904 
                   
Year Dummies   Included    Included    Included   Included    
                   
Industry Dummies  Included    Included    Included   Included    
                   
                   
N     7294       7294       7294     7294     
R Square   21%    22%    23%   21%    
ANOVA (F-
test)   73.539 ***   76.967 ***   83.34   73.794 
**
*   
Durbin-Watson   1.859    1.873    1.904   1.861    
Tolerance for each variable 
more than 
0.1    
more than 
0.1    
more than 
0.1   more than 0.1    
VIF for each 
variable  less than 10    less than 10    
less than 
10   less than 10    
Mean of residual  0    0    0   0    
Mean of standard predicted 
residual 0    0    0   0    
Mean of standard residual 0    0    0   0    
                                  
*** = 1% p-value significant and ** =5% p-value significance          
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Table 9.5 Panel B            
Comparing the Cost of Equity for Mandatory IFRS Firms in GO and Mandatory IFRS firms in GO in  
Mandatory Period. 
 
Previously, Table 9.3 shows that, overall, the post-mandatory period of IFRS adoption does not associate with a 
reduced COE. Panel A of this Table documents that German-origin (GO) does not relate to any lowering  
COE effect. This model  tests if GO interacts with post-mandatory IFRS adoption and relates to  
any statistically significant reduction in the COE.  
            
 
Model:            
Full-sample Results of Comparing the Cost of Equity for Mandatory IFRS Adopters and Effect of Strong CBF  
Cost of equity = β0 + β1 (PMAdopters) + β2(PMAdopters*GO) + β3 (PMAdopters*GO*MandatoryPeriod) + 
 β4(Size) +β5(Leverage) + β6(ROA) + β7 (Log of B-M Ratio)  + β8 (Ave. Inflation) +  
β9 (Industry dummy variables) +β10 (Year dummy variables) + error terms 
            
            
Variables   
Predicted 
Sign   Coefficient   t-value        
                     
Intercept  ?  0.193 *** 28.253       
              
PMAdopters  -  -0.017 *** -3.059       
              
PMAdopters*GO  +  0.001  0.161       
              
PMAdopters*GO*MandatoryPeriod -  -0.017 ** -2.42       
              
Size  -  -0.015 *** -17.674       
              
Leverage  +  0.03 *** 8.534       
              
ROA  -  -0.147 *** -20.634       
              
Log of Book-to-Market ratio +  0.015 *** 13.639       
              
Average inflation rate ?  -0.194 *** -2.568       
              
Year Dummies    Included         
              
Industry Dummies   Included         
              
N       7294            
R Square    21%         
ANOVA (F-test)    70.07 ***        
Durbin-Watson    1.86         
Tolerance for each variable   more than 0.1         
VIF for each variable   less than 10         
Mean of residual   0         
Mean of standard predicted residual  0         
Mean of standard residual   0         
                     
*** = 1% p-value significant and ** =5% p-value significance       
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9.6 Interaction between mandatory IFRS Adoption with strong CBF and 4 legal 
origins 
The previous sections provide evidence that in mandatory IFRS adoption, (i) strong 
CBF interacts with ICG to be associated with significantly lower COE; and (ii) different 
legal origins have variations in the effect on the COE. This section now turns to 
examining the empirical results of the COE when strong CBF interacts with different 
legal origins.  
 
German Origin (GO) 
Table 9.6 (Model 1) records evidence that mandatory IFRS adopting firms in German-
origin (GO) countries experience insignificant COE effect (this is the same result as in 
the previous Table 9.2). This accords with the descriptive statistics of Table 7-4 and the 
literature (e.g. Ball et al. 2005) that coded law countries such as Germany are regarded 
as relatively lower institutional environments for capital market investors (e.g. low 
Stock Exchange Disclosure and investor protection). However, when the interaction 
between mandatory firms in German (GO) and strong CBF is included, it has a 
significantly negative coefficient on the COE (-1.3% at 5% level of significance). This 
result highlights the importance of strong CBF for German (GO) mandatory firms, as it 
may strengthen their reporting incentive and subsequently associates with a significant 
negative COE. Therefore, when prior studies claim that some German (GO) firms adopt 
IFRS voluntarily with high reporting incentive and hence a lower COE, this result is 
also true for German (GO) mandatory firms with strong CBF. 
  
British Origin (BO) 
Table 9.6 (Model 2) indicates a similar result to that of Table 9.5 Panel A in that overall 
mandatory adoption by British (BO) firms has a degree of effect in lowering the COE as 
there is a -1% significant coefficient (with two-sided p<1%). However, when mandatory 
IFRS firms in British (BO) interact with strong CBF, this is linked to a further negative 
COE effect (-0.5%) but this is not significant.  The results suggest that, on average, BO 
firms with overall mandatory IFRS adoption experience lower COE, but not because of 
a strong CBF.  
 
Scandinavian Origin (SO) 
Contrary to other legal origins, Table 9.6 (Model 3) shows that statistically 
Scandinavian (SO) mandatory IFRS adopters are not negatively associated with the 
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COE. It is possible that Scandinavian-origin (SO) countries are regarded as heavy 
social-market based economies and, as a consequence equity investors may respond to 
mandatory IFRS adoption differently relative to the other legal origins.  The results do 
not show the any significant effect on the COE even when strong CBF is included 
(result not shown). However, when specific CBF variables are controlled, the parameter 
of Scandinavian (SO) firms with higher profitability has a significant -1.4% effect on 
the COE (with two-sided p<1%). This implies that strong composite CBF in 
Scandinavian (SO) IFRS adoption does not relate to a significant reduction in the COE, 
unless the firms are very profitable. One way of interpreting this result is that, maybe 
Scandinavian (SO) firms need more time to transition from the Nordic model social-
based to a more capital market-based approach in order to benefit from a reduction in 
their COE following mandatory IFRS adoption.  
 
French Origin (FO) 
Similar to the GO setting, evidence from Table 9.6 (Model 4) documents that the 
coefficient for the interaction between strong CBF and French (FO) mandatory adopters 
is significant with a -0.8% reduction in the COE. However, French (FO) mandatory 
adoption has zero effect on the COE. It indicates that French (FO) firms adopting IFRS 
are not related to any significant incremental lowering of their COE, unless they have 
strong CBF to enhance firm-specific reporting incentives. Overall, the test results from 
Table 9.6 confirms hypothesis 6 that the COE effect for mandatory IFRS firms differs 
between strong CBF and their IEF (proxied by legal origins). The findings here are 
similar to prior studies which document diverse empirical results for firm-specific CBF 
in interaction with legal origins (Krivogorsky et al. 2010). Due to the underlying 
differences in cultural, legal and economic backgrounds, country-specific IEF appears 
to interact with firms’ strong CBF differently. As a result, the evidence shows that only 
German and French equity investors respond to mandatory IFRS adopters’ strong CBF 
with significant negative COE effects.  
 
Besides legal origins, recent research studies proxy institutional factors with measures 
of national levels of bureaucratic formalities in business practices. In the following 
section, classifying European countries by such differentiating factors as the IEF, I 
document empirical results from testing hypothesis 7.
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Table 9.6 Comparing the Cost of Equity for Mandatory IFRS Adopters and the Interaction Effect between  
Strong CBF and the Four Legal Origins 
 
When firms’ strong CBF is proved to be a statistically significant coefficient in relation to lower COE (Table 9.2), this test examines 
if such strong CBF interacts with the four different legal origins in mandatory IFRS adoption and any reductions in the COE. 
   
Model 1: Full-sample Results of Comparing the Cost of Equity for Mandatory IFRS Adopters and Effect of German-Origin (GO)    
Cost of equity = β0 + β1 (PMAdopters) + β2(PMAdopters*StrongCBF) + β3 (PMAdopters*GO) +β4(PMAdopters*GO*LegalOrigin*StrongCBF) + β5 (size) + β6 (Leverage) + β7 (ROA)   
+ β8 (Log of BM) + β9(Average Inflation) + Year Dummies + Industry Dummies + Errors   
Model 2: Full-sample Results of Comparing the Cost of Equity for Mandatory IFRS Adopters and Effect of British-Origin (BO)  
Cost of equity = β0 + β1 (PMAdopters) + β2(PMAdopters*StrongCBF) + β3 (PMAdopters*BO) +β4(PMAdopters*BO*LegalOrigin*StrongCBF) + β5 (size) + β6 (Leverage) + β7 (ROA)  
+ β8 (Log of BM) + β9(Average Inflation) + Year Dummies + Industry Dummies + Errors   
Model 3: Full-sample Results of Comparing the Cost of Equity for Mandatory IFRS Adopters and Effect of Scandinavian-Origin (SO) 
Cost of equity = β0 + β1 (PMAdopters) + β2(PMAdopters*StrongCBF) + β3 (PMAdopters*SO) +β4(PMAdopters*SO*High Profitability) + β5(PMAdopters*SO*Capital Intensity)   
+ β6(PMAdopters*SO*Equity-based Structure) +β7 size) + β8(Leverage) + β9(ROA) + β10(Log of BM) + β11(Average Inflation) + Year Dummies + Industry Dummies + Errors 
  
Model 4: Full-sample Results of Comparing the Cost of Equity for Mandatory IFRS Adopters and Effect of French-Origin (FO)   
Cost of equity = β0 + β1 (PMAdopters) + β2(PMAdopters*StrongCBF) + β3 (PMAdopters*BO) +β4(PMAdopters*BO*LegalOrigin*StrongCBF + β5 (size) + β6 (Leverage) + β7 (ROA)   
+ β8 (Log of BM) + β9(Average Inflation) + Year Dummies + Industry Dummies + Errors   
                   
     
Model 
1: GO    
Model 
2:BO    
Model 
3:SO    
Model 
4: FO  
Variables   
Predicted 
Sign   Coefficient   
t-
value   Coefficient   
t-
value   Coefficient   
t-
value   Coefficient   
t-
value 
                             
Intercept  ?  0.189 *** 27.083  0.199 *** 50.421  0.178 *** 41.043  0.185 *** 42.493 
                     
PMAdopters  -  -0.015 *** -2.617  -0.001  -0.185  -0.02 *** -7.251  -0.011 ** -3.87 
                     
PMAdopters*HighCBF ?  -0.002  -1.071  0  -0.063  -0.003  -1.527  0.001  0.333 
                     
PMAdopters*Legal 
Origin +  0.001  0.173  -0.01 *** -5.17  0.036 *** 10.142  0  2.1 
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PMAdopters*HighCBF*Legal Origin -                -0.013 ** -2.056  -0.005  -1.681      -0.008 *** -2.708 
                     
PMAdopters*HighProfit*SO      ?                 -0.014 *** -4.162        
 
 
PMAdopters* 
CapitalIntensity*SO      ?                 
 
 
-0.003  -0.755        
 
PMAdopters 
*Equity-based*SO      ?                 -0.002  -0.728        
                     
Size  -  -0.014 *** 
-
13.543  -0.016 *** 
-
20.762  -0.016 *** 
-
18.058  -0.014 *** 
-
15.002 
                     
Leverage  +  0.029 *** 8.072  0.029 *** 16.094  0.039 *** 10.374  0.031 *** 8.4 
                     
ROA  -  -0.145 *** 
-
19.897  -0.041 *** 
-
17.448  -0.137 *** 
-
18.645  -0.148 *** 
-
20.385 
                     
Log of Book-to-Market  +  0.014 *** 11.56  0.016 *** 13.917  0.016 *** 13.273  0.015 *** 12.301 
                     
Average inflation rate ?  -0.187 ** -2.482  -0.126 *** -1.679  -0.007  -0.098  -0.137  -1.794 
                     
Year Dummies    Included    Included    Included    Included    
                     
Industry Dummies   Included    Included    Included    Included    
                     
N       7294       7294       7294       7294     
R Square    21%    22%    23.20%    20%    
ANOVA (F-test)    68.514 ***   71.655 ***   73.076    69.522 *** 
Durbin-Watson    1.862    1.874    1.905    1.885    
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Tolerance for each variable  
more than 
0.1    
more than 
0.1    
more than 
0.1    
more than 
0.1    
VIF for each variable   less than 10    
less than 
10    
less than 
10    
less than 
10    
Mean of residual   0    0    0    0    
Mean of standard predicted residual  0    0    0    0    
Mean of standard residual  0    0    0    0    
                                      
*** = 1% p-value significant and ** =5% p-value significance             
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9.7 Mandatory IFRS adoption and institutions’ bureaucratic and administrative 
formalities 
In the previous chapters, empirical tests are conducted based on a proxy for IEF that 
uses the sample countries’ legal origins. Another similar but more comprehensive way 
to examine the institutional effects on the COE in mandatory IFRS adoption is by using 
different national levels of bureaucratic and administrative formalities. In particular, this 
can be done by partitioning the EU countries based on the approach adopted by the 
Institutional Profiles database (www.cepii.fr/ProfilsInstitutionels Database.htm) This 
classifies EU countries into four Sectors A, B, C & D, as discussed in Chapter Four . 
 
Each Sector measures the magnitude of how various institutional factors interact with 
mandatory IFRS adoption using a country-specific composite index. Sector A estimates 
for each country’s such factors as public rights and liberties, transparency, corruption 
control, efficiency of administration, independence of the justice system, and etc. It 
includes countries such as Austria, Belgium and Demark which have the highest 
average score for the EU countries with highly developed public institutions and civil 
society. Sector B countries, such as Spain and the Netherlands, have a high scores for 
goods and services, thorough the regulation of competition and trade openness, 
privatization, nationalizations, freedom of prices, intellectual property protection and so 
on. Meanwhile, countries in Sector C, such as France and Italy, belong to the 
development of capital markets in areas like interest rates freedom, financial openness, 
micro-lending and regulations. Finally, countries of Sector D, such as Sweden and 
France, are measured by higher estimates on labor market and social relations, which 
are about trade union freedom and pluralism, respect for labor laws, circulation of 
workers, and so on. As per the discussion in Chapter 3, it is expected that since all 
sectors except Sector D share certain characteristics that link with mandatory IFRS 
adoption, there are expected negative coefficients for sectors A, B and C, but not D. 
Based upon such IEF partition system, this section examines if there are variations of 
COE effects from mandatory IFRS adoption in institutional factors with different 
focuses of bureaucratic formalities.  
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While Krivogorsky et al. (2010) argue that different sectors have substantial variations 
in national level of bureaucratic formalities in business practices that modify a 
company’s likelihood to early (voluntary) IFRS adoption, findings from Table 9.7 
shows evidence that sectors also have various impacts on mandatory IFRS adoption. 
Even though in Table 9.7 (Model 1) the coefficient of Sector A by itself is not 
significant, the interplay between Sector A and mandatory IFRS adopters is a 
statistically significant -0.2% (with two-sided p<1%) reduction in the COE. It suggests 
that a high level of public institutions and civil society interacted with IFRS adoption 
may be an important explanatory variable to enhance firms’ reporting incentive and 
subsequently lower the COE in mandatory adoption of IFRS. 
 
Table 9.7 (Model 2) shows the results for Sector B countries, where the model has a 
Sector B’s negative coefficient (-1.4% at 1% significance level) in reducing the COE. 
Furthermore, there is a significant -0.2% coefficient (with two-sided p<1%) for the 
interactive effect between Sector B countries’ IEF and mandatory IFRS adoption.  
The findings from Table 9.7 are in line with hypothesis 7 that IEF proxied by high level 
of bureaucratic formalities in Sectors A, B and C have the infrastructures to support 
mandatory IFRS adoption and be associated with a lowering of firms’ COE. It is 
possible that mandatory firms in sector D countries do not have any association with the 
lowering COE effect (where the coefficient equals 0), since sector D characteristics 
emphasize more in labor market and social relations but not in capital market 
development. Therefore, in addition to legal origins, the above results provide 
substantial evidence for the ultimate inter-relatedness between institutions’ bureaucratic 
and administrative formalities; and mandatory IFRS adoption. These results support the 
institutional-based view argued in Ch. 4 that along the IPOO model, in addition to the 
firm-specific CBF and ICG, the uncontrollable macro-level but unique influences from 
legal, cultural, economic and social also play an important role in mandatory IFRS 
adoption that leads to firms’ COE effects. 
 
Overall, the empirical tests provide inferential results for operating hypotheses #1 to 7 
and show that it is the substantial variations in CBF, ICG and IEF of mandatory IFRS 
adopters in the EU that leads to a change in firms’ COE. In the next chapter, further 
tests and results for hypothesis #8 about the interactive effects between theses proxies of 
reporting incentives will be considered.  
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Table 9.7 Comparing the Cost of Equity for Mandatory IFRS Adopters and the Four Sectors of Bureaucratic Formalities (A, B, C & D) 
 
In addition to using legal origins as the proxy of IEF, four sectors of bureaucratic formalities in the EU are proxied to test if such IEF setting  
interacts with mandatory IFRS adoption and associate with the reduction in the cost of equity. 
    
                
Model 1:                
Full-sample Results of Comparing the Cost of Equity for Mandatory IFRS Adopters and Sector A of bureaucratic formalities   
Cost of equity = β0 + β1 (Sector A score) + β2(PMAdopters*Sector A) + β3 Size) +β4(Log of DE) + β5(ROA) + β6 (Log of DE) + Year Dummies + Industry Dummies + Errors  
                
Model 2:                
Full-sample Results of Comparing the Cost of Equity for Mandatory IFRS Adopters and Sector B of bureaucratic formalities   
Cost of equity = β0 + β1 (Sector B score) + β2(PMAdopters*Sector B) + β3 Size) +β4(Log of DE) + β5(ROA) + β6 (Log of DE) + Year Dummies + Industry Dummies + Errors  
                
Model 3:                
Full-sample Results of Comparing the Cost of Equity for Mandatory IFRS Adopters and Sector C of bureaucratic formalities   
Cost of equity = β0 + β1 (Sector C score) + β2(PMAdopters*Sector C) + β3 Size) +β4(Log of DE) + β5(ROA) + β6 (Log of DE) + Year Dummies + Industry Dummies + Errors  
                
Model 4:                
Full-sample Results of Comparing the Cost of Equity for Mandatory IFRS Adopters and Sector D of bureaucratic formalities   
Cost of equity = β0 + β1 (Sector D score) + β2(PMAdopters*Sector D) + β3 Size) +β4(Log of DE) + β5(ROA) + β6 (Log of DE) + Year Dummies + Industry Dummies + Errors 
  
                
     
Model 1: 
SECTOR 
A   
Model 
2:SECTOR 
B   
Model 3: 
SECTOR 
C   
Model 4: 
SECTOR 
D  
Variables   
Predicted 
Sign   Coefficient   t-value Coefficient   t-value Coefficient   t-value Coefficient   t-value 
                          
Intercept  ?  0.194 *** 12.752 0.278 *** 19.258 0.244 *** 21.77 0.106 *** 8.986 
                  
Sector A/B/C/D Weighted 
Ave.Score -  -0.001  -0.529 -0.014 *** -6.345 -0.01 *** -5.247 0.011 ** 6.931 
                  
PMAdopters*Sector -  -0.002 *** -5.401 -0.002 *** -5.624 -0.001 ** -2.021 0  0.108 
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A/B/C/D 
                  
Size  -  -0.013 *** -18.251 -0.015 *** -19.666 -0.014 *** -19.252 -0.012 *** -16.887 
                  
Log of Debt-Equity  +  0.01 *** 5.56 0.01 *** 5.97 0.01 *** 5.892 0.01 *** 6.058 
                  
ROA  -  -0.151 *** -21.24 -0.151 *** -21.296 -0.15 *** -21.247 -0.152 *** -21.505 
                  
Log of TobinQ  -  -0.023 *** -11.765 -0.024 *** -12.055 -0.024 *** -12.233 -0.023 *** -11.683 
                  
Year Dummies    Included   Included   Included   Included    
                  
Industry Dummies   Included   Included   Included   Included    
                  
N       7294     7294     7294     7294     
R Square    20%   21%   20.70%   21%    
ANOVA (F-test)    73.587 ***  76.21 ***  75.588 ***  75.208 ***   
Durbin-Watson    1.852   1.862   1.859   1.859    
Tolerance for each variable   
more than 
0.1   
more than 
0.1   
more than 
0.1   
more than 
0.1    
VIF for each variable   
less than 
10   
less than 
10   
less than 
10   
less than 
10    
Mean of residual   0   0   0   0    
Mean of standard predicted residual  0   0   0   0    
Mean of standard residual   0   0   0   0    
                                
*** = 1% p-value significant and ** =5% p-value significance          
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Chapter 10 - Mandatory IFRS Adoption, CBF & ICG in Four Legal 
Origins; & Additional Analysis 
The previous chapters have discussed the empirical results concerning hypotheses #1 to 
7 about change in the COE from models capturing individual and some combined 
effects of CBF, ICG and then IEF. To systematically measure COE as the outcome from 
the IPOO model, this study tests and documents evidence for individual and interactions 
of both CBF and ICG in each IEF setting (proxied by legal origins).  
 
10.1 Effects from 4 Legal Origins: CBF and ICG in German Origin (GO) 
Table 10.1 (Model 1) shows that German origin (GO) mandatory firms and strong CBF 
when interacting together are associated with a significant incremental reduction in 
COE of -2.3% (with two-sided p<5%). This coefficient is much larger than that for the 
coefficient between the overall mandatory adoption and strong CBF. Also, this result is 
much stronger than that of Table 9.6 (Model 1) when ICG is absent (a significant  
-1.3%). Hence, it stresses the relative importance of both firm-specific CBF and ICG in 
the German origin (GO) model in strengthening the reporting incentives in mandatory 
IFRS adoption.  
 
Regarding the effect on the COE from ICG, Table 10.1 (Model 1) shows that this is 
significantly negatively correlated with the COE by -0.1% (at the 1% level). This is 
consistent with the result from Table 9.3 that in general ICG is inversely related to the 
COE. However, when ICG interacts with German origin (GO), it shows that the effect 
of GO-Mandatory firms’ ICG is positively related to the COE (0.1% at 1% level of 
significance); and it offsets the overall lowering COE benefits (-0.1% at 1% level of 
significance). It is possible that for the German code-law setting, ICG may not be 
helpful in reducing the COE in mandatory IFRS adoption. This result is consistent with 
the literature that historically most continental European firms (like in Germany) rely on 
debt, rather than equity markets, as their main source of financing. For instance, 
German bankers may sit on the supervisory board of directors of a client company and 
exercise control and closely monitor roles (Krivogorsky et al. 2010). Therefore, Table 
10.1 (Model 1) reveals that for German (GO) mandatory firms, significant benefits of 
lowering the COE mainly are related to a high level of firm-specific CBF, not ICG.   
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CBF and ICG in British-origin (BO) 
Similar to Table 9.6 (Model 2) in the previous section, Table 10.1 (Model 2) shows that 
British (BO) strong CBF is negatively associated with the COE but insignificantly. It 
reinforces the results that British (BO) mandatory adopters in the IPOO model do not 
rely on strong CBF to boost reporting incentives for lowering their COE. 
 
Table 10.1 (Model 2) also highlights the significant negative coefficient when ICG 
interacts with British (BO) mandatory firms, which is similar to the results from Table 
9.3 (at -1% with two-sided p<1%) but with a much larger and significant COE reduction 
effect (at -1.7% at 1% level). It suggests that British (BO) mandatory firms who benefit 
from a lower COE effect appear to have better corporate governance mechanisms. This 
result implies that for firms (before adoption of IFRS) where the local accounting 
standard is similar to IFRS, such as British (BO), equity investors’ cost of equity is 
negatively and statistically significantly linked with the effectiveness of how mandatory 
IFRS firms are governed by their respective boards of directors. Therefore, with UK 
mandatory IFRS adoption, it is possible that a high level of ICG is more influential 
compared to firms’ CBF in shaping reporting incentives and hence in giving investors’ 
better financial disclosures. As a result, there is a substantial and significant reduction in 
such firms’ COE. Compared to Model 1 for German origin (GO) firms, it is evident that 
British (BO) mandatory firms with a high level of ICG (not strong CBF) are 
significantly related to a substantial reduction in their COE.   
 
CBF and ICG in Scandinavian Origin (SO) 
Table 10.1 (Model 3) includes both strong CBF and ICG in the model and illustrates a 
consistent result with that of Table 9.6 in that strong CBF in SO mandatory adoption 
does not help in reducing the COE, unless such firms are relatively more profitable (the 
coefficient for this effect is -2.1% and significant at 1% level). Similarly, Scandinavian 
(SO) large-size firms with more analysts to follow seem to suggest a more negative 
effect on the COE, but this is not significant. From this initial result, it appears the result 
of mandatory IFRS adoption for Scandinavian (SO) firms is dissimilar to other 
European counterparts. However, this result is consistent with the related prior study by 
Aussenegg et al. (2009) that when change in earnings management level is the proxy for 
accounting quality following IFRS adoption, Northern European countries (i.e. 
Scandinavian origin) do not show any significant change due to such firms already 
evidencing lower earnings management prior to IFRS adoption compared to the rest of 
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Europe.. Meanwhile, Burgstahler et al. (2006) also point out that the need for raising 
capital in public markets in Europe results in greater demand for high quality earnings 
from IFRS adoption. It implies that it is possible that Scandinavian (SO) firms 
domiciled in heavy social-based market economy do not have such urgency to join the 
integrated capital markets, therefore, have fewer incentives to adopt IFRS, even though 
it is mandatory (Krivogorsky et al. 2010). 
 
The results indicate that overall ICG and its interaction with CBF in mandatory IFRS 
adoption is related to a reduced COE (Table 9-4 Model 2). However, for the results of 
ICG in Table 10.1, SO mandatory firms in Model 4 behave in the same way as GO 
mandatory firms in Model 1 in that the -0.1% lowering COE effect from ICG has been 
offset by the +0.1% of Scandinavian (SO) mandatory firms’ ICG. It is possible that, 
consistent with the literature, ICG may not function effectively to associate with lower 
COE in countries with a high level of ownership concentration as is the case for 
Scandinavian (SO) firms. This should be compared to the dispersed ownership of 
shareholdings in British origin (BO) countries where shareholders rely on corporate 
governance by the board of directors’ to regulate and monitor managers’ performance. 
Given this difference for SO firms the result for these firms is expected to be contrary to 
mandatory IFRS adopting firms in Model 2 when ICG interacts with British origin to 
associate with -1.7% reduced COE effect (with two-sided p<1% level of significance). 
It suggests that even though IFRS is mandated in the EU, Scandinavian (SO) mandatory 
adopters’ ICG, on average, is not able to associate with a lower COE.  
 
Thus, the empirical results show that strong CBF and ICG are not indicative of any 
lower COE for Scandinavian (SO) mandatory firms. The results here are consistent with 
the study by Hjelstrom and Schuster (2008) who find evidence suggesting that Swedish 
managers comply with the IFRS rules largely due to the potential costs of non-
compliance related to auditors, instead of looking for the benefits from more and better 
disclosures in the capital markets. Accordingly, based on the IPOO model, 
Scandinavian (SO) based mandatory IFRS adoption may not yet provide consistently 
strong incentives for firms that lead to observable benefits in a lowered COE.  
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CBF and ICG in French-origin (FO) 
When both variables CBF and ICG are included, as in Model 4, Table 10.1 reports that 
French (FO) mandatory IFRS adopters with strong CBF have a significant -0.5% (with 
two-sided p<1%) reduction in their COE. This result supports the outcomes from Table 
9.6 Model 4 where the variable of strong CBF of mandatory firms exhibits a significant 
coefficient in French origin adopters when ICG is not involved. It also indicates the 
relative importance of strong CBF for French (FO) firms in adopting IFRS mandatorily 
in reducing the COE. In fact, when mandatory adoption interacts with strong CBF in the 
French (FO) setting, it shows a slightly larger significant and negative coefficient for the 
COE (-0.9% for Table 10.1 vs. -0.8% for Table 9.6).  
 
Regarding the effect of ICG in Model 4, Table 10.1 demonstrates that the FO mandatory 
firms’ ICG index does not contribute to the COE effect (as the coefficient equals 0) and 
hence adds nothing to firms’ ICG overall -0.1% coefficient (significant at the 1% level).  
The lack of an interaction effect with ICG can be interpreted that, for French (FO) 
mandatory IFRS adoption, firm-specific strong CBF (like GO’s strong CBF) is an 
important component to associate with the lower COE for overall mandatory firms’ 
strong CBF. But that this does not interact with ICG to any degree. 
 
Taken together, Table 10.1 Models 1 to 4 presents empirical test results based on the 
complete IPOO model to investigate how (1) individual strong CBF and ICG interact 
with (2) legal origins relate to any reduction in the COE. Consistent with hypothesis #8, 
empirical results from Model 1 to 4 suggest that there are variations in the COE effects 
for mandatory adopters among legal origins so that their respective CBF and/or ICG 
interact. Particularly, in legal origins where established capital market and legal 
structures may support IFRS adoption, like British origin (BO), where a high level of 
reporting incentive is mainly powered by ICG and IEF. It is consistent with the 
literature that in Anglo-Saxon countries, corporate governance has been used to align 
management incentives with shareholders’ interests because firms typically have a wide 
separation between management and ownership (Fama and Jensen, 1983). This applies 
to mandatory IFRS adoption, which leads to more disclosures in financial reporting, so 
that shareholders are in a better position to collect information and monitor management 
behavior. As a result, the COE may be lowered when potential agency conflicts are 
possibly better mitigated due to the reduction in information asymmetry. On the other 
hand, both Germany origin (GO) and French origin (FO) mandatory IFRS firms display 
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a similar significant negative COE effect from strong CBF and its interactions with 
legal origins. It suggests that in such countries where IEF does not fully support IFRS 
adoption, firm-specific factors may prevail in achieving a lower COE. However, 
Scandinavian (SO) firms appear to lack the fundamental firm and country-specific 
factors to stimulate reporting incentives for mandatory IFRS adoption as these show no 
link to any additional significant reduction in their COE. In fact, this study provides 
empirical evidence that the desired outcome of a lower COE is linked the dynamics of 
different firm-specific micro and country-specific macro factors. These factors interact 
together in promoting reporting incentive for mandatory IFRS adoption.   
 
Overall, the findings of this study about significant variations in COE effect from 
mandatory IFRS adoption in Europe complement and extend the prior work by Ball et 
al. (2003).  This study analyzes accounting quality for four East Asian countries that 
have accounting standards similar to common law countries but differ in institutional 
structures. Despite the high quality of accounting standards, the earnings properties of 
the East Asian countries do not resemble those in common law countries like the U.K. 
and U.S., because different institutional factors shape managers’ reporting incentives.  
 
In addition to the above, this study also provides more insights about the joint effects of 
both firm-specific and country-specific influences on reporting incentives. Even though 
the “pro-standards” viewpoint say that IFRS adoption alone can bring in high quality of 
financial reports due to the requirements of more disclosures, IFRS is a principle-based 
accounting standard that gives room for managers’ to exercise a certain discretion in 
financial reporting. Thus, the empirical results show support for the “pro-incentive” 
school of thought (illustrated by the IPOO model) that due to the variations in reporting 
incentives from CBF, ICG and their interactions with IEF, there are different levels of 
“Influences” to managers’ motivation in adopting IFRS, even when such adoption is 
mandatory. Subsequently, the “Processing” and “Output” of financial information under 
IFRS will lead to uneven quality in the financial reports for firms with different 
incentives and this translates in differences to the information available to capital 
markets. As a result, these differences in incentives and the informativeness of financial 
statements appear to be associated with differences in the COE effect (i.e. the 
“Outcome”). Therefore, and consistent with the literature (e.g. Ball et al., 2003), the 
installation of such uniform, high-quality financial reporting standards is of itself 
unlikely to be sufficient for achieving comparable and even distributions of capital 
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market outcomes, such as a lower COE.  In fact, as Burgstahler et al. (2006) point out, 
despite decades of harmonization efforts by IFRS adoption, there are still considerable 
differences in the quality of financial reports across European firms. 
 
152 
 
Table 10.1 Comparing the Cost of Equity for Mandatory IFRS Adopters and the Effect of Internal Corporate Governance (ICG) & 
Core Business Factors (CBF) in different Legal Origins: German, British, Scandinavian & French Origins 
This analysis examines the comprehensive proxies of reporting incentives in mandatory IFRS adoption in the IPOO model. The tests aim tot provide 
evidence of any significant change in the cost of equity when both CBF and ICG of mandatory IFRS adopters interact with each of the four legal origins (in 
Models 1 to 4). 
               
Model 1:German Origin (GO)                 
Cost of equity = β0 + β1 (ICG) + β2(ICG*PMAdopters.*GO) + β3 (PMAdopters*HighCBF) +β4(PMAdopters*HighCBF*GO) + β5(Size) + β6 (Leverage)      
+ β7 (ROA) + Year Dummies + Industry Dummies + Errors 
              
Model 2:British Origin (BO)                 
Cost of equity = β0 + β1 (ICG) + β2(HigherICG*PMAdopters*BO) + β3 (PMAdopters*HigheCBF) +β4(PMAdopters*HighCBF*BO) + β5(Size) + β6 (Leverage)    
+ β7 (ROA) + Year Dummies + Industry Dummies + Errors 
              
Model 3:Scandinavian Origin (SO)                 
Cost of equity = β0 + β1 (ICG) + β2(ICG*PMAdopters*SO) + β3 (PMAdopters*HighCBF) +β4(PMAdopters*HighCBF*SO) + β5(PMAdopters*HighProfit*SO) + β6 
(PMAdopters*MoreAnalysts*SO) + β7 (PMAdopters*LargerSize*SO) + β8 (Size) +  β9 (Leverage) +  β10(ROA) +  β11 (Book-to-Mkt) + Year Dummies + Industry Dummies + Errors 
 
Model 4:French Origin (FO)                 
Cost of equity = β0 + β1 (ICG) + β2(ICG*PMAdopters*FO) + β3 (PMAdopters*HighCBF) +β4(PMAdopters*HighCBF*FO) + β5(Size) + β6 (Leverage)      
+ β7 (ROA) + Year Dummies + Industry Dummies + Errors              
                   
     
Model 
1: GO    
Model 
2:BO    
Model 
3:SO    
Model 
4: FO  
Variables   
Predicted 
Sign   Coefficient   t-value   Coefficient   t-value   Coefficient   t-value   Coefficient   t-value 
Intercept  ?  0.173 *** 33.788  0.154 *** 22.964  0.169 *** 33.639  0.185 *** 36.359 
                     
Firms' ICG    -0.001 *** -5.528  0.001 *** 2.492  -0.001 *** -4.497  -0.001 *** -7.775 
                     
Firms ICG*PMAdopters*LegalOrigin   0.001 *** 2.86  -0.017 *** -5.326  0.001 *** 6.11  0  -1.195 
                     
PMAdopters*HighCBF -  -0.008 *** -4.937  0  0.055  -0.014 *** -7.93  -0.005 *** -2.715 
PMAdopters*HighCBF*Legal Origin  -  -0.023 ** -3.523  -0.005  -1.7  0.022 *** 3.803  -0.009 *** -3.174 
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PMAdopters*HighProfit*SO      -                 -0.021 *** -5.82        
 
PMAdopters*MoreAnalysts*Legal Origin  -                -0.007  -1.752        
PMAdopters*LargerSize*SO    -                 -0.003  -0.56        
                   
Size  -  -0.01 *** -11.344  -0.016 *** -17.05  -0.011 *** -0.205  -0.014 *** -15.002 
                     
Leverage  +  0.019 *** 5.351  0.031 *** 8.456  0.028 *** 7.769  0.031 *** 8.4 
                     
ROA  -  -0.151 *** -20.607  -0.147 *** -20.448  -0.141 *** -18.899  -0.148 *** -20.385 
                     
Book-Market  +  0 *** 2.881  0 *** 12.42  0 *** 4.422  0.015 *** 12.301 
                     
Year Dummies    Included    Included    Included    Included    
                     
Industry Dummies   Included    Included    Included    Included    
                     
N       7294       7294       7294       7294     
R Square    20%    22%    21.70%    20%    
ANOVA (F-test)    65.549 ***   73.412 ***   64.022    64.441 ***   
Durbin-Watson    1.847    1.878    1.884    1.848    
Tolerance for each variable  
more than 
0.1    
more than 
0.1    
more than 
0.1    
more than 
0.1    
VIF for each variable   less than 10    
less than 
10    
less than 
10    less than 10    
Mean of residual   0    0    0    0    
Mean of standard predicted residual  0    0    0    0    
Mean of standard residual  0    0    0    0    
                                      
*** = 1% p-value significant and ** =5% p-value significance             
154 
 
10.2 Summary of the Hypotheses, Empirical Tests and Multivariate Results 
 
After running all empirical tests, Table 10.2provides a summary of the relevant 
empirical tests and results for all the hypotheses.  
 
From an examination of Table 10.2, it is evident that overall mandatory IFRS adoption 
has led to a lower COE than that for voluntary IFRS adoption. Also, Tables 9.1 to 9.14 
report that a high level of CBF and ICG, in general, has both significant individual and 
interactive effects with mandatory IFRS adopters that relate to additional lower COE. 
Meanwhile, IEF by proxies of legal origins in Table 9-5 show that British (BO) and 
French (FO) firms have negative effects on the COE in mandatory IFRS adoption. On 
the other hand, German (GO) has a negative but insignificant coefficient, and 
Scandinavian (SO) firms have a positive and significant coefficient. When combined, 
both high CBF and legal origins, as shown in Table 9.6, reveal that mandatory IFRS 
adopters with strong CBF in most legal origins (except SO) experience a lower COE, 
but that the coefficient for BO is not statistically significant. It suggests that the COE 
reducing effects from mandatory adopters’ strong CBF differ between legal origins. 
Furthermore, Table 9.7 records evidence about the negative COE effects from sectors 
A, B and C (but not D) that have institutional characteristics supportive of mandatory 
IFRS adoption. 
 
To find out the effect on the COE from reporting incentive in the complete IPOO 
model, this study also examines the results of how mandatory adopters’ strong CBF and 
ICG interact in each legal origin. Accordingly, Table 10.1 in Models 1 to 4 illustrates 
mandatory IFRS firms’ interaction with high CBF or ICG, but not both, that are related 
to significant incremental lower COE effects in different legal origins (except for SO). 
Specifically, the lowered COE can be related to the combined effects when mandatory 
IFRS adopters in British (BO) interact with ICG; and when German (GO) and French 
(FO) firms work with strong CBF. It appears that mandatory IFRS adoption in different 
legal origins provides a substitution, not complementary effect between high CBF and 
ICG in order to enrich the reporting incentive; and ultimately associates with a further 
lowering of the COE. 
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Table 10.2: Summary of Hypotheses and Empirical Test Results 
 
Operating Hypotheses Test Tables Empirical Test Results 
OH1: The cost of equity for mandatory IFRS 
adopting firms is different from voluntary 
IFRS adopting firms for the whole period 
from 2000 to 2009. 
 
Table 8-3 The test results supports prior research results 
(e.g. Li, 2010) and strongly support the 
hypothesis that the cost of equity for mandatory 
IFRS adopters is significantly lower than  
voluntary firms by -1.1%. 
 
OH2: For mandatory IFRS adopting 
firms, the cost of equity in the post-
mandatory period is not different from the 
pre mandatory period. 
Table 9-1 The cost of equity for mandatory adopters 
during the post-mandatory period is not 
associated with a lower COE effect when 
compared with the pre-mandatory period. 
OH3: (CBF) 
The cost of equity effect of mandatory IFRS 
adopting firms is negatively associated with 
strong CBF , other things being equal. 
Table 9-2 The result of -0.4% lowering COE is in line 
with hypothesis #3 that higher CBF is 
associated with larger educing COE effect in 
mandatory IFRS adoption. 
OH4a:   (ICG) 
The cost of equity effect of mandatory IFRS 
adopting firms is negatively associated with  
high ICG , other things being equal. 
Table 9-3 Table 9-3 records -1% coefficient for 
mandatory IFRS adopters with high ICG 
scores. Therefore, it shows a strong support for 
hypothesis #4a. 
 
OH4b: (CBF& ICG) 
Ha: The cost of equity effect of mandatory 
IFRS adopting firms is negatively associated 
with strong CBF and ICG, other things being 
equal. 
Table 9-4 The coefficient of the interaction effect between 
strong CBF and ICG shows a significant -0.6% 
in reducing COE effect. This result supports 
hypothesis #4b. 
 
 (IEF: legal origin) 
OH5: The cost of equity effect for mandatory 
IFRS firms is negatively associated with 
legal origins of BO and FO, but positively 
associated with legal origins of GO and SO, 
other things being equal. 
 
Table 9-5 The following results support hypothesis #5: 
 
Table 9-5 model 1 shows that GO firms have -
0.5% effect on the COE.  
 
Model 2 exhibits that the coefficient of BO 
firms have -1.3% lowering COE effect.  
 
SO firms face a 2.7% COE increase effect in 
mandatory IFRS adoption. 
 
For French-origin (FO) mandatory adopters, the 
dummy variable in Table 9.5 Panel A (model 4) 
indicates that it is significantly negatively 
related with the COE and has a coefficient of -
0.4%. 
 
OH6: The cost of equity effect for mandatory 
IFRS firms differs between strong CBF and 
their legal origins, other things being equal. 
 
 
 
 
Table 9-6 Table9.6 (model 1) records the interaction 
between mandatory firms in GO and strong 
CBF has a significant coefficient (-1.3%). 
 
Model 2 shows that mandatory adoption by BO 
firms overall has the effect of lowering COE 
with a -1% significant coefficient. 
 
Table 9.6 (model 3) shows that statistically SO-
based mandatory IFRS adopters are not 
negatively associated with any changes in their 
COE.  
 
Table 9.6 (model 4) shows that for the 
interaction between strong CBF and 4 legal 
origins, the only coefficient with a significantly 
negative effect on the COE is French-origin 
(FO) (at -0.8%). 
 
OH7: The cost of equity effect for mandatory 
IFRS firms is negatively associated with 
countries from sectors A, B, C but not from 
sector D, other things being equal. 
Table 9-7 Table 9.7 (model 1) show s that the interplay 
between sector A and mandatory IFRS adopters 
has significant 0.2% lower COE effect. 
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Table 9.7 (model 2) presents evidence that the 
interactive function between Sector B 
countries’ IEF and mandatory IFRS adoption 
augment additional significant negative 
coefficients (-0.2%). 
 
Sector C in Table 9.7 (model 3) documents that 
there is a -0.10% significant coefficient in the 
interaction between Sector C and mandatory 
IFRS adoption. 
 
Table 9.7 (model 4) is in line with hypothesis 7 
that mandatory firms in sector D countries do 
not associate with any lowering COE effect (the 
coefficient equals 0). 
OH 8: The cost of equity effect for 
mandatory IFRS firms differs between the 
legal origins and strong CBF and ICG, other 
things being equal. 
 
Table 10.1 Table 10.1 model 1 presents evidence that 
mandatory adoption interacts with high CBF to 
result in a significant -0.8% reduction in the 
COE. However, the effect of GO-Mandatory 
firms’ ICG has the opposite result for the COE 
(+0.1%). 
 
Table 10.1 model 2 shows that BO’s strong 
CBF is negatively associated with the COE but 
is not highly significant and there is a greater 
coefficient (-1.7% and significant) for BO 
mandatory firms with higher ICG.  
 
Table 10.1 shows that FO mandatory firms’ 
ICG index is not able to add any COE reducing 
effect (the coefficient equals 0) 
 
Strong CBF in SO mandatory firms does not 
help in reducing COE, unless these are 
relatively more profitable SO firms (the 
coefficient is -2.1% and significant). Also, 
mandatory firms in model 4 have a +0.1% COE 
effect for SO and ICG. 
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Table 10.3: Summary of the Significant Cost of equity (COE) Effects of Mandatory 
IFRS Adoption in the 4 Legal Origins in Interactions with CBF, ICG, IEF and 
Exchange Disclosure Requirements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
IFRS 
Mandatory 
Adoption 
CBF 
(Table 10-1) 
ICG 
(Table 10-1) 
IEF 
(Table 9-5 
Panel A) 
Exchange Disclosure 
Requirements 
(Table 10.4 Panel B) 
GO -2.3% ** 0.1% *** -0.5% -2.7% 
 
BO -0.5% -1.7% *** -1.3% *** -0.7% ** 
 
SO 0.22% *** 0.1% *** 2.7% *** 3.6% 
 
FO -0.9% *** 0 -0.4% ** 0 
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Results from Table 10.2 and Table10.3 illustrate a few key noteworthy points from the 
research.  First, mandatory IFRS adoption firms experience lower COE than their 
voluntary counterparts. Second, mandatory adopters’ high level of CBF and ICG, and 
interaction between CBF and ICG are evident, and together they are statistically 
significant and negatively related to such firms’ COE. Third, when we proxy IEF by 
legal origins and sectors, Table 9-6 and 9-7 report that only Sectors A, B and C; and 
British and French legal origins have infrastructures in cultural, legal, administrative 
and business practices that are supportive of mandatory IFRS adoption. These combined 
properties are statistically significantly associated with a lower COE. Fourth, it suggests 
that mandatory firms in EU countries exercise different dynamic and joint effects 
between CBF, ICG and IEF; when significant additional lowering COE effects may be 
associated with German (GO) firms’ CBF, British (BO) firms’ ICG and IEF, and French 
(FO) firms’ CBF and IEF. However, Scandinavian (SO) mandatory IFRS firms appear 
not to have strong enough foundation in their institutional environment to indicate any 
significant effect on their COE. These empirical results are consistent with prior studies’ 
argument that cultural, political and business differences may also continue to impose 
significant variations in the progress towards mandatory IFRS adoption as a single 
global financial communication system (Armstrong et al. 2008). 
 
The empirical tests, so far, have examined the influence of reporting incentives from the 
effects of institutional environments, proxied by general and macro-level of cultural, 
economic, social and legal origins. However, recent studies also argue that specific 
institutional factors such as investor protection are possible influences on reporting 
incentives. In the following section, additional tests will be performed and evidence will 
be provided on how firms’ COE is associated with specific institutional characteristics. 
 
10.4 Additional Analysis from Specific Institutional Factors 
Throughout the empirical analysis, this study argues that while firm-specific CBF and 
ICG may be controllable by management and the board of directors, country-specific 
IEF is a rigid and unique system that is beyond managers’ discretion. To measure the 
effects of IEF, the four legal origins, and four sectors of institutions’ bureaucratic and 
administrative formalities have been proxied as the institutional influences along the 
IPOO model. In addition to such comprehensive classification of IEF, some prior 
studies argue that there are specific institutional characteristics, such as the enforcement 
and protection mechanism in IFRS adoption that may be significant and affect the 
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change in the COE. Therefore, Table 10.4 Panel A reports the results from testing the 
COE effects between mandatory adoption and specific institutional factors.   
 
Table 10.4 Panel A shows that among Stock Exchange Disclosure, Investor Protections 
and Securities Regulation in the model, only the coefficient of Stock Exchange 
Disclosure has a significant effect on the COE (at -2.3% and the 1% level of 
significance). Consistent with the literature, it can be interpreted that stock market 
exchange disclosure is an important macro-level factor to strengthen IFRS’s reporting 
incentive for requiring greater and better disclosures. As a result, it is possible that the 
equity market rewards additional transparency from high quality accounting information 
with a lower cost of equity. Following this reasoning, this study extends the empirical 
tests to examine the effects on the COE when exchange disclosure interacts with CBF in 
the four different legal origins.  
 
German Origin (GO) with Stock Exchange Disclosure 
Table 10.4 Panel B (Model 1) displays that the overall mandatory adoption and 
exchange disclosure together have -3% on the COE (significant at 1% level). Also, 
German origin (GO) mandatory firms interact with exchange disclosure and are 
associated with an additional -2.7% effect on the COE but this is statistically 
insignificant. On the other hand, German (GO) firms’ strong CBF in mandatory IFRS 
adoption has a coefficient of -1.5% COE effect (at 5% level of significance). These 
results are in accord with the prior results from Table 10.1 and the literature (Ball et al. 
2003) that German (GO) firms lower COE as a result of mandatory IFRS adoption in 
such a weak regulatory environment, the is driven by reporting incentive from strong 
firm-specific CBF rather than the country level IEF effect, such as legal origin or 
specific IEF such as Stock Exchange Disclosure.  
 
British Origin (BO) with Stock Exchange Disclosure 
Table 10.4 Panel B (Model 2) indicates that the overall mandatory adoption and 
exchange disclosure mechanism in British origin (BO) acts to add another significantly 
negative -0.7% COE effect to mandatory IFRS adoption’s exchange disclosure 
requirement (at -4.5% and significant at 1% level). On the other hand, strong CBF 
becomes significant in the British (BO) setting (-0.6%) when stock exchange disclosure 
is controlled for. Comparing these results to Table 10.6, where British (BO) mandatory 
firms with strong CBF have -0.5% but an insignificant coefficient, it highlights the 
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importance of Stock Exchange Disclosure as an effective IEF factor that enhances BO 
mandatory firms’ strong CBF their COE. Scandinavian Origin (SO) with Stock 
Exchange Disclosure 
Table 10.4 Panel B (Model 3) reports identical results to the previous similar tests that 
mandatory adoption’s exchange disclosure in Scandinavian origin (SO) has a significant 
positive coefficient on the COE. This effect is more than able to offset the -1.8% 
lowering COE effect from the interaction between the overall mandatory adoption and 
exchange disclosure. Also, strong CBF for Scandinavian (SO) firms have no effect to 
further reduce the COE from the overall mandatory firms’ strong CBF (at -0.4%). This 
suggests that in the process of mandatory IFRS adoption Scandinavian (SO) mandatory 
firms’ COE is not lowered as a result of the exchange disclosure mechanism. 
 
French-origin (FO) with Stock Exchange Disclosures  
Different from the British setting, Table 10.4 Panel B (Model 4) shows that French (FO) 
mandatory firms’ interaction with exchange disclosure has no additional COE effect 
(the coefficient equals 0) in addition to overall mandatory IFRS firms’ exchange 
disclosure. Similar to the test result from Table 9.6, it is evident that French (FO) 
mandatory firms interact with strong CBF, rather than stock exchange disclosure, and 
this is associated with a lowered COE (at -0.9% and significant at the 1% level).  
 
To sum up, the empirical results suggest that even though Table 10.4 Panel A highlights 
the relative overall significance of Exchange Disclosure, Table 10.4 Panel B stresses 
there are significant regional differences in that only British (BO) mandatory firms in 
Exchange Disclosure benefit significantly from any additional reduction in their COE. 
This result is similar to Table 9.6 (Model 2) which shows that only mandatory firms in 
BO setting experience a -1% lowering of their COE. It suggests that Exchange 
Disclosure primarily interacts with British origin (BO). It can be interpreted that for BO 
countries, capital markets are deeper and more established than in the other legal origin 
countries to support the mandatory IFRS adoption. In addition, when Exchange 
Disclosure is included in Table 10.4 Panel B (Model 2), BO mandatory firms interact 
with high CBF with a significant -0.6% lowering effect on the COE. It implies that 
Exchange Disclosure can complement with British (BO) firms’ high CBF to lower their 
COE. These results are not consistent with the prior study by Kim and Shi (2007) who 
record significant negative COE effects from Exchange Disclosure, Investor Protection 
and Securities Regulation. Possible reasons for the difference in the results may be 
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because Kim and Shi (2007) measure voluntary adoption with a sample that covers the 
period from 1998 to 2004. However, this study examines mandatory adoption which 
includes data from 2000 to 2009. Hence the sample and time periods differ between the 
two studies. As was argued earlier, the longer post adoption time period and the fact that 
the current study includes both voluntary and mandatory adopters helps to explain these 
differences. In addition, the study by Kim and Shi (2007) does not partition countries by 
legal origins. Thus, this study shows that when mandatory adopting firms are classified 
by diverse legal, cultural and economic backgrounds and measured beyond the 
transition period, substantial lowering COE effects in the British (BO) setting seem to 
be mainly associated with specific IEF.  
 
Overall, results from models in Tables 9 and Tables10 illustrate a few key noteworthy 
points.  First, mandatory IFRS adopters experience lower COE than their voluntary 
counterparts. Second, mandatory adopters’ high level of CBF and ICG, and interaction 
between CBF and ICG are evident and together they are statistically significant and 
negatively related to the COE. Third, when this study proxies IEF by legal origins and 
sectors, Table 9-6 and 9-7 report that only Sectors A, B and C; and legal origins of BO 
and FO have infrastructures in cultural, legal, administrative and business practices that 
are supportive of COE effects when there is mandatory IFRS adoption. Fourth, it 
suggests that mandatory firms in EU countries exercise differential joint effects between 
CBF and ICG, depending on their IEF in that significant additional lowering COE 
effects may be associated with German (GO) firms’ CBF, British (BO) firms’ ICG and 
IEF, and French (FO) firms’ CBF and IEF. However, Scandinavian (SO) mandatory 
IFRS firms appear not to show any effects from their institutional environment in 
relation to any significant lowering of their COE. The results are consistent with prior 
studies’ arguments that cultural, political and business differences may also continue to 
impose significant variations in the progress towards mandatory IFRS adoption as a 
single global financial communication system (Armstrong et al. 2008). 
 
The empirical findings provide evidence that in mandatory IFRS adoption, the IPOO 
model identifies influences on reporting incentives that are associated with substantial 
and significant effects on firms’ COE. Such influences are dependent upon the 
interactions between firm-specific CBF and ICG, and country-specific IEF where 
mandatory firms are domiciled.  
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Table 10.4            
Panel A 
Comparing the Cost of Equity Effect from ICG and 3 Enforcement and Protection 
Mechanisms  
Some prior studies argue that specific institutional factors are significantly associated with firms’ 
COE. 
This study tests the COE effect by including both internal governance (ICG) and three selected  
specific external institutional environments that may influence firms’ reporting incentives in 
mandatory IFRS adoption.     
            
Model:            
Full-sample Results of Comparing the Cost of Equity for Firm’s ICG and specific institutional factors 
 
Cost of equity = β0 + β1 (ICG) + β2(Stock Exch. Disclosure) + β3(Investor Protection) +  
 Β4(Securities Regulations) +  β5(Size) +β6(Leverage) + β7(ROA) + β8 (Log of BM) +   
 + β9 (year dummy) + β10 (Industries dummy)+ error terms      
            
            
Variables   
Predicted 
Sign   Coefficient   t-value        
                     
Intercept  ?  0.185 *** 33.896       
              
Firms' ICG score -  -0.001 *** -5.797       
              
Stock Exch. Disclosure -  -0.023 *** -4.267       
              
Investor Protection ?  0 ** 6.052       
              
Securities Regulations ?  0 *** 2.127       
              
Size  -  -0.016 *** -20.793       
              
Leverage  +  0.036 *** 10.008       
              
ROA  -  -0.147 *** -20.88       
              
Log of Book-to-Market ratio +  0.016 *** 14.356       
              
Year Dummies    Included         
              
Industry Dummies   Included         
              
N       7294            
R Square    22%         
ANOVA (F-test)    76.435 ***        
Durbin-Watson    1.891         
Tolerance for each variable   more than 0.1         
VIF for each variable   less than 10         
Mean of residual   0         
Mean of standard predicted residual  0         
Mean of standard residual   0         
                     
*** = 1% p-value significant and ** =5% p-value significance       
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Table 10.4 Panel B: Comparing the Cost of Equity for Mandatory IFRS Adoption and the Effect of Exchange Disclosure in 
Four Different Legal Origins 
When exchange disclosure is shown as the significant factor (Panel A), I test how firms’ CBF and ICG interact in four different 
legal origins that lead to the association with the COE.   
                  
Model 1:GO                  
Cost of equity = β0 + β1 (PMAdopters*HighCBF) + β2(PMAdopters*HighCBF*GO) + β3 (PMAdopters*ExchangeDisclosure) 
+β4(PMAdopters*ExchangeDisclosure*GO) + β5(Size) + β6 (Leverage) + β7(ROA) + β8(Log of Book-to-Market) + Year Dummies + Industry Dummies 
+ Errors 
 
Model 2: BO                  
Cost of equity = β0 + β1 (PMAdopters*HighCBF) + β2(PMAdopters*HighCBF*BO) + β3 (PMAdopters*ExchangeDisclosure) 
+β4(PMAdopters*ExchangeDisclosure*BO) + β5(Size) + β6 (Leverage) + β7(ROA) + β8(Log of Book-to-Market) + Year Dummies + Industry Dummies 
+ Errors 
 
Model 3: SO                  
Cost of equity = β0 + β1 (PMAdopters*HighCBF) + β2(PMAdopters*HighCBF*SO) + β3 (PMAdopters*ExchangeDisclosure) 
+β4(PMAdopters*ExchangeDisclosure*SO) + β5(Size) + β6 (Leverage) + β7(ROA) + β8(Log of Book-to-Market) + Year Dummies + Industry Dummies 
+ Errors 
 
Model 4: FO                  
Cost of equity = β0 + β1 (PMAdopters*HighCBF) + β2(PMAdopters*HighCBF*FO) + β3 (PMAdopters*ExchangeDisclosure) 
+β4(PMAdopters*ExchangeDisclosure*FO) + β5(Size) + β6 (Leverage) + β7(ROA) + β8(Log of Book-to-Market) + Year Dummies + Industry Dummies 
+ Errors 
 
     
Model 1: 
GO    
Model 
2:BO    
Model 
3:SO   
Model 
4: FO  
Variables   
Predicted 
Sign   Coefficient   t-value   Coefficient   t-value    Coefficient   t-value  Coefficient   t-value 
Intercept  ?  0.182 *** 41.401  0.173 *** 46.793  0.174 *** 47.6 0.175 *** 47.311 
                    
PMAdopters*HighCBF ?  0  -0.195  0.003  1.163  -0.004 ** -1.954 0.004  1.772 
                    
PMAdopters*HighCBF*LegalOrigin -  -0.015 ** -2.265  -0.006 ** -2.358  0.007  1.842 -0.009 *** -3.437 
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PMAdopters*ExchangeDisclosure +  -0.03 *** -7.934  -0.045 *** 2.688  -0.018 *** -7.407 -0.021 *** -8.15 
                    
PMAdopters*ExchangeDisclosure                  
*LegalOrigin  ?  -0.027  -1.782  -0.007 ** -2.561  0.036 *** 5.988 0  0.142 
                    
Size  -  -0.016 *** -16.254  -0.016 *** -17.316  -0.017 *** -18.571 -0.015 *** -16.545 
                    
Leverage  +  0.032 *** 8.566  0.032 *** 8.647  0.04 *** 10.725 0.033 *** 8.872 
                    
ROA  -  -0.145 *** -20.051  -0.147 *** -20.381  -0.145 *** -20.381 -0.148 *** -20.54 
                    
Log of Book-to-Market +  0.015 *** 12.318  0.015 *** 12.632  0.016 *** 13.683 0.016 *** 12.932 
                    
Year Dummies    Included    Included    Included   Included    
                    
Industry Dummies   Included    Included    Included   Included    
                    
N       7294       7294       7294     7294     
R Square    22%    22%    23%   22%    
ANOVA (F-test)    72.736 ***   73.463 ***   80.468   73.007 ***   
Durbin-Watson    1.877    1.879    1.913   1.876    
Tolerance for each variable   
more than 
0.1    
more than 
0.1    
more than 
0.1   
more than 
0.1    
VIF for each variable   
less than 
10    less than 10    less than 10   
less than 
10    
Mean of residual   0    0    0   0    
Mean of standard predicted residual  0    0    0   0    
Mean of standard residual   0    0    0   0    
                                    
*** = 1% p-value significant and ** =5% p-value significance            
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Chapter 11 - Conclusions  
The purpose of this research study was to revisit, extend, validate and expand prior 
studies about the importance of reporting incentives in mandatory IFRS adoption. To 
incorporate the concepts of reporting incentives, the model of accounting harmonization 
(Rahman et al. 2002) is expanded into the four sequential components, namely, 
influences, process, output and outcome (IPOO). It is conjectured that in mandatory 
IFRS adoption, “Influences” will impact managers’ reporting incentives, which will 
subsequently determine the quality of “Output” from IFRS adoption. Presented with 
high quality financial reports, the capital market incorporates this new information 
which may then be associated with positive economic “Outcomes”, such as a reduced 
cost of equity (COE) Following the approach used by earlier studies, the empirical 
analysis tests whether the reporting incentives in the IPOO influence firms’ COE. The 
effect on firms’ COE arises because when more transparent financial information is 
produced by strong reporting incentives, the risk from information asymmetry between 
managers and investors is lessened. As a result, equity investors are willing to lower 
their required rate of return. 
 
Prior studies argue that financial reporting practice under a given set of standards is 
sensitive to the incentives of the managers responsible for financial statement 
preparation (Ball et al. 2003). Most of the early studies understand the limitation from 
just examining voluntary IFRS adoption with limited data availability in the transition 
period and recognize the need for measuring more meaningful results in post-IFRS 
studies (Schipper, 2005, Nobes 2005). For mandatory IFRS adoption, however, the 
majority of the literature only focuses on a particular, hence not comprehensive, aspect 
of reporting incentives. A key aspect of this study is that it explores the importance of 
reporting incentives in both the firm and country-specific elements of the IPOO model 
and determines whether there is an observable and statistically significant effect on 
firm’s COE from mandatory IFRS adoption. Such mandated adoption of new 
accounting standards allows the present study to examine financial reports prepared 
under identical, high-quality standards by firms domiciled in EU countries that have 
different cultural, social, regulatory and firm-specific incentives. 
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Following the rationale of the literature, it may not be empirically conclusive to link 
financial reporting quality directly to the cost of equity (Gassen and Sellhorn, 2006). 
This research study measures significant change in the COE as the subsequent effects 
(i.e. Outcome), following the mandatory IFRS adoption from the strong reporting 
incentives (i.e. Influence) in the IPOO model. Controlling for potential multicollinearity 
and endogeneity issues and using more data that is now available and better 
measurement metrics for estimating the ex-ante cost of equity, evidence is found that, 
on average, the cost of equity (COE) for mandatory IFRS adopters is 1.1% lower than 
that of voluntary adopting firms. It suggests that mandatory adopters are different from 
their voluntary counterparts in respect to the substantial reduction of their COE. This 
initial result has two implications. First, while the literature documents evidence that 
voluntary IFRS adopters experience a lower COE, this may be valid for the voluntary 
period. Second, when IFRS is mandated as it is for the EU from January 1, 2005, for 
such firms looking at the EU as a whole accounting quality has improved. This is so, 
since mandatory IFRS adoption requires more and better disclosures than most local 
GAAP. According, more and better disclosures are associated with a reduced COE 
(Botosan 1997; Easley and O’ Hara 2004; Barth et al. 2007). 
 
Also, with more data available in this study, the empirical tests show that the COE has 
not been reduced significantly between the pre and post mandatory period and which is 
contrary to the recent prior studies (e.g. Li, 2010). This finding arises even though the 
data is extracted from the same database as Li’s study (i.e. ComputStat). The reason is 
this study uses more extensive data following the mandatory adoption, and a better 
proxy for firms’ COE (i.e. PEG model) to prove that the reduced COE recorded in prior 
studies is mainly attributable to the transition period. Moreover, this result is also 
consistent with the literature that when all firms are required to implement IFRS, the 
accompanying positive effects from bonding and network will no longer apply to firms’ 
signaling their commitment to transparency to the capital markets (Coffee, 2002). Also, 
the potential benefits from signaling theory (Spence 1973) for countries willing to adopt 
IFRS voluntarily are no longer available in a mandatory IFRS adoption environment.  
 
In order to apply the comprehensive proxies of reporting incentives in mandatory IFRS 
adoption, tests on both firm-specific and country-specific variables in the change of 
COE have been conducted. First, it is evident that, in general, for mandatory IFRS 
adopters their core business factors (CBF) are significantly related to a reduction in their 
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COE. In addition, the interaction between strong CBF and internal corporate 
governance (ICG) mechanisms has a negative coefficient that is related to an additional 
lower COE effect for mandatory IFRS adopters. The literature on prior studies on 
voluntary adoption provides evidence to highlight that certain firm-specific 
characteristics are the important reporting incentives. The documented empirical results 
presented in this thesis show support for the hypotheses that systematic firm-specific 
CBF and ICG are equally important to motivate firms to adopt IFRS, and lead to a 
lower COE, even in a mandatory setting.  
 
Second, when IEF is proxied by legal origins is controlled for in the models, differential 
COE effects are evidently related to the diverse legal, economic, cultural and national 
backgrounds in the EU. For German-origin (GO), British-origin (BO) and French-origin 
(FO) settings, there are statistically significant coefficients between the legal origins and 
lowering of the COE for mandatory firms. For Scandinavian-origin (SO) firms, 
however, there is no negative COE effect in mandatory IFRS adoption. Furthermore, 
this study follows recent studies to proxy IEF by the 4 sectors representing different 
focuses from the comprehensive measurement of institutions’ bureaucratic and 
administrative formalities. The results are consistent with the hypotheses that Sector A, 
which emphasizes institution’s legal and enforcement, interacts with mandatory IFRS 
adoption and results in a significantly lower COE. Sectors B and Cs’ fixed-effect and 
interaction between each sector and mandatory IFRS adoption also link with a 
significant lower COE effect from the established institution of capital market. 
However, for Sector D, which focuses more on labor market and social relations, 
respect for labor laws and circulation of workers, it is possible that firms’ reporting 
incentive for high quality of financial information to equity investment is not promoted 
and emphasized.  As a result, mandatory IFRS adoption in Sector D does not interact to 
produce a lowered COE.  
 
To test the combined effects of the proxies for reporting incentives in mandatory IFRS 
adoption, an interaction variable between firms’ strong CBF and ICG in different legal 
origins is included to measure any change in the COE. As a result, German (GO) firms 
interact with strong CBF and this becomes a very significant coefficient to such reduce 
firms’ COE. For French origin (FO), firms’ strong CBF is measured as the most 
profound motivator to reduce their COE following mandatory IFRS adoption. For 
British (BO) firms, ICG is a significant coefficient, implying that when British origin 
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has local accounting standards compatible with IFRS, equity investors are concerned 
more about how the firms are governed in mandatory IFRS adoption. For Scandinavian 
origin (SO), however, the only significantly lower COE effect is associated with firms 
with higher profits. Also, there are insignificant results for larger sized firms with more 
analysts followed. It suggests that in mandatory IFRS adoption, Scandinavian firms may 
need to take a longer time to evolve from their heavy social market-based to a capital 
market-based economy; and subsequently benefit from a lower COE post IFRS 
adoption. Thus, the overall research results are consistent with the interaction effects 
from within and between firm-specific core business factors, internal corporate 
governance mechanism and country-differences in institutional factors on the cost of 
equity.  
 
Finally, where specific IEF’s have been examined by prior related studies, this study 
performs additional analysis to test what specific institutional factor(s) may be 
significantly linked to a lower COE.  In those cases where the findings show that only 
stock exchange disclosure requirements present a highly significant coefficient, this 
study further tests how exchange disclosure interacts with strong CBF in the different 
legal origins. This indicates that there are complementary effects for those German and 
British (GO and BO) firms which have a strong CBF and exchange disclosure which 
acts to further reduce their COE. On the other hand, for French firms (FO) there is no 
effect. However, Scandinavian (SO) firms show a positive coefficient on their cost of 
equity when linked with stock exchange disclosure.  
 
Overall, this study contributes to the literature by revisiting, validating and challenging 
the results of prior studies. In particular it examines if the COE is lower by mandatory 
IFRS adoption by testing for an extended the post-mandatory adoption period. More 
importantly, this research studies and explores the importance of reporting incentives in 
adopting new accounting standards that associate with a reduction in firms’ COE. 
Therefore, the empirical results can be interpreted as follows: while this study 
documents a reduced COE effect for the overall mandatory IFRS adoption sample of 
firms, the reduction would appear to be mainly attributable to a subset of adopters 
which have strong reporting incentives.  
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In particular, these comprehensive proxies of reporting incentives include firm-specific 
strong core business factors and board of directors’ internal corporate governance, as 
well as country-level institutional environment factors. This study shows that 
“Influences” in the IPOO model behave and interact in different ways to shape firms’ 
reporting incentives and this, in turn, leads to differences in the effects on firms’ COE. 
An important finding of this research is that the empirical results support the incentives-
view that if firms are influenced by particular internal and external characteristics to 
have strong reporting incentives in mandatory IFRS adoption, firms will commit in full 
compliance. Accordingly, under the incentives-view, information asymmetry between 
investors and managers should be improved. However not every firm will have strong 
incentives even under mandatory IFRS. Without this firm-specific motivation to 
augment reporting incentives, mandatory IFRS adoption does not necessarily produce a 
higher quality of financial information which then translates to a substantial and 
significant lower COE. 
 
In addition, the test results using ICG in the analysis supports the view that firms’ 
internal corporate governance systems are important in order to provide sufficient 
control to ensure managers’ commitment in mandatory IFRS adoption. Such 
mechanisms aim to protect shareholders’ interests and the result is that capital markets 
will reward such firms by demanding a lower COE from these. However, not every 
company’s board of directors is willing and able to establish internal corporate 
governance mechanisms that achieve this outcome. As a result, differential levels of 
governance may not lead to high levels of reporting incentives for managers when 
adopting IFRS.   
 
Finally, country-specific institutional factors are different in the various regions of the 
EU. Empirical test results show that differences in cultural and business practices may 
exert an influence to managers’ reporting incentives. This research study may help in 
our understanding of how important certain institutional environments such as cultural 
differences, regulations and enforcement policies are in order to influence firms’ 
reporting incentives and which in turn may lead to or sustain a full compliance of 
mandatory IFRS adoption. Even though the EU has adopted a common set of 
accounting standards, there are highly diverse institutional settings within different 
European countries that may shape reporting incentives. The empirical findings 
presented here indicate that these differences shape reporting incentives and hence lead 
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to differences in firms’ COE. Specifically, strong core business factors in Germany 
(GO) are highly significant in mandatory IFRS adoption and relate to such firms’ COE. 
However, for some jurisdictions which already have high quality of accounting 
standards and established capital market structure, like British firms (BO), then a high 
level of internal corporate governance (ICG) becomes a more primary driver in relation 
to a lower COE. French (FO) firms, on the other hand, exhibit modest but statistically 
significant negative COE effects in both CBF and ICG. These test different results 
provide support for the IPOO model where reporting incentives for mandatory IFRS 
adoption are influenced by individual firm and country-specific factors that result in 
substantial variations in firms’ cost of equity effects.  
 
However, there are a number of caveats to these results that could be improved for 
further research. First, it only focuses on the cost of equity reduction as the proxy for 
capital market benefit because it is believed that this is an important outcome that 
directly impacts the returns of firms’ investments. In addition, cost of equity is an 
indicator of the reduction of information asymmetry that occurs when high quality 
financial reports are communicated from managers to investors through IFRS adoption. 
However, prior studies also propose other measures for the information asymmetry 
component, such as a significant reduction in the bid-ask spread (Platikanova and 
Nobes, 2006), concentration of insider holdings (Chiang and Venkatesh, 1988), or 
residual volatility in a firm’s stock returns (Krishnaswami et al., 1999). Hence, future 
research studies may need to test on these and other measures which may provide a 
more comprehensive proxy for the reduction in information asymmetry that is one of 
desired outcomes of mandatory IFRS adoption. As the findings presented here for 
Scandinavian-origin (SO) firms do not support the reduction in the cost of equity that is 
the case for firms elsewhere, there may be other possible outcomes for Scandinavian 
firms after the mandatory IFRS adoption that need to be examined. 
 
Second, measures of the ex-ante cost of equity heavily depend on analysts’ consensus 
forecasts, which may be biased and are possibly subject to forecast errors. Third, using 
the Deminor credit ratings to proxy for the extent of internal corporate governance 
provides a comprehensive and all all-inclusive variable, these credit ratings may be 
biased towards large sized firms listed on stock markets. It is possible that certain 
specific corporate governance metrics measuring different firm-specific characteristics, 
such as capital structures, industries and legal origins, may provide different results. 
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Finally, even though the sample data in this study captures a relatively longer period of 
post-mandatory period than most prior studies, it is believed that test results may be 
more insightful if they analyze an even longer time period post the adoption period in 
order to measure the long-run sustainable effects from mandatory IFRS adoption.  
 
Because of the data availability the samples are drawn from European countries. When 
other countries, such as Australia, Japan and Canada, have gradually adopted IFRS as 
their local standards, there will be more data available to examine the relationship 
between mandatory IFRS adoption and other possible capital market outcomes. A wider 
range of countries with their own IPOO factors will improve the ability to undertake the 
tests carried out in this thesis and should provide more robust coefficients of the effects 
identified here. 
 
Elaboration of the managerial and policy implications of the study’s findings 
The empirical findings of this study highlight that, even though the intended aim of 
making IFRS mandatory in the countries used for this study is to enhance accounting 
disclosures, without the proper incentives, it is unlikely that it will achieve this 
objective. What the study finds is that country, institutional, and firm-specific influences 
affect the quality of the disclosures under mandatory IFRS reporting. That is to say, 
those managers who are not incentivised to embed within their firms the new disclosure 
requirements required under IFRS will make cosmetic adjustments to their general 
purpose financial statements that conform to the requirements but fail to provide the 
necessary new additional disclosures in a meaningful way. To benefit from IFRS, firms 
need to have what is described in the research as strong reporting incentives. As argued 
in the study, at the firm level, manager stewardship functions would be required to 
promote firms’ profitability, expansion, and growth opportunities. In doing so, 
managers then align the firm-specific characteristics with the genuine requirements of 
IFRS adoption through greater and better disclosure. Without such internal drivers, it is 
unlikely managers will do more than cosmetically commit to mandatory IFRS adoption.  
 
In addition to managers’ efforts, there are fiduciary duties that the board of directors 
have to fulfill in protecting shareholders’ interests. Consequently, the board of directors’ 
effective internal corporate governance mechanisms are vital to ensure IFRS is adopted 
with on-going firm-wide full commitment. Clearly, the implication of this is that in 
order to benefit fully from the additional disclosure and transparency that comes from 
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IFRS, firms that have less effective boards of directors need to improve their internal 
governance mechanisms. The implication for regulators is that improving corporate 
governance has a significant payoff in reducing information asymmetry between firms 
and the capital market. The research indicated that this translated into a significant 
reduction in firms’ cost of equity of 1 percent (Table 9.3, Model 2). 
 
Moreover, the macro-level institutional support through disclosure regulations, business 
practices and culture in promoting IFRS adoption is also found to be a significant factor. 
This study highlights that such country-specific institutional environment factors are 
supportive for firms mandatory adoption of IFRS, and are associated with a significant 
reduction in firms’ cost of equity. In highlighting the importance of legal origins, 
disclosure enforcements, and capital market development as having a positive role in 
leading to a lower COE through mandatory IFRS adoption, this study provides some 
guidance to regulators and politicians as to how to foster more effective disclosure. It 
makes sense therefore for policy makers to enhance efforts within the EU, for instance, 
to harmonise country regulations. But equally, it applies at the global level where 
adopting a clear legally enforceable disclosure and contractual environment would help 
to improve the effectiveness of IFRS. Therefore, this study therefore argues the relative 
importance of legal origins, disclosure enforcements, and capital market development 
that regulators and politicians should foster as supporting functions for IFRS adoption.  
 
According to the IPOO model, when ‘Influences’ are strengthened by strong reporting 
incentives at the firm and country levels, the ‘Process’ will be a significant or 
substantive-type of adoption (Daske, et al., 2008).  Such motivated adoption of IFRS 
will in turn feed into the ‘Output’ as high quality of financial statements that disclose 
greater and more useful information. As a result, the information asymmetry between 
the managers and investors is reduced. As a consequence, the desirable ‘Outcome’ 
through the positive capital market benefits of better information of a reduction in terms 
of firms’ cost of equity.  The research is therefore generally supportive of regulators 
efforts to get firms to adopt IFRS in a meaningful way. 
 
Clearly the best outcome from a disclosure perspective is when both the internal, firm-
specific factors and the country and institutional factors work in tandem. One wider 
policy implication therefore is that when crafting regulations, the interaction of the 
above factors should be considered. 
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Amplification of the scope for future research 
Using a set of better proxies and more data than has been available to prior research, the 
findings of this study highlight the relative importance of reporting incentives in 
mandatory IFRS adoption. However, while the present study does examine this within 
the IPOO model, the fundamental role of internal corporate governance in monitoring 
and regulating managers to ensure they have strong reporting incentives should be 
examined in more detail than was possible in the present research.  
Consequentially, one possible future area for research is to examine the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and reporting incentives in mandatory IFRS 
adoption using better indicators of corporate governance effectiveness. In the growing 
global acceptance of mandatory IFRS adoption, more (since IFRS favours the needs of 
shareholders), the availability and desirability of equity-based financing practices may 
be enhanced. This applies especially in the international context for, when more equity 
investments occur across borders, countries which previously relied on debt or bank-
financing are able to switch to a more equity-based source of funds. As a consequence, 
the corporate governance issues from the separation of control and ownership raised by 
widely spread equity investors may become more prominent. Given inadequate 
corporate governance, managers who control the business may be able to deviate from 
the objective of maximising shareholders’ wealth towards promoting personal benefits 
to the detriment of shareholders. To address this, much better and rigorous corporate 
governance systems for both internally and externally-based mechanisms are needed. 
On one hand, there are uncoordinated and disparate developments in corporate 
governance systems among companies and countries. On the other hand, there have 
been improvements in corporate governance codes and systems in the EU since 
mandatory IFRS adoption. Therefore, this study attempts to examine if the benefits from 
corporate governance in mandatory IFRS adoption are unevenly distributed.  
In addition, besides the core business factors and internal corporate governance, it will 
be interesting to study if there are additional significant factors that influence managers’ 
incentives in mandatory IFRS adoption. For instance, stronger reporting incentives may 
be associated with managers’ personal traits as intrinsic motivation from ethical, 
religious, and moral standards that may regulate their behavior that leads to a high level 
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of stewardship when adopting IFRS. Other possible factors such as corporate culture, 
the extent of social responsibilities and environmental awareness may be also 
reinforcing managers’ incentives in pursuing the genuine adoption of transparency, even 
if this is being mandated by accounting regulations. However, such opportunities may 
involve a normative approach, rather than the positivist paradigm commonly used in 
accounting research.   
The extant literature always proxies accounting quality by the level of earnings 
management practice and examines if it is improved following the IFRS adoption. If 
IFRS demands more transparent accounting information and disclosures from the 
business, then it is reasonable to expect that IFRS may be associated with more volatile 
reported earnings. An increase in the volatility of reported is an indicator of lower 
earnings management. Meanwhile, in view of the unwanted volatility in reported 
earnings, management and/or shareholders may be tempted to undertake income-
smoothing in order to signal a progressive growth in the business. This is particularly 
likely to take place when management has to meet both internal and external targets 
(e.g. EPS) in order to satisfy analyst forecasts and to keep the share price high. Thus, 
earnings management techniques and practices may become more commonly applied, 
even in an IFRS setting. However, the empirical results of the literature are still 
inconclusive as to whether IFRS adoption brings along reductions in earnings 
management between the pre- and post-adoption periods. One reason is that it is 
possible that prior studies did not adequately control for other important factors such as 
the effectiveness of corporate governance. Also, it is rare in the literature to discuss the 
genuine relationship between earnings management practices and reduction in the cost 
of equity in mandatory IFRS adoption. 
 
Moreover, this study recognizes the relative dominance of UK firms in the total 
mandatory IFRS adoption sample. Given that the UK has the most publicly-listed 
companies within the EU and hence they make up a significant sub-sample of firms that 
have mandatorily adopted IFRS, it may be interesting to compare UK companies with 
firms in other countries in Asia or North America where both have mandatorily adopted 
IFRS and where there are identical or different institutional settings. Given what the 
present research suggests, it would be useful to confirm whether when firms in different 
countries have adopted mandatorily IFRS but with different proxies of reporting 
incentives, the related capital market benefits will be unevenly distributed. 
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Finally, there may be certain industries/sectors in the EU that have been receiving more 
capital market benefits (such as greater reduction of the cost of equity) than others. 
There could be some particular internal and external factors and settings that are 
associated with such industries and sectors. Exploring and identifying these factors has 
public policy implications, since may indicate the best regulatory direction for other 
jurisdictions to mimic and practice.  
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